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OCCUPATIONS, A DIASPORA, AND THE DESIGN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE

WASIM AL-HABIL

ABSTRACT

The forces that shape administrative structures include the goals and objectives of
minority and majority groups, modern management principles, and a legacy or history in
which domestic political factions have gradually accepted rules and roles for mutual
tolerance and inclusion. However, this process can be muted or redefined in societies
where centuries of occupation and dispersion “short-circuit” maturation processes and
introduce non-indigenous systems externally imposed without any level of popular
acceptance or active citizenship participation. In these environments, as new states
emerge, their task of building local government institutions requires a clear understanding
of indigenous systems and institutions. What must also be understood are systems and
institutions resulting from (1) externally imposed systems, (2) ideas from returning
expatriates who seek to implement systems from the countries in which they lived,
learned, and (3) modern management science and accepted principles of civil service.
Unifying and untangling these threads to create administrative structures for internal
governance explains the difficulty emerging new states can face as they seek to
implement stable and modern governments in “contested spaces.”
This theoretical framework or perspective guides this dissertation and its effort to
proscribe appropriate local government institutions for Palestine. Palestine – in the
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modern era – emerges from centuries of externally imposed governance systems used by
the Ottoman Empire, the British government, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. In addition, many
of Palestine’s leaders came to maturity as part of a Diaspora in Western and Islamic
countries. As a result, it will be argued that the usual dichotomy between politics and
administration has never been applicable at any point in Palestine’s recent history.
Administrative systems have never been a product of Palestinian politics but emerged to
serve the interests of foreign governments. The Palestinian people have been subjected to
top-down administrative systems that ignored the voice, needs, and rights of people. Yet,
on the precipice of the establishment of a state, what is needed are recommendations
from this history for a local governance system that embraces modernity, history, and
local culture, and that will be presented in the dissertation’s final chapter.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Local governments assume critical roles in establishing and maintaining the
quality of life for residents of any country. Public safety, education, environmental
protection, recreation, and commerce each require effective delivery-level management
systems even in unitary systems where a national government has primary responsibility
for all public services and for enhancing economic development. In countries with more
decentralized governance systems the responsibilities of local governments can be even
more extensive for insuring a community’s quality of life and the conditions of the
physical and social environment and for local economic development.
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Students of public administration have long-recognized the contributions of local
government systems for social, economic, and environmental stability and the long-term
development of any region or country. For developing or emerging countries, Thomas
“Tip” O’Neill’s advice that “all politics is local” may be more profound than some
realize. The local government and governance systems that emerge in any country are the
product of political maturation processes where rules and conventions emerge to achieve
concurrence and the protection and incorporation of minority perspectives. Where and
when minority perspectives are not effectively included in governing processes the
potential for conflict exists. There is also the possibility that when majority/minority
perspectives are not incorporated into the formation of governing process that the ability
of effective, efficient, and modern administration systems to develop will be
compromised. Attention regarding majority/minority issues is frequently part of the
assessment of national systems. However, if Tip O’Neill is correct attention must also be
directed to understand if local governments and governing systems have evolved to
incorporate minority positions and encourage participation.

The creation and recognition of any country is a function of international treaties,
the resolution of socio-cultural conflicts, and the ensuing recognition of boundaries and
authority. However, if any newly established country is to have a measure of internal
stability and development effective local government systems must exist. It is through the
effective systems of local governments and governance that domestic stresses and
conflicts are resolved through the provision of services and the creation of a social and
physical environment that allows for development. Regardless of the level of
decentralization or centralization in any governance systems, without reliable,
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professional, and trusted local government systems, the needed development for stable
economic and social systems will be less likely to occur.

The need for professionalized local governments in areas where colonial or
occupying powers created geopolitical borders and governance systems to further their
interests is even more severe. In these regions it is likely that social and cultural groups
without common interests were placed in the same geographic space – creating the
potential for “contested” space – and the usual social compacts and contracts between
these groups never evolved or were forged. Instead, colonial and occupying forces
created layers of their own bureaucracy to administer and control an area for their own
benefit and frequently were quite willing to maintain or even advance conflicts or
conflictual positions between domestic factions to facilitate social control. As a result,
colonial systems and those used by occupying military forces were frequently not
designed to focus upon building social contract and compacts among indigenous
populations who may have had a series of historical differences and conflicts. When the
occupying forces leave an area or country the absence of institutionalized systems of
governance among different cultural and ethnic groups can lead to conflicts as each side
seeks to maximize its political control.

There are few examples of societies forged from the absence of colonial
occupying forces that have avoided civil strife when occupying cultures or nations left a
country. Ireland and India offer 20th century examples where severe civil wars or civil
conflict followed independence (or separation as in India’s case), but even the United
States where leaders tried for decades to avoid internal conflict was the site for one of
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history’s most destructive domestic wars within its first century as an independent state.
Further in the early years of the American republic there were several violent civil
skirmishes and threats for secession from the new republic. Today’s events would direct
attention to Iraq and Palestine where groups vie for control in the absence of the building
of social institutions at the local level to mediate the conflict between groups by external
governments and military forces. A longer view of recent history would focus on the
Balkans where civil strife required the presence of external troops but there is still the
threat of conflict with only Croatia and Slovenia having achieved a level of internal
stability that has fostered a decade of increasing social and economic development.

Palestine will be among the next nation states to emerge while in the throes of
frequent civilian and military occupation and conflicts between Palestinian political
factions. Unlike many other areas such as the Balkans and the Baltic States, Palestine has
no independent history and as a result its local government institutions are an
amalgamation produced by hundreds of years of successive domination and occupation
by the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain (the British Mandate years), Egypt and Jordan, and
Israel. Its geographic boundaries were created and recreated by external forces and
powers whose interests seldom included understanding the differences in local cultures
and indigenous preferences regarding unification, union, or association with other local
groups and cultures. Indeed the lack of agreed to or recognized borders lies at the heart of
the conflict with Israel in which both sides to the conflict seek to impose alternative
boundary sets on the other given their self-interests and their prejudicial views of what
was intended at different points in history
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The particular stress points for Palestine include divisions within the Islamic faith,
potential differences with Palestinians who are Christians, and conflicts with the other
minority groups within the areas usually identified as “Palestinian.” These other minority
groups include, but are not limited to, other ethnic and cultural groups including the
Bedouin, Islamists and secularists, conservatives and liberals. Local government
institutions if they are to establish a framework to avoid domestic conflict and create
social institutions that sustain development must benefit from past experiences and be
rooted in the social and political preferences of local constituents.

The object of this dissertation is to propose a set of local government and
governance structures for the Palestinian leadership to consider, evaluate, and implement
in efforts to professionalize and modernize local public administration and governance
systems. The means to this end involve several distinct tasks. First, the work is rooted in
the classical literature of administration and governance that has guided the development
of systems of local government and the administrative system in emerging nations. From
such classical works as John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations
on Representative Government, (1972), Woodrow Wilson’s The Study of Public
Administration (1887), Frank Goodnow’s Politics and Administration (1900), Fesler’s
Area and Administration, Dwight Waldo’s The Administrative State (1948), and
Ostrom’s Theory of a Compound Republic (1961). Careful consideration is also directed
towards the issues of changing from clan-based patronage systems – a prominent
characteristic of Palestinian society, to meritocracies. The reasons for the rise and
longevity of clan-based systems is discussed and a theoretical framework is presented to
frame the discussion of creating local government systems designed to be inclusive and
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professional while encouraging the evolution from familial-based systems to ones that
can include in areas with competing social and cultural groups.

This theoretical overview is followed by an assessment of the impact of each of
the occupying powers on the structure and institution of local government systems
beginning with the Ottoman Empire and then continuing through the British mandate, the
period of conjoint Egyptian/Jordanian Administration of the two parts of Palestine
separated by Israel, the Israeli military occupation of both Gaza and the West Bank.

Third, a detailed history of the development of local governance will be assessed
since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994. This part of
the history presents an analysis of how the new local governance system deals with
political factions’ and the effects of Palestine’s diaspora on the evolution of new local
government systems. When the PNA was created several leaders returned from long
periods of exile in other Middle and Western states. They brought with them ideas and
influences, and these two were then grafted into the structures that had devolved under
occupation. The continued Israeli occupation has thwarted the evolution of new systems
and that too is considered.

Fourth, the results of a survey of Palestinian leaders in the public, private, and
nonprofit sectors are presented to understand the realities of the current local governance
under the PNA. This local history will help frame the recommendations based on theory
and practice and insure that what is proposed is rooted in what has developed and can be
strengthened, while also illustrating what changes are required and what structures may
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need to be completed altered. The final section of the dissertation presents a set of
recommended local government structures.

The framework guiding this work posits that politics is a reflection of the socio
political characteristics of any community. Palestinian society was deprived from
exercising its socio political characteristics throughout frequent occupations. Many public
administration theorists, including Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and W. F.
Willoughby have argued that is difficult to separate politics from administration. Others,
including Dwight Waldo, Paul Appleby, and Robert Dahl, argue that administration is
politics. Therefore, the Palestinians are still exercising administration and governance
that is not generated from the Palestinian socio political characteristics emerging from
public participation. In other words, Palestine has not been able to establish local
governments with indigenous roots. This is the biggest challenge facing the reform of the
local governance and bureaucracy in the coming Palestinian State.

1.1 Problem Statement

The Oslo Accord or Agreement was signed between the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Israel on May 4, 1994 and led to the creation of and recognition
by the international community of the PNA. This was the first indigenous Palestinian
government in the modern era and perhaps the first in more than 500 years. On May 20th,
1994, President Yasser Arafat issued presidential decree No. 1 stating the laws,
regulations and orders that were applied before June 5th, 1967, would continue to be valid
in the West Bank and Gaza until they were modified, cancelled or unified by the PNA.
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The PNA inherited municipalities and local councils that suffered from severe
obstacles and difficulties resulting from frequent military and civil occupying powers that
tried to shape the local governance system to serve their external political agendas rather
than indigenous issues related to economic and social development. For example, Israel
did not establish during the period of its occupation any kind of infrastructure or system
to assist in the transformation of local leaders into individuals who could be political
leaders in negotiations to change the role of the PLO inside the Gaza Strip and West
Bank from a revolutionary to a governing force. (This is discussed in detail in chapter
four.) The occupation also made the Palestinian economy virtually dependent on Israel.
Both parts of Palestine drew their supplies of energy and currency from Israel. The
Palestinian municipalities and the other forms of local governance were subjected to a
strong central authority and dominance by the Israeli military forces which controlled the
process of decision making, appointing mayors and city councils, and cancelled the entity
of local council members by confiscating their roles and duties in the Palestinian
community. Indeed, as the Israeli army was the primary ruling authority the role of
civilian-based institutions in governance and governments was neither developed nor
emphasized. Civil laws and procedures were subject to military rules and laws subverting
the ability of Palestinian entrepreneurs to enjoy the benefits accorded Arab and Israeli
investors in Israel (to say nothing of the rights of entrepreneurs in Jordan or Egypt).

Intrusion into the local maturation processes was not limited to occupying
military forces and their governance systems. After the establishment of the PNA,
Palestinian citizens expected indigenous leadership would unify laws, regulations, and
rules and implement a healthy local governance system. However, the PNA imposed
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another form of centralized control through the creation of a strong central government
that dominated and controlled local governance and governments. Many of those put into
leadership positions had spent numerous years abroad and so they brought with them the
beliefs and values that may have been formed in other countries (Jarbawi, 1996). In many
instances this lead to a virtual absence of democracy at the local level combined with a
lack of funding, transparency and professionalism. In this environment it was not
surprising to find high levels of corruption combined with an inability to collect revenues
and taxes especially after Second Intifada and the deterioration of the economic situation
(World Bank, 2007). The Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) proposed several
reform plans including the appointment of municipal judges, organizing the relations with
donors, and organizing the financial policies and urban planning to serve citizens but
little things were achieved because of the interference of politics (World Bank, 2007).

There are then two levels of politics that negatively influenced the development of
local governance. Israeli politics is articulated through its occupation of the West Bank
(and its on-going control of economic and social space affecting Gaza) leaving
Palestinians without any ability to maintain and deliver the essential functions of local
governance including urban planning, constructions and other similar important duties.
Political events in Israel dictate the level of restrictions and control exercised by the
Israeli military (Drori, 1975). In addition, some political factions in Gaza have been more
interested in military and paramilitary actions against Israel than in forming stable
governance systems to serve the economic and social needs of residents.
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Domestic Palestinian politics have been defined by the political struggle between
the two largest political factions, Fatah and Hamas, especially after Hamas’s victory in
the 2006 legislative elections. Thus local politics disrupted or changed the development
of the local governance system but given the international community’s intervention to
support Fatah while classifying Hamas as a terrorist organization, Hamas’s contribution
or impact has been muted. This meant that the civilian arm of Hamas and local
governments where Hamas’ representatives secured a majority of the votes has been
ignored and their possible contribution to indigenous systems produced through
negotiations for mutual recognition or recognition of needed changes has not taken place.
Non-domestic politics interfered or controlled the extent to which local political forces
and processes could or would resolve the conflict between two political parties. Here,
again, then, is an example of external forces still controlling the evolution of local
governance systems making Palestine’s case and history unique. What is not unique are
differences between parties; what is unusual is the predominance of international forces
in usurping indigenous evolution to allow local politics to define local institutions and
their maturation. Those citizens living in areas controlled by Hamas have endured
substantial hardships as the international community has supported Fatah and depleted
resources available to local governments and their citizens in Gaza where Hamas has
assumed power.

1.2 Research Questions

(1) How have non-indigenous local government institutions in Palestine interfered
with the political maturation of administrative systems?
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(2) What differences, if any, in changes imposed on Palestine’s institutions are
related to the two periods of civilian-imposed external systems (Ottoman
Empire and Jordanian/Egyptian rule) and the military occupation rules (the
British Mandate period and the Israeli occupation)?
(3) How has the PNA’s politics shaped and formulated local government systems
to serve limited political factions’ interests ignoring the establishment of
indigenous local government institutions?

1.3 Research Hypothesis

Orthodox public administration theories state that politics can be separated from
administration for achieving effectiveness, efficiency, and reform while the new public
administration theorists state that politics cannot be separated completely from
administration because “it is ‘a science with principles of universal validity,’ it operated
on the basis of ‘political theories’” (Stivers, 2000: 124). Reflecting this observation, this
dissertation addresses two specific hypotheses:

(1) Politics have never been separated from administration throughout the history of
the Palestinian local governance, but has been essentially non-indigenous in
character retarding the formation of indigenous institutions and systems.
(2) PNA politics –itself dominated by Diaspora experiences and the constant
interference of the international community – has led to the establishment of local
government institutions serving non-indigenous political interests further
retarding the development of systems based on compacts and compromises
between local parties and groups.
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(3) The political factors have led to an absence of any reform movement capable of
producing indigenous systems.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Local governance in Palestine has been formulated and influenced sharply by the
political agenda and needs of the occupying powers and also the conflicts within
Palestinian society and the politics of the PNA. The role each of these political
dimensions assumed in the shaping of local governance systems often relegated the needs
of the indigenous population to a tertiary position. Moreover, the satisfaction of the needs
of external forces short-circuited the establishment of institutions or mechanisms to
address or ameliorate the normal and naturally occurring conflicts within Palestinian
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Society. As a result not only were needs unmet but a political maturation process never
was never fully engaged. It is therefore hardly surprising that when new governance
institutions were created by the PNA there were suspicions of corruption and a perceived
lack of transparency. To be sure, with no professionally trained administrative class the
expertise needed was in short supply and the resulting systems had substantial and often
insurmountable challenges in meeting the needs of the residents. These shortcomings
negatively influenced the development and performance of local governance systems
(World Bank, 2007).

Noting that there are political issues shaping the administrative structures in the
PNA and that politics in general affects administration is hardly a new perspective.
Scholars in the field of public administration have long debated the politicsadministration dichotomy, especially in the discipline’s early years. Initially many
prominent theorists including Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, Frederick Taylor, and
Luther Urwick, argued that the politics-administration dichotomy was the way to reach
the instrumental rationality of modernity. That modernity could achieve efficiency,
municipal reform, expertise, and professionalism in field of public administration but
only after the resolution of the politics-administration tension. However their debates
were in the context of indigenous systems free from foreign control. There was also little
attention directed to the role of a governing diaspora returned to power after long periods
abroad. Their discussions also did not need to treat this phenomenon in the context of the
United States. Yet that is a pertinent part of the evolution and politics that leads to the
formation of administrative structures for the Palestinian people. Before exploring those
issues, the first part of this chapter reviews the classical literature in public administration
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reflecting upon the politics-administration dichotomy and its resolution for institution
building and the creation of modern structures and systems. That literature is then placed
in the context of the experience of the Palestinian people to identify some of the
limitations that the research performed as part of this dissertation seeks to address.

This should be the lead into the section half emphasizing some of the points
emphasized earlier. The Palestinian people have been subjected to top-down
administrative systems that ignored the voice, needs, and rights of people (Jarbawi,
1996). Since Palestinian local governance has been subjected to centralized system
applied by the previous occupying powers and the current PNA (Jarbawi, 1996), the
second part of the literature review outlines the principles of governmental centralization
and decentralization reflecting the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems.

To learn from the experiences of other peoples it is necessary to review the
context and cases of other developing and developed countries. Therefore, the third part
of the literature review sheds light on the nation-state model in local governance that
integrates citizens, private sector, and non-profit organizations in planning, formulating
and implementing the policies of local governance. While some countries have applied
this model successfully in operating their administrative systems, other countries have
encountered difficulties in implementing this model.

2.2 Politics-Administration Dichotomy

Guy Adams (1994: 26) defined modernity in a way that characterizes the world
by “secularization, the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, the differentiation
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of the various spheres of the life-world, [and] the bureaucratization of economics.”
Through this definition, it is essential to note the universalistic claims of instrumental
rationality that is an important element to define modernity. Instrumental rationality is
portrayed as a technical “way of thinking and living that emphasizes the scientificanalytical mind-set and the belief in technological process” (Adam, 1994: 26).
These ideas are not new ones as they came from the 17th century Enlightenment to
emerge in the United States during the Progressive Era when the field of public
administration (PA) was founded. These ideas have prevailed during the founding period
of PA as an independent field of study during or just before the Progressive Era (Marini
& Pugh, 1983; Adams, 1994). Adams (1994) adds that these ideas are still dominant in
contemporary PA that is studied in universities.

With the strong shape of instrumental rationality, Adams (1994) argued that the
foundation of PA as a field of study has actually led to a particular framework. The level
of scientific methodology that scholars utilize to reach its ends represents this framework.
However, this particular framework created the trajectory of the field of PA that shaped
its evolution and new paradigms.

The politics-administration dichotomy is an example of the influence of the
scientific framework of positivism. However, being outside this framework, other
concepts and theories found themselves in conflict and endless debate with the scientific
approach. The theoretical and practical conflicts in the field can be categorized and
understood based on their logic or on what is well known in PA as the politicsadministration dichotomy. This dichotomy reflects the conflict between the value-driven
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political logic and the neutral scientific logic of handling administration. The
instrumental rationality of modernity presented the concepts of efficiency, effectiveness,
expertise, professionalism, accountability, and democracy and other issues in PA.

In Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 essay “A Study of Administration,” he asks what
government can do and how can it execute its tasks or perform its work with the utmost
efficiency and economy. As a political scientist he posed the right normative questions
but diverted into a discussion of two spheres of government: politics and administration.
Politics is the sphere that makes the choices regarding what government should do based
upon a majority of elected representatives, while the administration carries out the will of
these representatives through efficient procedures, free of political influence. But if the
policy implemented is a product of politics, then, by extension is the administration
inherently political? Public administration, according to Wilson, should be based upon a
science of management. It is worth noting that Wilson was writing at a time of corruption
and scandal within government, a result of a spoils system controlled by partisan
politicians. A need for civil service reform existed that would place government workers
with the skills, knowledge and experience of administration into the public service,
because, “there is no Republican way to build a road.” Mosher (1981) described Wilson’s
idea that if each sphere worked best without the other, functioning in isolation without
interference or meddling from the other side, there would be a clean division between
those responsible for determining policy and those responsible for carrying it out. In
addition to reforms within the personnel system, other reforms could be made to public
organization and management as well as demonstrated by initiatives of the Progressive
era.
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It was Frank Goodnow’s Politics and Administration (1900) that most clearly
articulated the desire to separate politics from administration. Citing the “expression of
the will of the state (politics) and the execution of that will (technical, scientific and
commercial activities)”, Goodnow formalized the politics-administration dichotomy.
Goodnow reacted to the unchallenged power given to political parties, cautioning that
they could upset the popular will if they were unchallenged in their leadership roles.
Parties could also threaten the sovereignty of local government, and escalate inefficiency
within the administrative state. In fact, the circumstances that Goodnow described aptly
apply to the Palestinian administrative setting. For Goodnow, political parties do not
reflect the will of the people, and threaten the separation of powers function established
by the Constitution or the basic laws. While politics was necessary for the establishment
of public policy, administration must be expert and professional in the administration of
its duties. Goodnow placed faith in the efforts of science to improve the functions of
administration.

While Wilson’s essay went unnoticed until the 1940s, efforts at reform did take
place including the founding of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in the early
1900s, implementation of the city-manager form of government, the formation of an
executive budget at the Federal level in 1921, and other efforts at reform within federal,
state and local levels of government. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research used
the scientific approach to consider the functions of public administration and to clean up
the corruption of municipalities (Holden, 1996; Lynn, 1996). According to Stivers (2000:
117), the bureau’s scientific approach was reflected in its motto: “To promote the
application of scientific principles to government”. The major components of the
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bureau’s philosophy emphasized that government is more management than politics and
called for increasing efficiency in public management through scientific inquiry.

Taylor’s “Principles of Scientific Management” (1911) which stated if there is
one best way to accomplish any given task, there can be also one best way to accomplish
a task of social organization was quite popular in the government reform movement.
Efforts to determine “one best way” became the mantra of attempts to focus on a “science
of administration.” This effort is illustrated through the public administration texts
authored by White and Willoughby, the work of the Taft Commission in creating an
executive budget “that is value free, unpolitical decision-making” (Caiden, 1971), and
Gulick and Urwick’s (1937) Papers on the Science of Administration. These latter
authors noted that “Politics in any bad sense ought not to intrude upon administration
and in any case is pernicious if it invades the management process proper; that
administration lends itself to scientific study, that out of scientific study of administration
would emerge principles that are useful guides to the conduct of administration.”

The focus on a science of administration that supports the politics-administration
dichotomy is supported by Fayol’s 14 General Principles of Management (1916) and
Barnard’s The Functions of Executives (1938). In both works discussions of theories of
management, such as unity of command, span of control, specialization and division of
labor. The emphasis was on science to improve the delivery of public service to the
exclusion of a discussion of values of what to provide, not just how to provide.

However, the politics-administration dichotomy started to lose cachet during the
1930s and 1940s, as governments increased in size as a response to programs developed
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to respond to the Great Depression and World War II. Two leading public administration
theorists debunked the politics-administration dichotomy. Herbert Simon (1946) with his
“Proverbs of Administration” satirized the tenets used by Gulick and Urwick and
criticized and ridiculed their use of science. Simon brought a new dichotomy to the
discussion, one of facts and values. Dwight Waldo opposed Simon, in his book entitled
“The Administrative State” (1948), stating that through 60 years of PA in America there
has been no progress in the name of democracy and service to the public. Furthermore, he
argues that PA could never be a value neutral science, because even if all neutral facts
were at hand the remaining question would be which line of action to take and that
decision is a completely political one. This debate between Dwight Waldo and Herbert
Simon marked the end of the orthodox era and replaced the politics-administration
dichotomy with the logical division between value laden and value neutral.

This division manifested itself in the split between the school of thought which
still considered public administration as a science, for example Simon, and the school of
thought that saw public administration as imbued with values and inherently political, for
example Waldo and the Blacksburg school. Whereas the former stream of thought
developed in the areas of policy science and organizational systems, the later set out to
construct a democratic theory of public administration. These efforts resulted in the 1968
Middlebrook Conference and the Blacksburg Manifesto, which laid the foundation for the
inquiry of themes such as participatory democracy, citizenship, equity, and ultimately
New Public Administration which do not exist in the Palestinian context. The former, PA
as science, stream of thought carried Wilson’s goal for ‘businessification’ and efficiency
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through various reform movements of which each had the goal to make the
administration of government more efficient and more businesslike.

Administrators should make decisions based on facts, discovered through the
logical-positivist view of knowledge. Waldo (1948) in the Administrative State questions
whether training in the mechanics of administration and professional ethics is enough for
running government affairs, calling for political theory and philosophy to support the
field of administration.

Additional public administration scholars who discuss the dichotomy include
Rohr (2001) who saw the demise of the dichotomy in the Brownlow Commission
recommendations that brought politics into the White House with the movement of the
Bureau of the Budget into the President’s office. Appleby shatters the myth by stating
that political activity acts as a check on the arbitrary exercise of bureaucratic power. He
argues “Government is different because government is politics” (Shafritz et al., 2004:
135). The research argues that government draws its politics and policies and implements
them through the administrative systems. The Palestinian national government dominates
the policies and the administrative systems completely. So for the Palestinians, there is no
clear line between politics and administration and the role of government towards the two
dimensions.

Ostrom, in his book, The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration, calls
Wilson’s dichotomy bad medicine for reforming public administration because the latter
is related directly to politics. Martin (1988), in “The Fading Legacy of Woodrow Wilson”
states Wilson repudiated his version within three years of its publication arguing that the
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state is not a private company or body corporate, rather it is a body politics which is not
always rules of good business. Rosenbloom (1983) states that administration must
involve all three branches of government and that administration is rooted in
administrative law and the politics - administration dichotomy fails to include that branch
of government. Public administration must be a combination of politics, law, and
management. Frederickson (1971) states that administrators are not neutral and should be
committed to values such as social equity. Administrators are actively involved in the
executing policy.

Waldo notes that the perdurability of the dichotomy is based upon the principles
of scientific objectivity – people seek pragmatic answers to their problems and want an
expert to give them those answers. With a professional class of administrators, we can
feel safer that the complex management of government is being well handled. The
dichotomy is the decision/execution dichotomy, to restate Goodnow’s work. According
to Waldo, if we can understand it and find ways to relate the two realms, it will be
relevant to the task of thinking who we are, what we are and the course we should pursue.
Otherwise it is a totalitarian government that offers a seamless weave of politics and
administration.

In summary, the politics-administration dichotomy explained in the classical
public administration literature sought to achieve governance reform away from the
interference of politics. In other words, the politics-administration dichotomy was born in
the reform context. The reformers of the 1870s and 1880s based their efforts on the
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notion that as knowledge was acquired and if incorporated into management systems
governance would exist outside of a political context.

Therefore, there are two schools of thought. For one, the politics-administration
dichotomy to achieve reform, efficiency, and effectiveness is of paramount concern. For
the other school it is difficult to separate politics from administration because the latter is
simply the former (politics). Therefore, the local governance of Palestine has been
suffering from politics and its positive and negative contributions from largely external
constituencies for centuries as will be described in the next chapters. To achieve any
reform in its local governance – and to make it responsive to the culture of local residents
– Palestinian officials must realize and organize the relationships between administration
and politics in a way that the politics’ from non-local sources is bounded relative to its
role in creating and defining local institutions.

Without having organized and well-defined relations between administrators and
politicians, the Palestinian local governance will continue suffering from the influence of
non-local politics and its implications; this the specific danger to the creation of modern
and effective local governance institutions that Goodnow was concerned about and about
which he issues his warnings more than a century ago.

2.3 Centralized Government

The Palestinian people have been subjected to top-down administrative systems
that ignored the voice, needs, and rights of people (Jarbawi, 1996). Since Palestinian
local governance has been subjected to centralized systems that were created by the
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Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and Israeli
occupation, the second part of the literature review outlines the principles of
governmental centralization and decentralization reflecting the advantages and
disadvantages of the centralized and decentralized systems. Currently, the PNA is
applying a central local governance system that is linked and related directly to the
control of the central government.

Oates (1990) discusses in detail two forms of government, centralized and
decentralized, in terms of allocation, distribution, and stability. He tries to present the
advantages and disadvantages of each form in order to introduce the most effective form
of government that can handle administrative and fiscal policies. In terms of the
centralized government, Oates (1990) argues that centralized governments have higher
level of stability than the decentralized form that relies on state and local governments
(SLG). He thinks that the centralized government has a better ability to maintain high
employment level with stable prices. In addition, he points out that the size of money
supplies needs to be controlled by centralized government rather than the decentralized
form. SLG may mismanage the financial and administrative system if they independently
take the control over it.

The discussion about public debt also infers that a centralized government has
more ability to stimulate the economy without burdening people with possible income
transfers to outsiders in the future. Bahl (1992: 256) also agrees with this argument
because when SLG borrow to “stabilize national income growth, a heavy burden would
be placed on future generations of local residents.” The discussion about stability
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concludes with the observation that “a central government is in a position to make good
use both of monetary and of fiscal policy in maintaining the economy at high levels of
outputs without excessive inflation” (Oates, 1990: 556).

Oates (1990) asserts that the problem of distribution clearly appears in the
decentralized form of government. The decentralized fiscal and administrative system is
likely to face real difficulties when it works to achieve differing re-distributional goals
independent from those of the central government. Therefore, Oates (1990) thinks that
the centralized form of government has a better chance of success in dealing with the
challenge of redistribution. He concludes that the “unitary form of government is
therefore likely to be far more effective in achieving any agreed to re-distributional
objectives” (Oates, 1990: 557)

In terms of the allocation problem Bahl (1992) asserts that the determination of
local services that should be offered and the concern about the national growth cannot be
detached. He points out a critique of the SLG, “the fiscal choices made by state and local
governments have contributed to a stunting of national economic growth” (Bahl, 1992:
259). Oates (1990) also presents the advantage of centralized governments in terms of the
allocation problem. He thinks that the central government is better able to provide the
proper levels of public goods and services than the local governments. Decentralized
system allows each local government to look for maximizing its own welfare regardless
to the needs or objectives of the other local governments.

Therefore, Oates (1990; 559) discusses how centralized governments provide “a
better approximation to the efficient level of output of those public goods that benefit the
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members of all communities than would a system of decentralized decision-making.” On
the other hand, it is argued, according to Oates (1990), that the SLG can also have an
effective decision-making system. This effectiveness comes from their better view of
expenditures because they are tied to the real cost of resources to produce services. In
summary, the centralized form of government functions is seen as better than the
decentralized system of SLG in order to meet selected economic responsibilities,
according to some viewpoints, even though it does not do an ideal job.

As mentioned earlier, the Palestinians have been living under a strong centralized
local governance system that has been shaped and formulated according to the decisions
and policies imposed by the central government. Such central government bases its local
governance system on a political agenda (important and strong conclusion for which data
are required) rather than a professional and technical one as it is explained in the coming
chapters. So it is important for Palestinians to organize the relationship between the local
governance and central government on modern and pragmatic bases so that the
administrative system can provide citizens with the different services efficiently and
effectively and can meet their expectations and voices.

2.4 Decentralized Government

In general, McClure (1990: 577) justifies his huge attack on the decentralized
governments, wherein SLG decide fiscal and administrative policies, by determining four
major disadvantages of this structure of government:

At least four lines of reasoning suggest that tax and spending
decisions by sub-national governments may not be optimal. First,
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spending may be less than would be required for welfare
maximization… because of spillovers of benefits between
jurisdictions. Second, even if there are no spillovers…tax
competition may result in suboptimal levels of expenditures. Third,
in the absence of competition between jurisdictions, politicians and
bureaucrats may act against the best interests of their
constituents… Finally, interstate migration based on fiscal
considerations may be excessive; because of the congestion
migration creates.
Although the decentralized form of government seems to be, for some
economists, less efficient than the centralized system, some other economists advocate
for the decentralized system because it has many advantages. Oates (1990) argues that
when a central government supplies all public goods, it is expected to reach a uniformity
of public program. However, individuals in different communities have different
preferences about the consumption of public goods. While some people may prefer a high
quality in specific programs, others may prefer to have a tax reduction in lieu of these
programs.

Tiebout (1956) discussed how consumers or voters move to the local communities
that best satisfy their preferences. Centralized government is criticized because it
provides similar outputs for all communities regardless to the possible variations that they
may have. Bahl (1992: 256) points out that SLG can perform better in terms of “the
decisions about how much local services will be provided and about how budgets will be
financed.” He emphasizes that the efficiency of decision-making will be increased
because the different preferences of local voters will be considered. Therefore, Oates
(1990: 560) asserts that SLG can increase the “economic efficiency by providing a range
of outputs of certain public goods that corresponds more closely to the different tastes of
groups of consumers”
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In fact, Tiebout (1956) advocated for a decentralized form of government through
presenting a complete model of local government. He illustrated that under specific
assumptions the decentralized form of government can be adopted when voters change
their communities based on their preferences. Voters will move to the communities that
have taxes and expenditures that meet their preferences as much as possible. It can be
said that “the greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among
them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position”
(Tiebout, 1956: 569). McClure (1990) rejects this view, which seems to be too ideal,
when one takes in consideration that migration creates congestion.

Furthermore, Oates (1990) points out that decentralized forms of government
have more chances to generate better experimentation and innovation in the production of
public goods. The decentralized form of government encourages local government to
increase the level of competitiveness with other local governments. This means that local
governments engage in competitive efforts to provide the most efficient level of public
goods and services.

Finally, the discussion about the decentralized governments’ advantages can be
seen in the effective decision-making, since they have “more efficient levels of public
output, because expenditures are tied more closely to real resource cost” (Oates, 1990:
560). Decentralized governments function better than the centralized form of
government, under specific conditions, to meet the economic responsibilities, according
to some viewpoints. This efficiency is considered in the SLG even though it does not run
in a perfect way. This chapter presents overviews about the politics-administration
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dichotomy and the centralized and decentralized government and how these two
dimensions influence the performance of local governance system.

2.5 Nation-State Model in Local Governance

Reviewing the experiences in other developing and developed countries, the third
part reviews nation-state model in local governance that integrates citizens, private
sector, and non-profit organizations in planning, formulating and implementing the
policies of local governance. While some countries have applied this model successfully
in running their local administrative systems other countries have been facing difficulties
in implementing this model.

Local governments in Western Europe have become increasingly involved in
network building with the local business community. Pierre (1997) suggests that
governance processes are not value neutral but reflect and sustain political values beyond
partisan conflict. Comparing managerial, corporatist, pro-growth, and welfare governance
models of urban governance, Pierre (1997) argues that nation-state factors play an
important role in shaping urban governance. Different sectors in urban politics display
different models of governance and local political choice matters. Also, cities within the
same national context differ with regard to the degree of inclusion of organized interests
in urban governance, which, in turn, is reflected in urban policy outcomes.

The spread of democratic ideas and the emergence of a global system have
contributed to a resurgence of the local governance. One major form of decentralization
in the twentieth century has been the breakup of empires into nation-states, the most
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recent example being the Soviet Union. Events in Spain and the United Kingdom across
the past 20 years offer further evidence of the decentralization-centralization tension
within many societies fostered by histories of conquest and domination. Teune (1995)
argues that the pressures for democratization have led to a new emphasis on local
governance below the level of the nation-state. The rise of a global political economy
provides localities with an alternative to national capitals. Although the patterns of local
governance have similar features of provincial and local governments, the push for
democracy will give local governance a greater role in the issues of peace and prosperity
than has been true during the long recent period of the rise in authority of nation-states.

Security for people, communities, and states is essential for sustainable
development, democratization and conflict mitigation. Politicized, badly managed or
ineffective security bodies and justice systems often create instability and insecurity,
largely due to the lack of effective democratic systems. Ball (2005) argues that
strengthening democratic security-sector governance after conflict presents enormous
challenges, particularly: (1) developing and implementing a legal framework consistent
with international law and democratic practice; (2) developing effective, well-functioning
civil management and oversight bodies; (3) developing viable, accountable and
affordable security forces; (4) ensuring that the institutional culture of the security forces
supports the legal framework, international law, good democratic practice and civil
management and oversight bodies. Addressing these challenges requires professional
security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional approaches. Reform
activities should be guided by local ownership, sensitivity to the politics of reform, local
capacity, local context and a comprehensive sector-wide framework. Local stakeholders
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must make hard decisions about priorities on the availability of domestic resources
available and the costs and benefits of accepting external assistance.

A strong rule of law is needed everywhere including in the Palestinian territories.
For example, many Palestinian officials were accused of corruption and stealing public
money but existing laws did not give the Attorney General the authority to investigate
and prosecute (World Bank, 2006). Moreover, the PA has a weak and unprofessional
security force (World Bank, 2006) that was not able to counter Hamas’s effort to control
Gaza in June 2007, effectively dividing the Palestinian society into two and creating a de
facto succession movement similar to what some groups tried (unsuccessfully) in the
early years of the American republic.

In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level
governance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of
these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of
villages in rural China have held local government elections (Zhang, Fan, Zhang, and
Huang, 2004), providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization
on the level of local public goods provision and production. Using a recent village survey
conducted across several years, Zhang, Fan, Zhang, and Huang (2004) compared two
different governance modes. They find that elections affect little on the size of revenue
but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individuals to enterprises if
possible. However, privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more
difficult. They also show that elections and power sharing are conducive to improve the
allocation of public expenditures.
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Palestinians did not exercise their rights of electing their local governance
representatives regularly under the different occupying powers. The PNA also never held
local elections. Currently, Palestinian local governance is suffering from unfair
distributions of public expenditures (World Bank, 2006) among the different cities and
other localities in West Bank and Gaza where big cities, like Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron
and Gaza, enjoying political power are receiving larger shares of the public budget and
direct international donations without any coordination with the central government
(World Bank, 2007).

Zones of state failure that can be defined as the zones where the state is absent
and cannot maintain and force the rule of law (Menkhaus, 2007). Zones of failure as a
result of the PNA’s activities exist in Palestine as evidenced by Hamas’ control over
Gaza which became subjected to a sever blockade imposed by Israel and the PNA. In
reality, communities facing the absence of an effective state authority forge systems of
governance to provide modest levels of security and rule of law (Menkhaus, 2007).
Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in Somalia, where an array of local and
regional governance arrangements have emerged since the 1991 collapse of the state.
Menkhaus (2007) argues that the Somalia case can be used both to document the rise of
governance without government in a zone of state collapse and to assess the changing
interests of local actors seeking to survive and prosper in a context of state failure. The
interests of key actors can and do shift over time as they accrue resources and
investments; the shift “from warlord to landlord” gives some actors greater interests in
governance and security, but not necessarily in state revival; risk aversion infuses
decision-making in areas of state failure; and state-building initiatives generally fail to
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account for the existence of local governance arrangements. The possibilities and
problems of the “mediated state model,” in which weak states negotiate political access
through existing local authorities, are considerable.

Palestinian territories are sometimes facing similar zones of state failure including
in Gaza where Hamas formally challenged and rejected the central authority based in the
West Bank. Moreover, other territories are still under the occupation of the Israeli
authorities for more than 30 years prohibiting the PNA from exercising its local
governance responsibilities including planning, constructions, and other functions
common to local governments (Jarbawi, 1992).

In Palestine, local governance is influenced clearly by the elite interests (Jarbawi,
1992) and, for example, this can be represented by the willingness of the central
government to select certain mayors for specific cities from wealthy and big families,
including Khalidis, Alamis, Husaynis, Dajanis, and Nashashibis, controlled the most
prominent positions in the administrative and municipal offices (Maoz, 1984), as it is
explained in the fifth chapter. Moreover, such mayors might coordinate and get funding
from donor countries without any consultation or coordination with the central
government and its ministries of finance and local governance. In other words, there is
not an equity process of funding and supervision that is applied on all local governments
in Palestine.

33

2.6 Citizenship Participation in Local Governance

To create an indigenous administrative system, this research argues that this
system has to address the voices, needs, and rights of people governed. The final part of
literature review focuses on citizenship participation in establishing indigenous local
governance. The final section of the chapter uses this research to define the research
questions and hypotheses that guide this study.

The modernity era saw the emergence of popular participation as a mechanism for
promoting good governance in developing countries. Good governance was seen as
crucial to efforts to improve the welfare of poor people in countries where elites had
hitherto benefited disproportionately from policies conceived at the top without reference
to ordinary citizens at the bottom (Habermas, 1996). Donor pressure to achieve
governance reform sometimes helped accelerate the change. With regard to planning for
the physical environment of communities Aravot (1996) stresses the need for urban
planners to create environments that reflect users’ preferences. This requires a widening
of their basis for decision-making beyond their personal knowledge, norms of the
profession, or a reflection of the desires of donors or central governments that frequently
pay for the plans. He argues that public participation in the policies and planning process
is necessary for the popular legitimization of governance in the design of communities.
People have the knowledge, desire, and the willingness to engage in government
activities and policies and to contribute to the implementation of plans if they are vested
in the process (Macedo et al. 2005).
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In fact, the majority of the local governance research focused on the roles of
influential and powerful actors in the urban planning process such as urban mayors
(Teaford, 1990), federal officials and “political entrepreneurs” (Mollenkopf, 1983), and
real estate officials (Weiss, 1980). However, the local governance research does not
examine deeply another influential actor – citizens – and their relationship to other
powerful institutions and groups that if properly fostered and nurtured can contribute to
the legitimization of indigenous local governance systems.

Throughout the decades the indigenous people in Palestine faced great challenges
and difficulties to participate in local governance issues under the different occupation
powers (Al-Abbadi, 1995). This exclusion begins with the centralized administration of
the Ottoman Empire and was then continued under the British Mandate (Al-Nammura,
1994), the administration by Egypt and Jordan (Jarbawi, 1996), and by the Israeli military
occupations and the Israeli government’s failure to establish principles of civilian
administration. After the establishment of the PNA people hoped to participate in free
elections that could be the bases for establishing a new democratic state but this again has
not been accomplished (Jarbawi, 1996, World Bank, 2006). Therefore, people have not
been part of the local governance that affects and controls their lives and businesses.
They believe that they have been separated from the administrative system (Jarbawi,
1996) that is utilized to achieve a certain political ends by different central governments
(World Bank, 2007).

However, some Palestinian officials might respond that the limited participation
of citizens in local governance is a result of several factors (Jarbawi, 1996). For example,
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some local governance researchers argue that a limited number of citizens will participate
in local governance issues and urban planning and this minority cannot represent the
needs or perspectives of all citizens in the neighborhood. Transferring too much power to
a vocal minority can also lead to alienation and disenfranchisement (Thomas, 1986).
Consequently, citizen participation might favor a particular interest group and ignore the
needs and interests of other groups. In addition, some local governance researchers
believe that such participation might raise unrealistic expectations regarding what local
governance and urban planning can achieve (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). Moreover,
participation might consume some of the limited resources allocated for the local
governance planning through frequent meetings and calls for studies (Fagotto & Fung,
2006). Finally, the opinions and thoughts raised by participation might lead to vague
guidelines and contradict the needs of residents that in turn will negatively impact city
departments designing and implementing much-needed plans (Fagotto & Fung, 2006).

The proponents of participation argue “there is no better way to ensure the long
term success of public involvement than to institutionalize a decision-making role for that
involvement” (Thomas, 1995: 163). This institutionalization can be achieved through
neighborhood associations or resident committees that can collect data through surveys,
direct meetings, and focus groups. These groups can permit concerns, fears, demands,
and priorities to be addressed (Williams, 1985). This provides local governments with
information that permits an understanding of the diversity of existing needs. In addition,
the information regarding citizens’ preferences is advantageous because it creates “vast
inventories of facts which are numerous to be related to individually, and might be
rendered irrelevant to the planning process during statistical contraction” (Aravot, 1996:
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67). The community organizations and associations with its volunteers can deliver this
information to the city council for further review and discussion till reaching a final
approval for the plan by all partners. The citizens should be involved in the
implementation stage as well through resident committees that supervise and follow up
the execution of the local governance plans and programs.

Giving a seat at the table of decision making to citizens will create new levels of
commitment to local governance systems as people participate in formulating and
designing its programs and policies (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). The city government can
benefit from this participation as citizen-volunteers are ready to assist in carrying out
projects including cleanups, planting, community policing, and other community
activities supported by the neighborhood organizations. In addition, citizens can find an
available contact officer to resolve any complications or troubles that might occur during
the implementation processes. This interaction and cooperation will grant the opportunity
for the city government to learn more about the actual needs and fears of citizens and will
help citizens to learn more about the urban governance. This participation will inject the
local governance with a sense of realism that can address the actual local problems and
create a civic infrastructure that can support and protect the plan (Fagotto & Fung, 2006).

Are there any reasons to limit participation? There are three main reasons that
stand behind the limited participation of citizens in local governance issues: (1) the need
to include and understand different and contradicted interests and needs of citizens; (2)
the time required to make participation meaningful, and (3) cultural barriers that might
represent obstacles in the way of participation. Firstly, citizens look at local governance
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issues and urban planning programs as projects designed and implemented only for a
specific group of residents. For example, some homeowners who are aware of the fact
that local policies of urban planning are directly influencing the future value of their
properties may participate while others either less affected or having less information
may not participate. In addition, citizens who are renters might be discouraged from
participating in any local governance meetings or discussions because they may believe
that changes or new initiatives do not directly influence their personal wealth (Thomas,
1986).

Secondly, citizen participation in local governance issues requires a commitment
of time from citizens (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). Thirdly, limited participation might be
attributed to cultural barriers represented by citizens who have no experience or
knowledge about local governance issues. Moreover, the cultural barriers might be
represented by language and knowledge level proficiencies required for participation.
Therefore, some residents cannot or will not express their concerns or demands regarding
any planning or intended revitalization efforts (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). It is true that
citizens cannot be forced to participate but more affirmative measures should be taken by
to ensure that neighborhood meetings, committees, and associations reflect the
neighborhood (Fagotto & Fung, 2006).

At the beginning of twenty-first century, urban planners and policy makers need
to develop new methods to include all constituencies or impacted parties in plans to
“guide economic growth and remedy the problems of uneven development” (Gotham
2001: 308). The citizenship participation in urban and other local governance issues

38

consolidate and “renovate the social fabric and create a sense of ownership of the
neighborhood and, more broadly, of the city” (Fagotto & Fung, 2006: 652). Emphasizing
the important role of the mutual dialogue between the different partners of the
community about various local governance issues to understand the meaning and the
identity of the community, Simpson (1995: 718) states that:

a dialogic perspective allows us to hear people struggle to come to terms with
urban community. Apart from the official surveys and studies that chart new
businesses, measure numbers of tourists, and count populations, there is another
story of community, a story told daily as people give voice to their experiences…
people trying to become subjects, as well as objects, of the spectacle-producing
machinery of modernization.
To create an indigenous administrative system, the research argues that a system
has to address the voices, needs, and rights of those to be governed. Consequently, the
final part of literature focuses on citizenship participation in establishing indigenous local
governance systems. The final section of the chapter uses this research to define the
research questions and hypotheses that guide this study.
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CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

My theoretical framework was developed from a review based on four main
themes from literature in the fields of public administration and political science:

(1) Governance after revolution;
(2) Controlling political factions;
(3) Local governance is for and from citizens; and,
(4) Communicative discourse with citizens
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3.1 Governance after Revolution

Palestinians live under revolutionary circumstances as they are still struggling to
achieve their freedom and establish an independent state. In On Revolution (1961: 273),
Hannah Arendt states that a government after revolution is often “democratic in that
popular welfare and private happiness are its chief goals; but it can be called oligarchic in
the sense that public happiness and public freedom have again become the privilege of
the few.” Arendt tries to examine some of the weaknesses of governance in the aftermath
of revolutions by noting that the spirit or commitment that sustains a revolt eventually
dissipates. She thinks this is a result of the unwillingness or inability of leaders to
conceptualize the revolutionary experience and fervor in post-conflict periods. This
sometimes leads to a decline of or limited citizen participation in new governments and
governance systems. For Arendt, freedom does not mean voting every four years for one
of two candidates by unseen party functionaries, or even every two years for
representatives and local leaders. She argues that the essence of freedom is not
representation but participation and action. This is similar to the perspectives put forth
by Johan Stuart Mill (1972). Freedom is the opportunity to participate in government.
What humanity calls democracy is really once again the few ruling the many or the
minority controlling the majority (Olsen, 1997).

Arendt argues that revolutions which humanity witnessed cannot maintain the full
and continuous participation of the citizens in the governance process. This is what has
been lost in the aftermath of every revolution. Enhanced participation existed for a time
in the American town hall meetings, in Jefferson’s dream of wards at all levels of
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government, in the Russian soviets, in the French societies, and in the Hungarian and
other revolutionary councils. However, what happened after each of these revolutions is
that people began to see one party dictatorships, two-party oligarchies, or multi-party
chaos (Campbell, 1970).

This view is aptly describes Palestine. After the Palestinian revolution ended with
the Oslo Peace Accord in 1993, Fatah became the dominant ruler in the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the government. There was a virtual one party
dictatorship in the Palestinian community from 1994 through 2005. However, after the
last election of 2006, the opposition party, Hamas, won and the Palestinian community
has witnessed a struggle for control of authority between the biggest two political parties
leading to two-party oligarchies.The same can said in the Israeli side where the Labor
Party became dominant for decades after the declaration of the independence. However,
this domination was followed by the rise of the Likud Party which drew a substantial
portion of its electoral base on a political minority – Jews from Arab countries and
Africa, the Sephardim – who were often excluded from the circles of power maintained
by the Labor Party and its base of Jews from Europe and North America (Jarbawi, 1992).

Some of the reasons behind the observed deterioration of citizen participation in
post-revolutionary times might be attributed to the fact that the pursuit of happiness
becomes, for many, the private accumulation of economic wealth (Arendt, 1961). This
means that people are willing to forsake participation because of the years before and
during a revolution where economic security and achievement was either postponed or
not possible. Hence the focus becomes wealth accumulation with people willing to
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forsake opportunities to participate or invest their time in governance systems. In
addition, the chief end of government became protection of the state economy and market
place and certainly events in the post-revolutionary period of the demise of the state
system in the Soviet Union provides additional evidence of the validity of these
observations.

Arendt argues that to answer social questions does not necessarily mean to answer
political questions. To end human poverty and organize an effective flow of goods and
services are essential tasks for every government, even a mandatory obligation. However
the establishment of such systems does not establish freedom. Revolutions or political
change that does not deal with citizen participation and human freedom will not last for a
long time as demonstrated by the quick decline of the former Soviet Union or accomplish
anything (Campbell, 1970). Arendt asserts that in too many instances political freedom is
often exchanged for economic benefits and gains. Arendt argues that the founding fathers
meant “public happiness” in the revolutionary phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness,” not private bohemia’s. Jefferson and Adams and the others experienced
public happiness in public debates and long discussions of Congress, shaping by word
and deed the web of political system and relationships in a new country (Campbell,
1970).

To expand or enhance citizenship participation in governance Arendt adopts
processes to reinforce and strengthen the involvement of citizens in the governance.
Therefore, she concludes On Revolution by suggesting that people should try once again
to build structures of government through which at every level all people who want to
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participate in public debates can do so. She envisioned a series of councils – councils of
peers – from local communities to the national level, with each council sending one of its
members to constitute the next level council (Olsen, 1997). Her recommendations are
sketchy but they hold at least the possibility that new political structures or systems are
yet conceivable. In addition, her recommendations should motivate the political theorists
to examine and prepare the rationales for considering such proposed political system in
more functional and pragmatic way (Olsen, 1997).

This perspective would suggest that Palestinian citizens were not given a chance
to participate in the local governance system under the various occupations beginning
from the Ottomans and ending with the Israeli occupation (Jarbawi, 1992). In addition
their opportunities to advance economically have been thwarted by repeated political
actions and endless circle of violence by Israel, Fatah, and Hamas (World Bank, 2006).
Moreover, the citizens have not been granted a systematic and organized way to
participate in the local governance under the PNA. The PNA did organize a few local
elections but the election process was interrupted and fragmented but political actions and
did not take place in some parts of the West Bank and Gaza. The role and participation of
the citizens in the local governance was undermined and blocked by political interests
exercised by the ruler (World Bank, 2006).

Arendt favors the decisively more direct democratic councils and associations and
structures of governance that seem to emerge inevitably “out of the organizational
impulses of the people themselves” (1963: 283) in the revolutionary situation. She adds
that such councils and associations are “never thought of... as germs for a new form of
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government,” for the “professional revolutionaries” of the avant-garde. However, she
believes that they should be “regarded... as mere instruments to be dispensed with once
the revolution came to an end.” It is for this reason she adopts and recommends “the
council system” in moments of revolutionary upheaval after revolution. She describes the
status of having less democratic modes of governance after the end of revolution as “a
strange and sad story,” and constitutes what she calls “The Lost Treasure [of]... the
Revolutionary Tradition” (1963: 283). Throughout the chapters of On Revolution, it is
obvious that the theme of citizenship participation in government and other public affairs
flows on the surface once again. As it has been demonstrated in Mill’s assignment; this
theme is one of the major issues in the field of public administration. To create an
indigenous local governance system in Palestine, citizens have to participate in designing
and implementing such a system. What is applicable in Palestine has been modified from
other local governance system imposed by frequent occupation powers beginning from
the Ottomans and ending by Israelis (Jarbawi, 1992; Al-A’raj 1996). The PNA has
neither been able to legislate a comprehensive law governing the administrative system
nor to organize comprehensive local elections in Palestine (World Bank, 1996).

3.2 Controlling Political Factions

In Federalist Papers #10 and #51 James Madison (1965) presents the major
themes for societies that must deal with, cooperate with, and include factions within the
governance systems of a society. The issue of the protection of minorities and minority
interests against the infringements of majority interests and culture are paramount in his
consideration of the need for representative government and a separation of powers.
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James Madison argues in Federalist Paper #10 that factions in society lead to instability
and injustice and they are the “moral diseases under which popular governments have
every where perished” (Madison, 1965, p. 42). This means that a pure democracy would
crumble under the pressure of various factions claiming their interests. Madison argues
that the main reason for the establishment of factions is the unequal distribution of
property. He further argues that a unified republic would “break and control the violence
of factions” due to its extended sphere with so many passions and interests that no faction
would be able to get strong enough to dictate their will. Madison states that there are two
lines of action that could prevent the formation of factions, of which the first is the
removal of all liberties that makes it possible to form and maintain a faction. However
this solution is worse than the problem and unacceptable. The second solution would be
to create an equal society where every citizen had the same passion and interest, however
this is impossible as well, because people have the liberty to foster different interests.
Different interests mainly arise because of the issue of property rights.

As property ownership and its defense is defined by the existence of a state, that
responsibility manifests itself into political divisions between owners and non-owners.
Therefore it is impossible to prevent the formation of factions. The only thing that can be
done is to control the effects. This would be easy if the faction would be a minority,
because popular vote would prevent them from dictating their will. However, when the
majority starts oppressing the rest of the citizens the situation is more difficult because
the goal is to establish a government and prevent oppression. Madison argues that
majorities with common interests have to be located distant from each other (to avoid
political and civil conflict) and there has to be enough power and independent that neither

46

can oppress the other. Pure democracies cannot protect themselves from the implications
of factions and that is why they are short in life and violent in their death (1965:46).
Madison claims that only an extended republic can render the implications of factions.

He then continues to refine his theory of an extended republic in the matters of
representation. He defines representation as the delegation of government to an elected group
of citizens. This chosen, wise body of citizens would then “refine and enlarge public views.”
This filtering effect would ensure that permanent common goals would be attained rather
than short-lived goals serving any group’s interest. According to Rohr (1986), the Federalists
feared the excesses of democracy and favored a ruling of the better sort and wanted to “curb”
it with representation. Another characteristic of a unified republic is its great number of
citizens. They would elect enough representatives so no self-serving group among them
could form. Furthermore, if representatives are elected it will be much more difficult for
“unworthy candidates” to corrupt the system. In summary, the greater the sphere and
citizenry of a republic the less likely factions will emerge to disrupt or oppress other interest
groups. According to Madison, these conditions are met in a unified republic.

In the Palestinian context, there are more than five political factions in the Palestinian
community; each has separate ideologies, agendas and goals. For example, Fatah adopts a
strategy of peace negotiations to resolve the conflict with Israel while Hamas is not even
ready to recognize the existence of the Israeli State (Schulz, 2006). This research argues that
there has not been any legal mechanism by which the Palestinian people can control the
political factions’ ambitions and their political interests, or resolve the differences. In
addition, different ruling regimes in Palestine have benefited from the existence of the
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competing interests (Jarbawi, 1992). The rule of law cannot decide and judge on the conflicts
that often break out between the political factions. After the establishment of the PNA, Fatah
was the dominant political faction in the West Bank and Gaza from 1994 through 2006. It
exercised a kind of partisan governing strategy and corruption in the field of administrative
appointments and financial issues (World Bank, 2006). After its success in the 2006 election
Hamas began to hire its own political appointees in all the fields of public sector and
eliminated staff affiliated with Fatah in the high and middle public positions and in all
ministries. There have been continuous conflicts between the two political parties for control
of the governing authority and its employment possibilities creating a dual system unable to
government or effectively provide needed service and stability. The result is two
governments, one in Gaza and one in the West Bank. Yet, in each locale, opposition party
members seek to advance the interests of their party. Therefore, the political parties have
been exercising disenfranchising policies against each other in the local governance without
any consideration for merit, qualifications, virtue, and experience in the employment process.

Therefore, Palestinian citizens are paying the price of having poor administrative
governance system subjected to competing political factions. This research argues that the
Palestinian society is not able to control its political factions due to the fact that the relations
between politics and public administration are not organized. Palestinian politics interferes
negatively in the administrative system shifting it away from being a bureaucratic tool to
serve citizens to a political tool to serve limited interests of one political party. This might be
attributed to the absence of the role of law that can organize the relations between the
parliament, elected government, bureaucracy and governance systems. In other western
countries, such relations are organized and controlled by the role of law. This dissertation
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measures the attitudes of the Palestinian community leaders towards these unorganized
relations between politics and administration in the Palestinian community and its negative
consequences on the level of the services provided to people.

3.3 Local Governance is for and From Citizens

On Representative Government, John Stuart Mill (1972: 210) states that

We have now, therefore, obtained a foundation for a twofold division of
the merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It consists
partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental
advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement
in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of
the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual,
and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect
on public affairs.
Mill’s analyses his theory of government by arguing that the principles of
competence and participation are the major goals and basis of a good government.
Citizens have to participate in the public affairs and the most qualified have to provide
the leadership for good government that requires virtue, and experience. The hope was
these skills are available in the citizens who serve and those who are sovereign. Then
Mill identifies the measurement of the good government in two ways: First, “the degree
in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and
individually”; and second, “the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral,
intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on
public affairs” (Mill, 1972, 210).

The government’s work should be evaluated by citizen in terms of its actions,
improvement or deterioration of the people conditions and affairs, and its ability to
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perform good work for them. But is this enough? Mill adds that good government should
also dedicate itself to develop the virtue and the intelligence of the people. The
government will not be good if it does not possess the necessary levels of civic virtue,
interest and morality. Mill asserts that every person should have a voice in government.
However, he limits this influence for the persons who have less education and experience
in government. It is obvious that Mill concentrates on the principles of citizenship
participation. But why does Mill insist on citizenship participation in government? He
argues that participation protects the interests of people by granting them a voice in
government that must be accountable to its citizens (Warner, 2001).

Mill advocates for popular limited government and argues for the benefits of
participation. He believes that properly administered and representative government can
be the best form of government for the people either in theory or in practice. The political
process that creates the representative government will be one of several tools that work
to improve the intellectual level of people. Consequently, citizens will learn the benefits
of having their affairs managed by persons of greater knowledge and intelligence through
participation and civic education. Moreover, Mill argues that the representative
government can be a shield against the danger and the tyranny of democracy. In addition,
the inclusion of various opinions, skills, and experiences diffuses knowledge and
prosperity and thus benefits the context of the citizens as a whole (Warner, 2001).

Mill states that

In addition to this, the Parliament has an office, not inferior even to this in
importance; to be at once the nation’s Committee of Grievances, and its
Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general opinion of
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the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every
eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and
challenge discussion (1976: 258, 259)
Here, Mill discusses the wise representative theme arguing that the
representatives should be selected carefully from among the people. These
representatives must enjoy superior intellect, high education, and supervisory experience.
At the same time, they should reflect diverse opinions and voices of the people. Because
of the trust that people give to these representatives the later in turn have moral
obligations and national commitment that they must respect and preserve. “This is the
trust that is given by voters choose a representative wiser than themselves” (Warner,
2001: 407).

But what is the role of representative? Mill argues that the representative has to
talk, deliberate, discuss, publicize, propose diverse opinions, suggest views to be the
nation’s “committee of grievances, and its congress of opinion.” In other words, the
elected representatives have to facilitate the process of the public discourse regarding any
public issue or problem encountered (Warner, 2001: 407).

Mill argues that

The work of government has been in the hands of governors by
profession; which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy. Whether the
work is done by them because they have been trained to it, or they are
trained to it because it is to be done by them, makes a great difference in
many respects, but none at all as to the essential character of the rule
(1976: 265)
Through this quotation, Mill explains the need for skilled bureaucrats. He believes
that government works require training and necessary skills to be implemented and done.
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For example, the legislative commission and the administrative body should consist of
qualified and well-trained bureaucrats. Why? Mill argues that the representative body
cannot function well simply because the legislative work is not an easy task. The
legislative commissions are responsible for protecting the existing laws and making sure
that the new laws match and do not contradict with the previous ones (laws). The
representative body can propose ideas for legislation and such ideas have to be modified
and improved for ratification. Mill asserts that this complicated process needs qualified
people who are well-trained and experienced on performing the legal studies and devices.
In addition, the representative body cannot function well without the assistance and the
help of the technical experts (bureaucrats). Mill argues that the principles of
administration can be taught and understood by anybody. However, these principles do
not come spontaneously or by intuition but they do come through study, practice and
experience. He adds that the administrative bureaucracy can do the whole work of the
government by applying the principles of public administration to actual governing of the
state (Warner, 2001).

Such bureaucratic administrations should be controlled by certain limits and rules
that it should be above partisan and political interests; Palestinian leaders have not have
not been these procedures. When created they should be based on merit with clear lines
of responsibility and accountability. Therefore, to recruit for the bureaucratic
administration, intelligence, education, and governmental skills should be available in the
characters of the expected employees. In addition, such employees should demonstrate
their capacity of good record keeping, measures of accountability, and other technical
knowledge through passing certain tests (Warner, 2001). Mill argues that the
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representative body should not interfere in the work of the bureaucratic administration
simply because this body does not have the knowledge and the experience in this field.
Moreover, such interference might lead to achieve some political interest that in turn will
be the source of corruption in the administrative system. Mill emphasizes the need to
dismiss any bureaucrats who might be engaged in such corruption (Warner, 2001, p.
407).

However, this does not mean that bureaucrats have complete freedom. The
representative body must be responsible for checking, criticizing, supervising, following up,
giving final approvals, or withdrawing approvals of the public work. So it is clear that Mill
separates the function of the representative bodies from the legislative and administrative
bureaucracy “to attain as many of the qualities of the one as are consistent with the other.”

The process of hiring bureaucrats in the Palestinian context ignores the principles of
skill, merit, experience, virtue, and others that should be available in any bureaucracy (World
Bank, 2006). The whole process of hiring has been based and influenced by political interests
and partisan efforts to gain power inside the executive bureaucratic system in Palestine.
While the same situation might be applicable in many democratic countries including the
USA the Palestinian context ignores the educational, professional and the experiential
requirements that must be available in any candidate for the positions (World Bank, 2006).
Therefore, waves of fraud, theft, and other shapes of corruption have increased involving
political officials. However, no one has been prosecuted on the grounds of any legal claims
of corruption (World Bank, 2006), a scenario which does not exist in the democratic
countries. On contrary, some of them are still holding higher political positions in the
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Palestinian government. Thus the Palestinian public has lost confidence and belief in the
government that reflected negatively on the citizens’ interest to activate their participation in
public affairs.

3.4 Between Facts and Norms

Jurgen Habermas presents a theory of democracy developed and presented in
Between Facts and Norms. In particular, he focuses on the concept of communicative
power that is the key normative resource that is supposed to counter the norm-free
steering media of money and administrative power theory (Flynn, 2004). He explains
systematically the discourse theory in relation to democratic and legal. He develops a
model of democracy that combines a procedural account of democratic legitimacy with a
deliberative politics. Habermas tries to specify how the normative ideal of popular
sovereignty may still be preserved or implemented in recognizable ways within a context
of complicated modern social conditions (Flynn, 2004). Habermas states that “[I]n
contrast to Weber, who sees the fundamental phenomenon of power as the probability
that in a social relationship one can assert one’s own will against opposition, Arendt
views power as the potential of a common will formed in non-coercive communication”
(1996: 147).

Habermas, here, tries to present the concept of the communicative power. He
argues that the attempt to interpret popular sovereignty in procedural terms must be
carefully defined so as not to mix up the meanings of the popular sovereignty with the
radical-democratic content. He defines the principle of popular sovereignty in terms of
discourse theory by arguing that all political power emerges from the communicative
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power of citizens. On the other hand, he states that the communicative power lies at the
heart of the communication model of the political process and consequently expressing
the radical democratic content of popular sovereignty. It is believed that “Habermas
borrows the concept of communicative power from Hannah Arendt, while reformulating
it” (Flynn, 2004). Arendt argues that power is always something exercised by the whole
people collectively, not by an individual. Power is possessed and is kept alive and active
and practiced so long as the group is united. Habermas was influenced by Arendt’s view
of political power in terms of ‘jurisgenesis’ and the authorizing force involved in the
creation of laws and the founding of institutions (Flynn, 2004).

After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 the decision-making
has been dominated by a limited group came from Tunisia (Jarbawi, 1996). In other
words, a few individuals from Fatah dominate all decisions regarding local governance
(Jarbawi, 1996) depriving citizens from debating, discussing, and participating in the
administrative system that organizes their life. The communicative power indicated by
Habermas has not existed in the Palestinian society in any form including the
organizations of comprehensive local elections (Worl Bank, 2006).

Habermas adds that

For the transformation of communicative power into administrative has
the character of an empowerment within the framework of statutory
authorization. We can then interpret the idea of the constitutional state in
general as the requirement that the administrative system, which is steered
through the power code, be tied to the lawmaking communicative power
and kept free of illegitimate interventions of social power (1886: 150).
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Habermas believes that it is necessary to differentiate between the concepts of
political powers. He states that the communicative power, which is generated, is not the
same as administrative power that is employed for implementing the laws and regulations
efficiently and effectively. He adds that we have to distinguish administrative from
communicative power and to look at law as the mediator for translating or transferring
communicative power into administrative one. He argues that law is considered to act as
a transformer of communicative power and the practice of state authority through
administrative power that is only legitimate if it is accompanied by this generated
communicative power exercised by the people (Flynn, 2004).

But who is the source of this communicatively generated power and how is it
formed? Habermas answers by stating that a communicative power of this kind can be
established only in un-deformed public spheres. It can survive only from structures of
undamaged inter-subjectivity found in non-distorted communication (Flynn, 2004). Once
again, being influenced by Arendt’s theories, Habermas develops the concept of
communicative power in relation to his own account of communicative rationality and his
procedural model of popular sovereignty (Flynn, 2004).

Habermas clarifies that “Practical reason no longer resides . . . in the ethical
substance of a specific community, but in the rules of discourse and forms of
argumentation that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action
oriented to reaching understanding” (1996: 296–7). Habermas emphasizes on his theory
of procedural rationality by calling for the use of reason within politics. Reason can
provides us with logic and understanding of politics and its implications on the
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community. He agrees with this focus on deliberative politics. “The idea of a network of
discourses, on the other hand, does not limit the public use of reason to ethical–political
reasons but runs the entire gamut of reasons including pragmatic and moral reasons and
extending beyond ‘rational discourse’ to bargaining processes” (Flynn, 2004). Habermas
has called this model ‘Kantian republicanism.’ However, this model places constraints on
ethical–political reasoning from all sides. The network of discourses interwoven with the
principle of democracy leads to a complex notion of legal validity (Flynn, 2004)

The Palestinian community did not practice an authentic discourse under the
foreign occupations of the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, Egypt, Jordan, or Israel
(Jarbawi, 1992). Citizens were forced to live with local governance laws and regulations
imposed by the occupiers to meet their political objectives as it is shown in chapter VI.
Therefore, Palestinians did not have a set of indigenous laws that could act as a
transformer of communicative power. The practice of state authority through
administrative power is only legitimate if it is accompanied by this generated
communicative power exercised by the people, as stated earlier by Habermas. The laws
and regulations imposed on the Palestinian citizens were foreign and they did not reflect
the authentic needs and views of the governed. Even after the establishment of the PNA
in 1994, the Palestinian Authority has not set up a comprehensive law that can organize
and rule in Palestine (World Bank, 2006). On contrary, while the Gaza Strip is still
applying some Egyptian laws the West Bank is still applying some Jordanian laws in the
local governance sphere and both of the two areas are rules by the same Ministry of Local
Governance and the same central government. Therefore, the research argues that the
principle of popular sovereignty in terms of discourse theory where all political power
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emerges from the communicative power of citizens has not been existed yet in the
Palestinian context.

3.5 Conceptual Framework

The research argues that the Palestinian local governance administrative system,
after the end of its revolution, suffers from lack of accountability, transparency,
professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness. Such difficulties are mainly attributed to
the central government’s interference and the application of top-down administrative
system to dominate and rule the local governance for the sake of achieving certain
political and partisan interests. In the Palestinian context, the dichotomy between politics
and administration has not existed. On the contrary, the research argues that the politics is
the only final decision player who shapes, formulates and influences the local governance
administrative system in order to serve specific political interests on the account of the
indigenous citizens’ needs and rights.

This role of politics has been found in the local governance administrative system
imposed by the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, Egyptian/Administrative
Administration, and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Politics’ role can be
investigated and verified by historical overview of the frequent occupying powers and
data collected under the current PNA which led ultimately to create an un-indigenous
local governance that has not addressed the concerns of the people.

58

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation addresses several points related to the development of
Palestine’s local government systems. One goal is to understand how successive external
forces influenced the development of local government systems. The dissertation first
investigates how externally imposed local government institutions created to largely
control Palestine have interfered with the political maturation of indigenous
administrative systems through a detailed analysis of historical studies and documents.
The dissertation then focuses on how the PNA’s politics shaped and formulated local
government systems to serve the interests of political factions’ while ignoring the
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establishment of indigenous local government institutions. This analysis also relies on an
analysis of past studies and historical documents. The third area of interest is on the
current state of Palestine’s indigenous local government systems and their ability to serve
local residents while providing opportunities to facilitate participation in the local
governance process and the implementation of modern administrative structures. These
issues are addressed through a survey of community leaders.

These issues, then, are addresses through a three-pronged, triangulation approach
relying on primary and secondary data sources. According to Creswell (1994),
triangulation is a combined method study, one in which the researcher uses multiple
methods of data collection and analysis. These methods might be drawn from “within
methods” approaches, such as different types of quantitative data collection strategies
(e.g. surveys and experiments). Alternatively it might involve “between methods,”
drawing on qualitative and quantitative data collection procedures (e.g. a survey and indepth interviews). Denzin (1978), Jick (1979), and Denzin and Lincoln (1998) have each
studied the utilization of an approach involving the triangulation of research methods for
social research.

4.1 Overview of Data Sources

In order to learn more about Palestine’s indigenous local government systems and
its implications for Palestinian society, a triangulation approach aims to examine, in an
explanatory fashion, whether the current local governance system can respond to the
needs of the Palestinian community. The data sources used in this research include
historical documents and studies used to discuss the development of the local governance
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systems under different regimes that have controlled Palestine: the Ottoman Empire, the
British Empire through the mandate from the League of Nations, the governments of
Egypt and Jordan through their control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank from 1949 to
1967, and finally the military system imposed as a result of the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank (1967 through 2008) and of Gaza (1967 through 2006). The second source of
data is the historical assessment that focuses on the status of the local governance systems
applied by the previous occupations and the current applied local governance system
under the current Palestinian National Authority. The third data set is a survey of
community leaders. The survey completed by leaders in Gaza and the West Bank asks
respondents about the potential and efficiency of the current local governance system, its
relationship to political issues and the judicial system, and its ability to meet citizens’
needs and expectations. The survey also included questions to understand what
respondents thought are the needed local government systems and to compare that ideal
with what actually exists. The survey is also an experiment itself in that a unique data
collection process was followed given the political issues for respondents. The success of
this technique is also discussed and analyzed as it may help identify a data collection
method for studies in areas with extreme political divisions.

W. Lawrence Neuman (1997) concluded that before a researcher begins to
conduct a study, he or she must decide on a specific type of research. Neuman identified
four dimensions of social research: 1) the purpose of doing it; 2) its intended use; 3) how
it treats time; and 4) the research techniques used in it. The dissertation then utilizes an
exploratory methodology that incorporates the following four dimensions. First, its
purpose is to explore a new topic or issue to learn about it because little is known or
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written on the topic of interest. Exploratory research may be the first stage in a sequence
of study. According to Neuman (1997) exploratory studies often go unpublished;
typically their intended use is to incorporate their results into further research conducted
and published at a latter point. Since an exploratory study is intended to provide initial
insights into a topic it can be conducted using a variety of research techniques.

Second, the intended use of the study is to investigate the current local
governance systems in the Palestinian territories and provide insight regarding the current
governance system to produce some recommendations that can assist in establishing a
healthy and indigenous local governance system in the forthcoming Palestinian State.
Third, for the time dimension the research provides a historical assessment of the
development of the local governance systems in the Palestinian territories since the
Ottoman Empire through the establishment of the PNA. Fourth, the study utilizes a
survey of community leaders in Palestine to assess attitudes regarding the development of
local governance systems. Moreover, the survey includes questions about the influences
of the previous occupations powers on to the evolution of local government institutions in
Palestine.

“Exploratory researchers are creative, open minded and flexible; adopt an
investigative stance; and explore all sources of information … Exploratory researchers
frequently use qualitative data. The techniques for gathering qualitative data are less
wedded to a specific theory or research question. Qualitative research tends to be more
open to suing a range of evidence and discovering new issues” (Neuman, 1997: 215).
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Babbie (1995) underscores many of these points in his description of the importance of
exploratory and descriptive research.

Consistent with the dimensions of an exploratory study, the methodological
approach used in this research includes qualitative research that is converted and coded
into a data set. Strauss and Corbin (1990: 17-18) describe the meaning of the term
qualitative research as follows:

By the term qualitative research we mean any kind of research that
produces findings not arrived by the means of statistical procedures or
other means of quantification. It can refer to research about … lives,
stories, behaviors, but also about organizational functioning, social
movements or interactional relationships… Some researchers gather data
by means of interviews and observation-techniques normally associated
with qualitative methods. However, they can code that data in a manner
that allows them to be statically analyzed…”

Creswell (1994) states “[I]n quantitative studies as in qualitative studies,
questions, objectives, hypotheses represent specific treatments of the purpose of the
study. In survey projects these restatements typically take the form of research questions
and objectives …”

A survey design provides quantitative or numeric descriptions of some fraction of
a population – i.e. a sample-through the data collection process of asking questions of
people. Qualitative implies an emphasis on processes and meanings not rigorously
examined, or measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency (Denzen and
Lincoln, 1998).
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4.2 Research Model

The research model in this mixed method is described in Figure 1. The model
illustrates the various factors that have interacted and impacted the development of local
governance systems in Palestine. The model begins with the inputs and impacts from four
external or occupying forces, recognizing that each had different temporal components.
For example, Palestine was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for more than 200 years.
Britain’s mandate from the League of Nations lasted from the end of World War I until
1948 and the United Nations’ decision to partition the land into two states. After the
regional war established a second set of borders for Israel and Palestine, Jordan and
Egypt established different local government systems in the areas they controlled from
1948 through 1967 when the Israeli occupation began. Neither Egypt nor Jordan elected
to fulfill the United Nation’s objective of creating an independent Palestinian state.
Instead they imposed their control, and after the 1967 war, Israel too resisted the creation
of an independent state for Palestinians. During these different periods of occupation or
foreign rule, each occupying government or force developed and defined local
governance systems for the Palestinians. Some institutions and practices extended for
longer or shorter period of times (corresponding to the length of an occupation) and in
some instances practices and policies implemented by one power were continued by the
next.

The second phase of the development of local systems was initiated after by the
Oslo accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. These
agreements established the framework for an indigenous Palestinian government by
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vesting authority in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Since its creation and
establishment the PNA has governed the West Bank and Gaza Strip within the constraints
and limitation imposed by Israel’s occupation. Those constraints and limitations have
consistently changed relative to local political issues between Israel and Palestinians
short-circuiting the development and maturation of Palestinian institutions. For example,
checkpoints and closures have sometimes made economic development and management
in possible to execute. In that regard, then, the PNA while a “de jure” institution created
as a result of the Oslo accords has at times had its de facto existence curtailed.

Presidential and legislative elections were held with the participation of
candidates from only one party, Fatah. As other Palestinian political parties opposed the
Oslo Accords they chose not to submit lists of candidates in the parliamentary-style
elections. However, the Palestinian political map changed in 2006 when Hamas, an
opposition political party that had decided to adapt to the new reality of the PNA, won
the legislative elections. Palestinian politics was immediately transformed into a two
party struggle that quickly escalated to include armed confrontations between opposing
supporters. This conflict has had extreme negative consequences for the development of
local administrative systems creating a de facto civil war. In effect each party has begun
to protect its own political interests ignoring the professionalization of administrative
systems in favor of the establishment of two governments and administrative systems.
Hamas’ organization is vested in Gaza but it has supporters in the West Bank. Fatah’s
organization and government is concentrated in the West Bank, but it too has supporters
in Gaza. Opposition supporters living in areas controlled by the other party have been
targets of violence and discrimination (Edwards, 2007).
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Figure 1: Research Model

The research model in Figure 1-4 is divided into three parts. The initial inputs into
the formation of local government systems is defined by the rule of the external powers
represented by the Ottoman politics, British Mandate politics, Egyptian/Jordanian
politics, and the Israeli politics. The second phase are the developments in the post-Oslo
period which was distinguished by the establishment of the PNA and the evolving
struggle between the biggest two political factions, Fatah and Hamas, and its implication
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on the local governance system in such matters as the funding of government, the
supervision and hiring local governance servants, the establishment of laws and elections,
the selection or the appointment of mayors when no elections approved and organized by
the central government, and the appointment of senior staff. Finally, the model depicts
the connections and the involvement between the local governance system and citizens
who have the right to express their voices, views and needs, participate in the supervision
of municipal operations and having the bureaucrats accountable and transparent.

The inputs of the model are identified and defined as fellows:

a. Ottoman Politics – the political system used by the Ottoman regime in
Palestine from 1870 to 1917 and its impact on local governance system in
Palestine.
b. British Politics – the political system used by the British under its Mandate
from the League of Nations in Palestine from 1918 to 1948 and its impact on
local governance systems in Palestine.
c.

Israeli Politics – the political system used by Israel for local affairs in the
West Bank and Gaza during their occupation of the West Bank from 1976
through the present date and in the Gaza Strip from 1967 from through 2006
and its impact on local governance systems in Palestine.

d. Palestinian National Authority (PNA): The PNA established after the
Declaration of Principle between the PLO and Israel in 1993. The PNA ruled
the West Bank and Gaza Strip and while its operations and institutions never

67

were created in the absence of Israel’s occupation the PNA is as near to the
concept of self-autonomy as has ever existed for Palestinians.
e. Fatah Party: The most popular political faction in the Palestinian territories
and it dominated the governance system from the establishment of the PNA
through 2006. Now it controls the governance system only in the West Bank.
f. Hamas Party: It is an Islamic Political Party that opposed the Oslo Agreement.
In 2006, it won the legislative elections in both the West Bank and Gaza and
now controls the Gaza Strip through an independent government.
g. Local Governments: These are various administrative offices created by
occupying forces or the PNA that are smaller than a state. The term is used to
contrast with offices at nation-state level, which are referred to as the central
government, national government, or (where appropriate) federal government.
h. Funding: It is the process of financing to provide the capital needed by local
governments/authorities for infrastructure and service delivery.
i. Law: It is a system of rules, usually enforced through a set of institutions,
applied to govern a group of people.
j. Regulation: Legal restrictions promulgated by government authority. One can
consider at least two levels in democracies -- legislative acts, and
implementing specifications of conduct imposed sanction. This administrative
law or implementing regulatory law is in contrast to statutory or case law.
k. Staffing: Staffing involves finding the right people, with the right skills,
abilities, and fit, who may be hired or already working for the local
government or municipality.
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l. Supervision: This refers to the act of watching and guidance over the local
governments’ work or tasks of municipality who may lack full knowledge of
the concept at hand.
m. Elections: An election is a decision-making process by which a group of
people chooses an individual to hold local government or municipality office.
n. Mayor: The word of mayor is a modern title used in many countries for the
highest ranking officer in a municipal government.
o. Citizen: Generally citizenship is membership in a society, community, or a
country and carries with it rights to political participation; a person having
such membership is a citizen.

The study utilizes studies and historical documents that provide data related to the
local governance systems implemented in Palestine by the occupations forces or
governments of the Ottoman Empire, the British government through its League of
Nations mandate, the countries of Jordan and Egypt, and Israel. This historical
assessment helps to explain the development of the existing systems of Palestinian local
governance. The results from the survey of community leaders and their attitudes are also
possible to assess elements of the efficiency of the current local governance system.
Utilizing the two assessments, the study draws a group of recommendations that can help
in establishing more healthy local governance system.

The measurement of each of the elements of the model and the data collected
through the survey is clarified in Table I:
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Table I

No.
1.

2.

Independent Variables

Occupations’
Influence Dimension
National Government
& Local Government
Dimension

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.

1. PNA’s Local Governance Law
does not contribute largely
toward achieving an efficient
and effective performance of
the administrative system
2. The Palestinian Legislative

Survey responses
and historical
analysis.

1.
2.
3.
4.

4.

Politics Dimension

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Legal Dimension

Survey responses
and historical
analysis.
Survey responses
and historical
analysis.

5.

Professional
Dimension

Measurement

Dissolving local governments
Postponing local elections
Approving or denying any
local government budget
Administering local police
services
Forming new local
governments by citizens
Selection of mayors
dominated by politics
mayors lack academic
qualifications & experiences
Staffing inside the public
sector is based on favoritism
Municipalities lack the
technical and professional
manpower capabilities
Electing an independent, wellqualified candidate is better
than electing politically
affiliated, well-qualified
candidate
Politics relations must be
reorganized with the
administrative system
Selection and the appointment
of mayors of local governance
are based on political
affiliations only
Political factions’ struggle
hinders the efficiency &
effectiveness of municipalities

4.

3.

Factor
Ottoman Empire
British Mandate
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration
Israeli Occupation
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Survey responses
and historical
analysis.

Survey responses
and historical
analysis.

3.
4.

6.

Citizenry Dimension

1.

2.

Council needs to take further
laws to reinforce the
transparency
The current Palestinian role of
law is weak
The national government
interferes and influences the
performance and the functions
of the judicial system
Municipalities and local
councils do not address the
indigenous needs and wants of
citizens British Mandate
Local governance institutions
have representation of civil
society representatives

Survey responses
and historical
analysis.

The data sources used in this mixed method analysis are described as fellows:

1) The study presents an assessment of the historical development of the
Palestinian local governance system under the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate,
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and finally the Israeli occupation examining the
extent to which systems encouraged or extended local involvement or limited it. An
extensive literature search was conducted to collect data from secondary sources to
understand how the Palestinian local governance system was administered before the
establishment of the PNA in 1994 and to explores and explains how the local governance
system emerged and developed beginning from the Ottomans and through the Israeli
occupation. Chapters V and VI illustrate the consequences of the these foreign and the
PNA’s local governance systems on the Palestinian society especially in the areas of
laws, selections of mayors, staffing, operations, funding, supervision and elections which
are essential factors and the core of any local governance system.
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2) What ought to be done by the current PNA based on the experiences of the
previous occupations and the current applied local governance system and its limitations
is also emphasized in this study. Chapter VI explores the current local governance system
established by the PNA since 1993 up-to-date now in the field of elections, selection of
mayors, staffing, supervision, funding and the used laws and regulations. Chapter VIII
includes a group of short-term and long-term recommendations that PNA should do to
improve the local governance systems if a viable and healthy Palestinian State is to
establish in the near future.

3) The final data source includes the community leaders’ response to the survey
which investigates the potential and efficiency of the current local governance system, its
relationship with politics and judicial system, and its ability to meet citizens’ needs and
expectation. The survey data permits compassion of what ought to be done with what is
actually done by bureaucrats of the local governance and their political supervisors in the
PNA for the sake of establishing a viable Palestinian state. Chapter VIII presents some
recommendations based on the respondents’ views that could assist in establishing the
indigenous local governance system based on the responses of the survey and the history
of the development of the local governance system.

4.3 Survey of Community Leaders

a. Study Population

The population for the study in the survey consisted of the Palestinian community
leaders working in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors in the West Bank and Gaza
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Strip reflecting the attitudes of various citizens working in different academic and
professional sectors. A total of 1000 surveys were sent to more than 80 organizations that
participated in the study. The selection of these organizations was based on their
knowledge about the impact of the previous occupying powers on the community and
their involvement in the different issues of the local governance systems including
corruption combating, transparency of public servant recruitments, public financing and
others.

The community leaders are mixed economically and geographically and they
represent the two sexes and different ages beginning from 30 to 60 years old.

B. Respondents:

The respondents are Palestinian community leaders who are working in different
sectors in the West Bank and Gaza.

C. Survey Instrument

A survey instrument was developed to gather qualitative data. Each leader was
asked to complete a series of questions on a survey instrument that was designed to
capture what the community leaders think of the efficiency and the effectiveness of the
current local governance system and what ought to be done to create an indigenous local
governance system that can meet citizens’ needs and expectations. The survey design was
based upon the research questions.

The survey instrument consisted of five sections that are described below:

73

1.

Occupations’ Influence Dimension: Local government institutions in
Palestine have evolved through periods where the Ottoman Empire, the
British Government, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel have controlled elements
of the political, social, and economic life of Palestinians. This sector
tries to assess the occupations’ impact on local governments in Palestine
today through the responses of educated and involved officials in the
different governance issues in Palestine.

2.

National Government and Local Governments Dimension: This sector
tries to explain the current relations between the two governments and
the how such relations should be.

3.

Professional Dimension: This part measures the proficiency of local
governance system including the staffing policies, the academic
qualifications, and relevant experiences of the mayors and employees.

4.

Politics Dimension: It explains what kind of relations between politics
and local governance system in the Palestinian context.

5.

Legal Dimension: It explains the relations between the legal system and
the administrative system. It measures the efficiency of role of law in
the Palestinian community.

6.

Citizen Participation: Respondents were asked to provide their views
about the efficiency and the effectiveness of the local governance
system towards meeting citizens’ needs and expectations.
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d. Data Gathering

Each respondent was provided with a sealable envelope for returning the survey
to the address found on the consent form. Also an electronic copy of the survey was
submitted to these organizations so that respondents, if they wished, could print more
copies and email the filled survey directly to the co-researchers. As the survey responses
and signed consent forms are retrieved they will be manually recorded to keep an
accurate count. The survey responses and signed consent will be recorded and were
stored separately, to insure anonymity.

For more information about the questionnaire and the Research Project Consent
Letter to participants, please refer to the appendix B.

4.4 Data Analysis

Once it was confirmed that all completed the survey, the filled surveys had been
returned to the researcher and the data was entered into the SPSS Program. The SPSS
data explains the profile of participants (community leaders) and provides different
descriptive statistics about the responses of the different questions classified into different
dimensions. In order to know the relations between two variables, Chi-Square Tests are
used as well.

4.5 Summary

The multi-method methodology employed in this study was used to seek
information that would assist in answering how non-indigenous local government
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institutions in Palestine have interfered with the political maturation of administrative
systems, how the PNA’s politics has shaped and formulated local government systems to
serve limited political factions’ interests ignoring the establishment of indigenous local
government institutions, and what Palestine’s indigenous local government systems
means.

The data sources used in this research includes a historical development of the
Palestinian local governance system under the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate,
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and finally the Israeli occupation. An extensive
literature search was conducted to collect data from secondary sources to research how
the Palestinian local governance system was administered before the establishment of the
PNA. In addition, the data source includes community leaders’ response to the survey
which asks about the potential and efficiency of the current local governance system, its
relationship with politics and judicial system, and its ability to meet citizens’ needs and
expectation.

The survey was pre-tested to ensure clarity of language, order of questions, format
and to ensure validity and reliability and it was approved by the IRB Review Board at
Cleveland State University. The survey consisted of six dimensions that include
occupations’ influence dimension, national government and local governments
dimension, professional dimension, politics dimension, legal dimension, and finally the
citizenry dimension.
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CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PALESTINE
SINCE THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

5.1 Introduction

This chapter initiates the exploration of the extent to which Palestinian governing
institutions have been the product of external forces. While external forces likely impact
the governing systems of all countries, in the Palestinian context local or indigenous factors
were constantly thwarted or relegated to positions of secondary importance to insure that
the needs of the occupying forces were met. At the same time, the evolution of governing
institutions in Palestine occurred against the backdrop of a prolonged struggle for
independence. That struggle continues today. This chapter first presents a literature review
of the history of local governance system in Palestine from its Ottoman roots, through the
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British Mandate period. Attention is also directed towards changes made by Jordan and
Egypt during their periods of occupation. Careful attention is also directed at understanding
what occurred during Israel’s military occupation. The governing systems that now exist
are a result of the imposed politics exercised by occupations (LID Strom, 1999). These
imposed systems not only short-circuited the needed political maturation process, but it will
be argued that the establishments of a professionalized and modern bureaucracy for
effective public administration was also thwarted by the actions of the occupying countries
or societies.

The following account of the evolution of local governance system in Palestine
prior to the establishment of the PNA is divided into four historical stages, each of which
displays the nature and the relationship between the central authority of the ruler and local
authorities. The following part sheds light on the characteristics of local governance system
in each of the following stages:

1. Palestine as Part of Ottoman Empire;
2. Palestine under the League of Nations’ Mandate to Great Britain;
3. Gaza Strip under the Egyptian Government;
4. West Bank under the Jordanian Government; and
5. Palestine under the Israeli Military Occupation.

The key laws or administrative decisions made impacting the formation of local
government in Palestine are enumerated in Table II. Each of these is discussed, in turn,
and their impact noted.
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Table II
The Most Important Laws of Local Governance in the Palestinian History
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Ottoman Empire’s law of
district administration in
1864.
Ottoman Empire’s of Law of
Municipalities 1877
Articles Nos. 50-55 of the
Ottoman Empire’ s 1877
Municipalities Law
The 1921 British Law of
Local Councils

The British Mandate’s 1930
Local Municipalities Law
The British Amended Local
Municipalities Law of 1934

7.

The British Amended Local
Municipalities Law of 1938

8.

The British Villages
Administration Law of 1944
Egyptian order No. 509 of
1957
The Jordanian 1951law

9.
10.

11.

The 1954 Jordanian Law of
Municipalities and later 1955
amendment no. 29

12.

Israeli Military Orders 80
and 194 in 1967

13.

The First Presidential
Decision No. 1 of
Governance Rules in 1994

This law defined a five-level hierarchy of regional and local
administration and defined the authorities and responsibilities of
governors in each level.
The 1877 Law of Municipalities is considered as the organizational and
legal basis of the structure of municipal councils and the functions of
municipalities during the late Ottoman period.
These articles necessitated the accompaniment of municipal councils by
“municipal societies” which were government appointed.
The law preserved certain Ottoman laws with regards to Arab local
councils, gave the British High Commissioner the authority when
instructed by the governor of the district, to change the administration of
any large village to a local council through the issuance of a decree, and
specified the form of the council, its functions, and authorities.
It defined the functions and the authorities of municipalities in supervising
local construction, streets, and commercial markets and others.
It confirmed the authority of the High commissioner, the head of the
British civilian regime, to appoint and dismiss both the mayor and the
deputy-mayor of the municipal council, dismiss a council, call for
elections, approve bylaws or reject them, and sanction or disapprove of
financial transactions.
It confirmed the authority of the High commissioner to appoint “any
person” to fill a council vacancy. His will was both encompassing and
absolute as there was no legal way to appeal his decisions or limit his
wide-ranging administrative prerogatives.
It defined the functions and the authorities of village councils.
In the Gaza Strip, the establishment and administration of village and
municipal affairs were addressed by this Egyptian order No. 509 in 1957.
The 1951 law stipulated that all the references mentioned in the 1934 law
to the Mandate government, the high commissioner and the district
governor are replaced by the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, the Cabinet, the Interior Minister, and the governor respectively.
It is the law which applied by the Jordanian Administration in the West
Bank from 1950 till 1967. The law replaced the previous laws and
regulations related to municipalities and local councils in the Kingdom
(Article 105). The Law of Municipalities (Article 47) defined the
procedures for election of local councils by the citizens and the election of
the municipal chairman by the local council (from among the elected local
council members). Also, the law made provisions for complementary subelections when a seat became vacant in the municipal council (Article 45)
and other local governances’ details.
The orders specified that laws which were valid in both regions before the
6th of June, 1967, would remain valid as long as they do not oppose the
Israeli military orders. The orders transferred the different powers of the
central authority included in the Jordanian and British laws to Israel’s
Interior Military Officer.
The Israeli military orders remained in force until the 1994 Oslo
Agreement. On November 20th, 1994, President Yasser Arafat issued the
Presidential Decision No. 1, which confirmed that the rules, regulations,
and orders in place in June 1967 would remain valid till further notice.

Source: (Drori, 1975; Al Abadi, 1995; Peretz, 1986; & Amro, 1991).
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5.2 Palestine as Part of Ottoman Empire

Figure 2: Map of the Ottoman Empire and Its Growth and Expansion
Source: images.google.com/imgres?

In 1516 the Ottoman Turks conquered Palestine and the surrounding areas of
modern-day Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. The entire region was incorporated into the
dominions of the Ottoman Empire (see figure 1). Local governors were appointed from
Istanbul where annual revenues were sent, but important public works projects were also
undertaken.1 For example the city walls surrounding Jerusalem were extended in 1537 and
remain an important historical site. Palestine remained under Turkish rule until the end of
World War I. However, between 1832 and 1840 the Egyptian vassal, Muhammed Ali, led a
rebellion and took control of Palestine, Syria and areas of Asia from the Ottoman Empire.
1

The name Istanbul has been in common usage for the city since the conquest by the
Turks in 1453. Western sources used the name Constantinople through the end of the
19th century even though the Ottoman Empire used the name Istanbul for the seat of their
empire from the later part of the 15th century.
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His control was short-lived and the area was re-conquered by the Ottoman Empire with the
assistance of the British and Russian Empires (Verete, 1978, Al-Abadi, 1995).

The Ottoman government divided the region or area that is the Middle East today
into four districts that included the major cities or urban communities and their surrounding
areas. These districts were Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza and each was attached
administratively to the province of Damascus (Verete, 1978). Despite the federalist-like
structure of districts, provinces, and the national government (headquartered in Istanbul)
there was little decentralization and all decisions had to be approved by the central
government in the capital city. The Ottoman regime applied an administrative system based
on the central government in Istanbul through tightening control of its administrative
sections in all the geographical areas of the empire (Aronson, 1990). They gave names to
some administrative units in east Jordan and Palestine based on the names of most
important cities. However, there were no significant relations between the geographic and
organizational units. For instance, the Nablus District was once connected administratively
with Jerusalem and once was connected with Beirut (Al-Abbadi, 1995). It can be inferred
that there was no sustainable system regarding the distribution of the administrative
districts in the area. The administrative districts of Palestine under the Ottomans are
depicted in Figure 5-2.
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Figuure 3: Map of Palestine under
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walls of the Old City and in adjacent areas and their political and social significance for the
Empire’s important allies, France and Russia required special attention from the Empire.
That attention help to insure that neither France nor Russia would threaten military action
to protect the sites that were important to Christianity and the Churches in their countries.
In addition the region, then, as now, was prone to conflicts among residents increasing the
pressure on the Empire to maintain order (Kushner, 1999). According to Kushner (1999),
there were also other problems included the control of the nomadic population (the
Bedouin, a non-territorial people that still create administrative and political challenges for
Israel and Egypt), the collection of taxes, the lack of public funds, and the inefficiency and
corruption of the administrative apparatus. Yet, the importance of Jerusalem for the
Empire’s allies and powerful countries that could become enemies required that the city
and its holy places receive special attention. The overall management situation was further
complicated by the presence of protectors2 in Istanbul who ignored the needs of ordinary
people and looked after the interests of individuals or groups - such as foreign consuls,
Jews, notables, and officials - and who prevented the removal of corrupt officials by the
governors (Kushner, 1999).

In 1854, the Ottomans approved the first municipal council in the Empire by a
special decree. However, the procedures for establishing regional or local administrative
units or councils were not legally clarified until a second decree regarding district
administration was issued in 1864 (Amro, 1991). This law established a five-level

2

Protector refers to a person ruling a kingdom or Empire during the minority, absence, or
incapacity of the sovereign. Protectors were the Ottoman senior employees who were in
charge of employing the rulers in the Jerusalem District and supporting their corrupt roles
and safeguarding their illegal actions.
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hierarchy of regional and local administration structures, categories, or levels and defined
the authorities and responsibilities of governors in each administrative level. In 1870, local
government autonomy was enhanced by a decree that transferred authority for municipal
affairs from the ruler of the city to the municipal councils (Al-Nammura, 1994).
Subsequently, in 1871, a state law was issued creating the various levels of regional
administration: regional districts (designated as Wileit), districts, and villages.
Municipalities, on the other hand, remained without appointment or recognition until the
Ottoman Law of Municipalities was issued in 1877 (Al-Abbadi, 1995).

The 1877 Law of Municipalities issued by the Ottoman Empire regarded by many
researchers as the organizational and legal basis of the structure of municipal councils and
the functions of municipalities during the late Ottoman period (Amro, 1991). The law
created the procedures for establishing municipalities (urban or city governments) and
their functions and responsibilities separate from the powers granted to regions or districts
(Maoz, 1984). The decree also created the background or structures that characterize the
current local governance system in Palestine. The decree stated that a municipal council
would be established in each city and village and suburb. However, to ensure the Ottoman
dominance of the local councils, the central authority stipulated that the members of the
municipal council should be able to write and speak Turkish (Article 18/Ottoman Law,
1877). In addition, all council members had to be regarded as wealthy or from influential
families and hold Ottoman citizenship. These requirements made it impossible for most
Palestinians to be directly involved in the local governance systems that impacted their
daily lives. Citizenship in the Empire was granted only to individuals whose fathers, not
mothers, were originally Ottoman (Maoz, 1984). In essence the local government system
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was a structure developed to co-opt wealthy and leading families who could be trusted
with the reigns of local control. Their support was seen as a requirement to maintain
stability and control over the conquered lands. Little attention was placed on service
delivery or democratic control. Control over the empire and its domains were the only
priority. The delivery of services or the building of professional administrative structures
connected to any sort of democratic institution was not a concern for the Empire.

The number of municipalities in Palestine reached 22 by the end of the Ottoman
reign. Acre, Haifa, Shafa Amro, Safad, Nazareth, Tiberias, Bissan, Jenin, Tulkerm,
Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Al-Lud, Al-Ramleh, Jaffa, Beit Jala, Bethlehem, Hebron,
Beer Al-Sabe’, al-Majdal, Gaza and Khan Younes were each recognized (Al-Nammura,
1994). There is no evidence that the 22 municipalities created by the Ottomans in Palestine
were established to serve the needs of local public interests (Maoz, 1984). For example,
the services of education and health were not available to all residents. Service delivery
was restricted and provided only in specific urban areas and for the influential and rich
families. The remote areas even suffered from a lack of pure water and well-planned roads
and streets that could help improve local economies and permit residents to have access to
surrounding cities and villages (Al-Nammura, 1994). The infrastructure of roads was
designed to meet the military needs of the Empire and its military forces (Maoz, 1984).

The central Ottoman authority was directly involved in the selection of the
chairman of the municipalities’ councils although it did not involve itself openly in the
election process of council members (Maoz, 1984). Article 5 of the Ottoman Municipalities
Law of 1877 stated that the chairman of the municipality would be appointed by the central
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government of the Ottoman Empire (Maoz, 1984). The central authority also restricted the
autonomy of the local councils by requiring that local actions and decisions had to be
approved in advance by the local administration council (Mary & Usama, 1996). Moreover,
the central authority adopted Articles Number 50 through 55 requiring each municipal
council to be connected to a “municipal society.” The societies were governmental entities
consisting of Ottoman appointed employees to supervise all the municipal issues in the
Empire’s areas (Al-Abbadi, 1995). Reinforcing the desire to centralize policy control, the
municipal societies met twice a year in Istanbul and were given the authority to investigate
conditions of any municipal council and issue reports submitted to the Ottoman governor
evaluating the performance of any council (Al-Abbadi, 1995).

Competing candidates did not contest elections and the right to vote was
restricted. The governance system implemented was designed to insure that influential and
wealthy families supported the Empire. These families - the Khalidis, Alamis, Husaynis,
Dajanis, and Nashashibis - controlled the most prominent positions in the administrative
and municipal offices and ruled the regions on behalf of the Empire (Maoz, 1984). Other
people could not run for positions in the municipal governments as a result of the
requirement to speak Turkish and hold citizenship in the Empire. Further if these
requirements were not sufficient to insure that acceptable people were selected to lead the
cities, the Ottoman government could interfere in the appointment of any individual
through the chairman of the municipality (Al-Nammura, 1994).

The authority granted to the local councils was also limited. They were not given
the responsibility or authority to deliver services to large segments of the population. For
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example, the local councils’ responsibilities were limited to supervising hotels, cafés,
theaters, and recreation places, registering individuals, recording births, deaths, and
property transfers, supervising and facilitating traffic and transport processes within the
municipality, cleaning the city, and preparing annual council budgets and monthly reports
on revenues and expenditures (Ottoman Law, 1877). Different from the US where local
governments by tradition also provided limited services at this time, self-help or citizen
groups/organizations did not emerge to bridge gaps in the provision of services by local
governments. Local organizations were suppressed as these were seen as expressions of
Arab nationalism or independence. The Empire would not tolerate any expression of
national identity or independence (Jarbawi, 1996).

Most importantly relative to the economic development of cities the councils did
not have any authority to deal with infrastructure development, maintenance of existing
assets, and urban planning and land use. Further, the curricula used in schools was also set
by the Empire meaning that virtually all of the fundamental services that could advance
local areas and improve the quality of life in the cities was controlled by Istanbul (Jarbawi,
1996). Public education, from its very beginnings, was never under the control of the
Palestinian people but instead, was controlled by successive colonial external
administrations beginning in the Ottoman period (1516 to 1917) and continuing through
the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Abu-Saad, 2006). During four
centuries of Ottoman rule in Palestine, the Palestinians also relied on traditional medicines
delivered by local practitioners who may have had little formal training and used herbal
medicines. Male religious healers routinely performed bone-settings and cauterizations and
probably relied on blood-letting through the period of Ottoman regime (Abu-Rabia, 2005).
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Professionalization of health care delivery in conquered areas was also not a priority for
the Ottoman Empire.

It is also important to note that peasants did not own the lands they plowed and
planted outside the village perimeter and there was little they could achieve for themselves
except for the future delivery of their harvests to the governments of the areas (Doumani
and Jaquet, 2006).3 The land property contract was related to a centralizing Ottoman state
that decided on the use of land in Palestine and limited people’s participation (Doumani
and Jaquet, 2006). Moreover, Cosgel (2006) argued that the Ottomans’ administered a
discriminatory taxation system based on an analysis of taxing procedures and their
distributional consequences in Palestine, Jordan and Syria. The tax system applied in these
areas was different from the one applied in Istanbul and other original Turkish areas
(Cosgel, 2006).

It is obvious that the local government institutions created under the Ottoman
regime did not serve the indigenous people. Rather the system created was used to
centralize authority in the Istanbul. All plans and policies were determined by the central
authority and without meaningful representation of the indigenous people who could not
influence the decisions, rules, and laws of the local governance systems (Amro, 1991).
Local governance in Palestine was overly centralized with policies and practices shaped by
the politics and needs of the Ottoman Empire (Al-Nammura, 1994). The dichotomy
between politics and administration was not applicable in Palestine as the Ottoman Empire
3

This would emerge as an important political issue in the early 20th century as a result of
the Empire’s decision to sell land to European Jews who created a string of communities
(the Kibbutzim and Moshavim) that, in turn would lead to increased conflicts between
Jewish and Arab residents of the region during the British Mandate years.
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was shaped all policies, practices, and institutions of public administration. In this sense
the entire system was a product of activities located distant from the indigenous people and
created without respect to their needs or desires (Jarbawi, 1996). All policies, laws, and
rules of local governance systems were decided in Istanbul and in the attendance of the
appointed Ottoman employees and the chairpersons of municipalities.

5.3 Palestine under the League of Nations’ Mandate to Great Britain

The boundaries between Palestine and Jordan were drawn up as a result of the
1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain, France and Russia to determine the future of
the Middle Eastern Ottoman Empire after World War I. Most contemporary discussions on
the Middle East ignore how the current system of states was formed as David Fromkin
(1989) points out in A Peace to End All Peace. The system of states in the Middle East was
invented by the end of the First World War and was crafted by Europeans in the early
1920s to expand their empires as they divided the holdings of the fallen Ottoman Empire
(Fromkin, 1989). The created states were administrative conveniences to allow the British
and French to establish their influence and control following practices used in previous
areas after other wars. By 1922, the political characteristics of the Middle East seems were
drawn.

Britain tinkered with elections in the new state of Iraq to set up and control
influential Arab figures who fought with the Western countries against the Ottoman Empire
for the British promises of helping them to gain the authority in their areas (Fromkin,
1989). The British supported kings and rulers to guarantee their loyalty in the different
areas of the Middle East on the account of achieving any democratic popular process
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(Fromkin, 1989). For example, Feisal (Hussein’s son) as ruler of Iraqi; Britain set up
Abdullah (Hussein’s other son) in Jordan; ibn Saud, who kept causing problems with
Abdullah, was given Saudia Arabia; and Britain managed to mollify France by parceling
out Syria and Lebanon. Fromkin’s main point is that by 1922, European powers had
partitioned the former Ottoman Empire into states and setup puppet regimes, drawing
boundaries and imposing rulers while ignoring the wishes of the indigenous people who
actually lived there.

However, the situation in Palestine was more complicated and different from the
new neighboring Arab areas. The area was to be directly administered by Great Britain.
Great Britain had previously made a commitment to representatives of the International
Zionist Movement to assist in the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The commitment
was defined in the 1917 Balfour Declaration in which the establishment of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine was clearly outlined (Barker, 2008). Arab residents of Palestine were
ill-informed about the scope of the declaration and the British government’s commitment
to it when the area came under British military administration in October 1918 (Gil-Har,
2000). In turn, the Palestine’s Arab leadership as well as the Arab leaders in other areas
rejected the principles of The Balfour Declaration. However, during World War I Arab
countries sought their independence from the Ottoman Empire and similarly from the
British Empire after the war (Al-Nammura, 1994). That focus deflected attention from the
commitment of other Arabs for and to Palestinian independence or the establishment of an
Arab state in the land administered by the British. In a strategic error the Palestinian
community did not seek its own independence.
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Segev (2001) argues in his book, One Palestine, Complete Jews and Arabs under
the British Mandate, that the Arabs did not receive the British as an army of liberation
when they occupied Palestine in 1917-18 but rather as an enemy of the Ottoman Empire.
Loyalty to the Ottoman Empire or just poor insight might have contributed to the failure of
using the UN Mandate period to seek an independent Palestinian state. Segev additionally
argues that the British were pro-Zionist and supported the establishment of the Israeli state.
Inserting rich historical details and being sensitive to all perspectives, Segev describes the
decline of the British Empire in the area, the birth of the Israeli nation, and the tragedy of
the Palestinian people. Segev (2001) asserts that whatever the British may have said to the
Palestinians, their actions were uncompromisingly pro-Zionist from the start. For example,
the British administration appointed Zionist Jews to important positions: not only Herbert
Samuel, but also his son Edwin Samuel to serve as liaisons with the Zionist Commission
and Norman Bentwich as attorney-general. Zionist influence in London annoyed British
high commissioners and senior officers alike, but that did not deter the commitment to the
creation of a Jewish state. For example, the officers knew that Chaim Weizmann, a
Russian-born Jewish immigrant who sought to succeed Herzl after his death in 1904 as
leader of the Zionist efforts to create a Jewish state, had far better access to British prime
ministers than they did any Palestinian Arab leader (Segev, 2001). He believes this was
done out of the mistaken, anti-Semitic belief that “[I]n standing by the Zionist movement,
the British believed they were winning the support of a strong and influential ally. This was
an echo of the notion that the Jews turned the wheels of history, a uniquely modern brand
of classical anti-Semitic pre-conceptions and romantic veneration of the Holy Land and its
people” (Segev, 2001: 125). Segev (2001) completely downplays the impact of Western
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war guilt over the Holocaust that led to a huge growth in support for an independent Israeli
state at the expense of Palestinian rights. He analyzed why the British left Palestine in 1948
by stating that it was because the 1936-39 Palestinian-Arab revolt made the British sick of
Palestine and convinced them once and for all that there was nothing left for them to do in
Palestine.

The Palestinians suffered tremendously under British’s rule (Al-Nammura, 1994).
Britain made efforts to fulfill the commitments in the Balfour Declaration and to give a
legal basis to its policies once the League of Nations had approved the British Mandate for
Palestine in June 1922 (Amro, 1991). The Mandate changed some Ottoman administrative
divisions by issuing the 1921 Law of Local Councils and the 1934 Municipalities Law. The
six administrative districts are explained in Table III.

Table III

The Six Administrative Districts divided into sixteen sub-districts under the British
Mandate in 1921.
District

Sq.Kms.

Headqtrs. Subdistricts

Gaza

13,689

Gaza

Lydda

1,206

Jaffa

Jerusalem

4,334

Jerusalem

Samaria

3,266

Nablus

Haifa
Galilee

1,021
2,804

Haifa
Nazareth

Gaza
Beer Al-Sabe’
Jaffa
Ramle
Jerusalem
Hebron
Ramallah
Nablus
Jenin
Tulkarm
Haifa
Nazareth
Acre
Beisan
Safad
Tiberias

Sq.Kms.
1, 113
12,576
336
370
1,571
2,076
687
1,637
839
790
1,021
499
810
361
695
439

Source: A Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information
of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Jerusalem: Palestine Government Printer,

1946), volume 1, pp. 103-105.
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Table IV

The Population of the Historical Palestine under the British Mandate
Religions
Muslims
Jews
Christians
Others
TOTAL

1920
521,403
66,574
77,801
7,415
673, 193

1921
585,271
81,263
88,049
7,213
761,796

1922
590,890
83,794
73,024
9,474
757, 182

Source: Chapter 1: Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem
www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter01.htm

The British implemented and managed two different local governance policies,
one for the Jewish immigrants and the other for the Palestinians (Amro, 1991). While the
1921 Law of Local Councils served to pave the way for establishing a national homeland
for the Jews in Palestine (Amro, 1991), the British kept some Ottoman laws and thus the
Palestinian administrative councils were not able to represent the indigenous people
(Jarbawi, 1996). For example, Segev (2001) argues that the British kept their promise to the
Zionists. They opened up the country to 20,000 Jewish immigrants between 1920 and
1922. By 1948, the Jewish population had increased by more than tenfold a result of the
Holocaust and WW II. At the same time, there were active movements designed to
encourage Muslims and Christians to move to the area to protect their own holy sites after
the Belfour Declaration (Jarbawi, 1996). The Jews were permitted to purchase land,
develop agriculture, and establish industries and banks. The British allowed them to set up
hundreds of new settlements, including several towns adjacent to Tel Aviv (the city that
was to become the largest in Israel). These towns became suburban cities in the Tel Aviv
metropolitan area. The Jewish immigrants also created a school system and military
organizations (Haganah); they had sophisticated political leadership and created several
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institutions that held elections to choose leaders (Jarbawi, 1996). Each of these institutions
contributed to the military victory Israel secured after the partition of Palestine in 1948.
The Jewish Diaspora including funds to purchase land also provided financial support. All
of this took place with the full support of the British forces to underscore the support for
the Balfour Declaration. Contrary to the widely held belief of Britain’s pro-Arab policies
and positions, British actions supported the Zionist enterprise (Segev, 2001). In addition,
the Jewish Diaspora’s substantial financial support led to the creation of the prestigious
Hebrew University. That too was done with British support.

According to 1921 Law of Local Councils, the British High Commissioner had
the authority, instructed by the governor of the district, to change the administration of any
large village to a local council through the issuance of a decree. The decree also specified
the form of the council, its functions, and authorities. The British High Commissioner had
the authority to declare the formation of a local council in any suburb of a city (Articles 120 of the law). The establishment of the new Palestinian local councils faced challenges
during that era because there was a tendency towards establishing a kind of electoral
institutions that were unfamiliar and new to Palestinian society (Amro, 1991). The
Palestinians were accustomed to the very centralized local governance used by the Ottoman
Empire with limited opportunities for participation. The Jewish immigrants largely from
Europe, however, had more experience with the institutions, policies, and practices created
and implemented by the British (Segev, 2001).
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Table V shows the development of sub-district and their population in 1931 and
1948:

Table V

Source: Chapter 1: Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem
www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter01.htm

For example, prior to the first municipal election in 1926, the British had
established municipal institutions, created municipal districts as indicated in Table 5-4, and
appointed mayors without giving the local population – either Jewish or Palestinian – the
opportunity to express its political views (Maoz, 1984). Thus British politics shaped public
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administration in Palestine. When local elections were held in the major cities, the voting
was so demanding and restrictive that only six percent of the indigenous inhabitants of
municipalities actually voted (Maoz, 1984). Because of continuing Palestinian-Jewish
conflict the British were not able to achieve a real development or reform in local
governance system. Because of the security situation the British cancelled elections in 1930
and it was not until four years later, following the passage of the Municipal Corporations
Ordinance, that elections for mayors and municipal councils were held. Moreover, the 1934
legislative enactment did not provide a strong legal foundation for the advancement of local
rule in Palestine but primarily served British interests rather than those of the indigenous
population (Asuf, 1985; Jarbawi, 1996). For example, the senior health care officers, who
were British, were responsible for the administration and supervision of the health care
activities while the Arab Palestinian employees only acted on those tasks approved by the
British (Abu-Rabia, 2005). Moreover, malaria, tuberculosis, trachoma, and other diseases
were widespread in Palestine during the British Mandate (Sufian, 2002). Abu Rabia (2005)
states that people, particularly in the Negev, suffered from numerous communicable
diseases, illnesses, isolation, ignorance and the stress of economic conditions. All of these
factors greatly contributed to the high mortality rate. Most illnesses sprang from cold, damp
and mosquitoes. Many infants died at birth, and mothers died during delivery. The existing
local governments did little or nothing to improve conditions.

In addition, the education curricula that were imposed on the people by the British
mandate did not meet the culture needs of the Palestinians but did emphasize literacy skills
(Abu-Saad, 2006). In many cases, people expressed their disappointment and frustration at
the lack of Palestinian autonomy over their educational system that was administered and

96

controlled by British officials (Mar’i, 1978). Numerous authors have commented on the
very alien curriculum imposed by the British on Palestinian students, in which “direct
teaching of contemporary history was excluded from the official syllabus” (Tibawi, 1956:
196; Khalidi, 1981).

Goren (2006) in his discussion of the establishment of Palestinian neighborhoods
in 1930s cited various factors that led to the failure of the housing projects undertaken by
the local governments in Haifa and Jaffa and other districts due to the failure to secure
central government financial support. All urban planning and land use decisions were made
by the British often without regard to local needs, preferences, or the participation of local
residents in the planning process (Goren, 2006). Stockdale (2006) argued that through
missionaries and other long-term English residents the British organized ‘mothers’
educational meetings based on English methods that contradicted the Palestinian
indigenous maternal knowledge and culture. This was just another example of the
imposition of British practices and philosophies in area that included people from a nonEuropean culture. While the Jewish residents – comprised of large numbers of European
immigrants – were comfortable with British policies, practices, and institutions, for the
Arab residents of the area an alien culture was trying to impose its values and practices
without regard for their preferences and norms.

Table 5-5 shows the number of British, Arab, and Jewish high officers in the
governmental departments in 1937. There were a total of 556 British employees, 309 Arabs
and 177 Jews (Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, 2006). Examining Table VI
illustrates that the majority of the public employees were British generally and in the fields
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of administration, labor, legal system, police, public works, railways, secretariat,
government printing, social welfare, surveys, and city planning. This implied that the
policies, decisions, rules and regulations were dominated by the British views rather than
the views and hopes of the Palestinian people.

Table VI
Number of British, Arab, and Jewish officers in the governmental departments in 1937

Source: Chapter 1: Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, 2066.
www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter01.htm
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According to the 1934 Ordinance, the British High commissioner had the military
authority to appoint and dismiss both the mayor and the deputy-mayor of the municipal
councils. The high commissioner could similarly dismiss a council, call for elections,
approve bylaws or reject them, impose sanctions, and disapprove of financial transactions
(Asuf, 1985). In a 1938 supplement to the Ordinance, the High Commissioner was granted
the authority to appoint “any person” to fill a council vacancy. The high commissioner’s
will was both encompassing and absolute. In addition, there was no legal way to appeal
decisions and the only limits to the wide-ranging administrative prerogatives lied with the
British authorities in London (Peretz, 1986).

Local and administrative units suffered from internal divisions between Jews and
Arabs, the British and the Palestinians, and the British and the Jews, a general lack of
public interest and participation, and violent confrontations between Jews and Arabs
(Peretz, 1986). Consequently, with this weak foundation for autonomous local action and a
narrow electoral base, any potential to form a government characterized by professional
public administration and a representative government was very limited. Indeed, from a
purely quantitative approach, it is revealing that there were 31 local councils within the
Arab sector in 1926, 20 in 1931, and only 24 by 1944. The fact that the number of
municipalities remained fairly constant – 22 in 1917 and 24 in 1944 – indicates that this
level of local government was not matching the growth of the population and their
increasing needs (Maoz, 1984). Maoz (1984) argues that the one-third elimination of the
municipalities was attributed to the lack of the financial resources that ignored the annual
population increase indicated in Table VII.
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Table VII
Yearly Population Growth in Mandatory Palestine
Year

Muslims

Percentage
Change

Christians

Percentage
Change

Percentage
Change

Percentage
Change

Percentage
Change

1923

609,331

3.4

72,090

0.8

681,421

3.1

7,908

3.8

89,660

7.0

1924

627,660

3.0

74,094

2.7

701,754

2.9

8,263

4.4

94,945

5.8

1925

641,494

2.2

75,512

1.9

717,006

2.1

8,507

2.9

121,725

28.2

1926

663,613

3.4

76,467

1.2

740,080

3.2

8,782

3.2

149,500

22.8

1927

680,725

2.5

77,880

1.8

758,605

2.5

8,921

1.5

149,789

0.1

1928

695,280

2.1

79,812

2.4

775,092

2.1

9,203

3.1

151,656

1.2

1929

712,343

2.4

81,776

2.4

794,119

2.4

9,443

2.6

156,481

3.1

1930

733,149

2.9

84,986

3.9

818,135

3.0

9,628

1.9

164,796

5.3

1931

753,812

2.8

87,870

3.3

841,682

2.8

10,024

4.1

172,028

4.3

1932

771,174

2.3

90,624

3.1

861,798

2.3

10,281

2.5

180,793

5.0

1933

789,980

2.4

95,165

5.0

885,145

2.7

10,532

2.4

209,207

15.7

1934

807,180

2.1

99,532

4.5

906,712

2.4

10,746

2.0

253,700

21.2

1935

826,457

2.3

103,371

3.8

929,828

2.5

10,896

1.3

320,358

26.2

1936

848,342

2.6

106,474

3.0

954,816

2.6

11,219

2.9

370,483

15.6

1937

875,947

3.2

109,769

3.0

985,716

3.2

11,520

2.6

386,084

4.2

2.9

7,617

Jews

589,177

2.6

660,641

Others

1922

Average Increase

71,464

Total "Arabs"

2.7

83,790

2.8

11.0

Source: www.mideastweb.org/palpop.htm
This bureaucratic system encouraged the British to appoint secretaries and
municipal commissions to oversee a number of Palestinian towns, councils and
municipalities. These individuals had the authority to ignore any electoral process that
involved the people. In 1939 the scheduled elections were cancelled after violent
confrontations between Jews and Arabs. Even the basic human services including water
and electricity for houses, schools, and streets were disrupted because of the violence and
the inability of the British administration’s to contain it (Amro, 1995). The administrative
organizations provided a limited number of services in the field of health and education. In
1946, (after World War II) local elections were held in the Palestinian towns but the results
remained controlled by the policies of the British authorities that left Palestine in 1949 with
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weak form of local governance (Peretz, 1986). Moreover, the Ottoman Law restricting
chairmanship and membership of the municipal councils to specific wealthy individuals of
influential families was still exercised and applied by the British through the final years of
their administration of Palestine (Amro, 1995).

In summary, the British gave special attention to municipalities and local
government institutions largely because they those municipalities were institutional liaisons
that could be used to penetrate the Palestinian local community and tighten effective
control (Jarbawi, 1996). The British authorities were also interested in fulfilling the
commitments made in the Balfour Declaration (Segev, 2001). Therefore, the dichotomy
between politics and administration was not applicable in Palestine as the British politics
shaped and drew the characteristics of the public administration that was far away from the
indigenous needs of people and close enough to their military rule and political promises
and agendas.

5.4 Gaza Strip under the Egyptian Government

The Gaza strip was under Egyptian administration from 1948 until 1967. The
administrative systems used were specified in order No. 509 issued in 1957. Participating
with the French and British colonial powers Israel briefly occupied Gaza in 1956 as part of
their attack on Egypt in an effort to restore Western control over the Suez Canal after
Egypt’s after its nationalization. Between 1948 and 1957 the Egyptian administration
maintained the British mandate laws and regulations without any important changes or
amendments (Jarbawi, 1996). The Egyptians regarded the Gaza Strip as a region separate
from Egypt with two municipalities, Gaza and Khan Younis, and one village council, Deir
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Al-Balah. In 1957 Egypt decided to establish nine new village councils that matched the
nine villages of Gaza, (Rafah, Nuseirat, Buriej, Maghazi, Jabalia, Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia,
Abbassan, and Khuza’ha) and maintained the status of the two cities. The Gazan local
administrative entities did not enjoy autonomy and could only oversee specific and limited
services in the field of education, health, and transportation (Amro, 1991). Moreover, no
local municipal elections were conducted throughout the period of the Egyptian
administration (Jarbawi, 1996).

The Egyptian administration appointed municipal committees and councils in an
effort to control the activities and missions of local government in the Gaza Strip. Thus,
councils operated under strict and tight control by Egypt’s central authorities. In the case of
changing or imposing any amendments, an Egyptian legislator, not a Palestinian, was the
final decision maker (Jarbawi, 1996). In spite of the absence of free elections for the local
governance in Gaza, the Egyptian legislation required that both the electors and nominees
for municipal and village councils had no overdue taxes owed to the municipality prior
their official appointment by the governor.

In summary, the dichotomy between politics and administration is not applicable
in Gaza as the Egyptian politics shaped and drew the characteristics of the public
administration that is far away from the indigenous needs of people. This demonstrated that
there was an absence of democracy and that the officials had to meet the criteria established
by the Egyptians. Candidates for municipal office had to be accepted to the Egyptians
(Amro, 1991). At the same time, the people in Gaza could not achieve their essential needs
of having proper electricity and water supplies, professionalized urban planning services,
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leadership for their economy and the needed infrastructure for development. Moreover, the
people were forced to implement Egyptian curricula in their school systems. There was no
single college or university developed in Gaza during their administration (Jarbawi, 1996).

Figure 4: Map of the West Bank & Gaza
Source: images.google.com/imgres?

5.5 West Bank under the Jordanian Government

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan assumed administrative control of the West
Bank after the 1948 War with Israel and held it until 1967. After the termination of the
British Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab States rejected the
decision to divide the country between Palestinians and Jews and instead chose to engage
the emerging State of Israel in a war fought on three fronts. Syria attached from the north,
the Jordanian army advanced from the east, and Egyptian forces attacked from the south.
When the establishment of a Jewish state was announced, many countries including the
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former Soviet Union, the USA, France and others recognized the Jewish State leaving the
Palestinians’ fate to be decided by the other Arab countries. It is unclear if the Palestinians
themselves would have accepted a separate state or if they too wanted to engage the
emerging Jewish state in a war. The Jewish leadership declared the existence of the State of
Israel but no similar declaration of independence was made by the Palestinians. The
Palestinians’ case and hopes for an independent state and homeland rested with the three
Arab governments that engaged Israel in the war. Officially the Palestinians’ case was
represented by the Arab League (officially the League of Arab States); a regional
organization of Arab States. These independent countries were located across southwest
Asia and north and northeast Africa. The League was formed in Cairo in March 1945.
Egypt and Jordan were founding members (Al-Abbadi, 1995) and were committed – or so
it seemed to an armed confrontation with the emerging Jewish state. Years later it would be
learned that Jordan’s interest lied with the creation of Israel and its intent with regard to the
West Bank was to include it in its sphere of influence and as part of the Hashemite state
(Segev, 2007).

When the Palestinians failed to declare their independence Jordan’s King
Abdullah was able to secure his interests by controlling and annexing the Palestinian
territories of the West Bank including East Jerusalem (Al-Nammura, 1994). The King
wanted to unify that land with his existing kingdom and extend his authority to both sides
of the Jordan River. These intentions were formally declared at the 1949 Jericho
Conference where the King called for the unity of Jordanian and Palestinian lands with him
as the reigning monarch (Al-Nammura, 1994).
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After the annexation of the West Bank Jordan tried to amend the British 1934
Municipalities Law to respond to some of the demands of the Palestinian people. In 1951, a
number of Hebron residents sent a petition to the district governor asking for revisions in
the electoral law. For example, they wanted to change the voting law to extend the right to
vote to citizens between 18 and 21 years of age. They also wanted the mayor to be elected
by city council members (Al-Abbadi, 1995). In addition, they demanded reforms of the city
tax code and municipal systems in accordance with the population size of cities and
villages and asked that the municipal council should be accountable to the people (Maoz,
1984).

In a transparent effort to legitimatize the annexation of the West Bank, King
Abdullah called for elections to establish a new Jordanian Parliament that would formally
approve the annexation of the West Bank. Without any hesitation the elected parliament
approved the annexation. The administration of the West Bank was then subjected to the
laws and regulations of the Jordanian Constitution and the country’s administrative
structure including statues related to municipalities and village councils. However, the
Jordanian government required numerous reforms and frequently changed laws and
procedures. For example the 1934 Law of Municipalities remained as the administrative
format for the West Bank until 1951 when a new law amended the 1934 act (Maoz, 1984).
The 1951 law stated that all the articles of the British 1934 law would be changed to
comply with laws and statutes of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Cabinet, the
Interior Minister, and the regional governor respectively. The Jordanian Constitution of
1952 referred to the establishment of local units in the areas of the Kingdom. Article 121
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stipulated that municipal and local affairs were to be administered by municipal or local
councils in accordance with national laws.

The British Mandate’s laws of local governance and municipal councils were
replaced by the Jordanian municipalities and local councils law (Article 105) that granted
very limited autonomy to the local councils. The Law of Municipalities (Article 47)
defined the procedures for electing local councils by the citizens and electing the municipal
chairman by the local council (from among the elected local council members). Such
changes from the procedures established by Great Britain under its Mandate from the
League of Nations allowed local councils to appoint private and public committees that
monitored specific tasks and problems handled by the councils (Article 58). Also, the law
allowed for complementary sub-elections when a seat became vacant in the municipal
council (Article 45).

However, local autonomy was severely limited and the election procedures were
controlled and dominated by the central authority of the Jordanian Interior Minister. That
minister had the authority to establish or cancel any municipal body, to change the
boundaries of the municipal areas (Articles 2-5), to determine the number of the municipal
council members through the approval of the Cabinet, to determine the dates of municipal
elections (Article 58), to divide any municipal area to elective constituencies (Article 12),
and to define regulations concerning the methods of nomination and election (Article 20).
All municipal budgets were also under the supervision and administration of the Interior
Minister (Articles 70-71), and the municipal councils were not allowed to make any
payments unless part of a previously approved budget (Article 61). Governors and rulers,
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under the 1957 Law of Administrative Divisions, were given the power to control and
supervise all municipal affairs.

The Municipalities Law of 1954 remained in effect for only one year. In 1955 the
Jordanian legislature found that the 1954 law was not covering all the municipal affairs and
therefore issued a new and more comprehensive Municipalities Law (Number 29) (Amro,
1991). This law and its amendments constituted the framework for present day legal and
organizational framework of local councils both in Palestine and Jordan (Amro, 1991). The
Jordanian government also issued a series of administrative regulations, instructions, and
formations following the law’s publication. It appears through reviewing those procedures
that the central authority would continue to exercise direct control of municipal affairs
through two approaches. The first consisted of issuing several regulations and rules during
the 1950s to control the local councils and restrict their political autonomy. These
procedures caused the dissolution of several local councils and the appointment of
municipal committees from 1962 through1966. The second tactic involved the appointment
of two members of each municipal council by the Ministry (Technical team, 1994).

Municipalities Law No. 29 gave the central authority (represented by the Interior
Minister and subject to the approval of the Cabinet) the power to appoint two additional
members to each local council (Article 27). In appointing these members, the government
considered political balances and the interests of important local families in the municipal
councils. The rural councils were second to urban ones in the hierarchy. Similar in
principle to the Israeli local councils, these were established by a proclamation of the
Jordanian Minister of the Interior in accordance with the prevision of the Villages
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Administration Law, No 5 of 1954. A local council enjoyed less autonomy than
municipalities. During the period of Jordanian governance there were 96 rural councils;
almost half of them stopped functioning in 1967 (Drori, 1975).

A close examination of the Jordanian Constitution regarding local administration
illustrates that the Jordanian Parliament applied two administrative approaches to monitor
and administer local governance. The legislature assigned the administrative divisions to
the cabinet while the organization of municipal and village affairs were assigned to the
legislative authority that is represented by the Jordanian Parliament. The governance
system that emerged in Jordan consisted of administratively running regions and partly
elected local authorities. The administratively operated regions were granted authority to
supervise and control the lower level of local authorities and to perform functions that were
assigned to local authorities. Therefore, it can be argued that administrative governance, in
practice, created a substantial overlap between the responsibilities and authorities of two
separate systems of local governance (Al-Abbadi, 1995).

The governor was granted complete control over the municipal council staff
(Articles 52, 77-79-82). Under the provisions of the 1957 Law of Administrative Divisions
No. 2 a three -level hierarchy was created. The central authority, represented by the
cabinet, exercised full power by having the right to establish, change and amend the
administrative divisions. The Jordanian king appointed a governor who administered the
nine governorates, three of which were in the West Bank (Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron).
Each governorate was divided into several areas, administered by rulers that were also
appointed by the King. Areas were divided into smaller districts that did not function as
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administrative units (Amro, 1991). Powers granted to the local councils in the law of 1954
were restricted to the provision of rather limited services, quite similar to the British
Mandate Law of 1934 (Article 87). Once again, the Palestinians were living within a topdown centralized local governance administrative system with extremely limited
opportunities for local participation.

Indeed, the analysis of local governance in the West Bank was designed to
centralize political power in Amman and to combat any local Palestinian political
leadership in the Hashemite areas including the West Bank. There was a substantial
number of Palestinians living within Jordan having relocated as refugees after Israel State
declared its independence. The Jordanian political agenda aimed to fight against the
concept of regional Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and worked hard to control
party organizations and ideological groups, as well as local authorities. Therefore, it can be
argued that local governance in the West Bank was controlled directly by officials in
Amman with little attention focused on the political and social needs of the indigenous
people living in the West Bank (Maoz, 1984).

The last local elections for the central towns in the West Bank were conducted in
September 1963. Elections were not held in 1967. In the aftermath of Israel’s occupation
of the West Bank new procedures were developed (Drori, 1975). The Israeli military
occupation cancelled the scheduled local elections.

It can be argued that external governors dominated the legal and administrative
framework of municipal government. As result, local governance and municipalities
suffered from weak administration, scarce resources, limited autonomy, limited
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opportunities for citizenship participation, non-local laws and regulations, and a narrow
range of responsibilities (Jarbawi, 1992). Several conditions and various factors including
limited educational services, lack of administrative development, and weak citizen
participation prevented local governance and municipalities from being responsive to the
different needs of the people (Al-Abbadi, 1995). The final decisions were made in Amman
regardless of the issue or local sentiments or attitudes and that inhibited the establishment
of indigenous bureaucratic system that matched the sociopolitical characteristics of the
Palestinian people (Amro, 1991). Simply put, the municipal and local governance served as
one of the government’s political instruments for control (Maoz, 1984).

In summary, then, during the Jordanian control of the West Bank the local
governance and the municipal system were directed from Amman and shaped by politics
related to Jordan’s needs. Jordan wanted control over the West Bank and the Palestinian
people. The Jordanian regime did not establish an institution of self-rule or local autonomy
where the indigenous population could exercise their political rights, issue their own laws
and regulations, and adopt administrative reforms that met their expectations, needs, and
will-expression.

5.6 Palestine under the Israeli Military Occupation
On June 7th, 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and
established military control over all Palestinian lands (Jarbawi, 1992). In the immediate
aftermath of the military victories over Egypt and Jordan the Israeli authorities maintained
laws and practices established by the British, the Egyptians, and the Jordanians with regard
to local government institutions. The Israeli army stated that existing Jordanian, Egyptian,
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and British laws and orders would be valid in both regions as long as the established
practices, policies, and mandates did not contradict any Israeli military directives or
security concerns. However, the orders did transfer center powers to Israel’s military
forces. Civilian authorities in Israel never would have control over the affairs of the
residents of the West Bank and Gaza. The areas were to remain occupied territories subject
to military oversight. This practice was different from the policies and practices of the
Egyptians, Jordanians, the Ottomans, and the British despite the roles played by their
military forces (Technical team, 1994; Segev, 2007).

Many Israelis, however, had never stopped dreaming of a Greater Israel; those
supporting the concept of a Greater Israel wanted to the Jewish state to extend from the
Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea thus including all of the West Bank and Gaza.
Within this policy perspective was the idea that Palestinians would eventually relocate to
Jordan or remain as non-citizens of the State of Israel. Some justified their desire for more
territory on strategic grounds; others were motivated more by national and religious
sentiments (Segev, 2001). In short order those dreaming of a Greater Israel would be
outside of the mainstream of Israeli political thought, both camps exerted considerable
moral and political influence and remain powerful political minorities focused on retaining
the Golan Heights and as much territory as possible within the West Bank (Gorenberg,
2006; Segev, 2007). Gorenberg (2006) writes with great insight about such forces,
including radicals within the ruling Labor movement who had opposed the idea of partition
since the 1920s and continued to do so after Israel’s independence. He quotes leading
rabbis who prayed that the Jews would recapture the Western Wall and other holy sites that
had fallen under Jordanian control in 1949. He gives scant attention, however, to another
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important force: Menachem Begin’s right-wing Herut (Freedom) Party, which, after 1948,
did more than any other group to keep the hope for a Greater Israel on the political agenda.
As a member of the war cabinet, which was hastily formed in June 1967, Begin played a
major part in the fateful decision to occupy East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.

To achieve complete control and dominance of local governance structures in the
Palestinian territories Israel’s military command issued several orders that interfered with
indigenous control, placed indigenous institutions under direct Israeli supervision, and
directly organized the structure and work of local governing systems to support Israel’s
occupation. In the first two days of its occupation the Israel issued Military Orders 80 and
194. These decrees made it clear that all Palestinian governance and legislative affairs
would be subordinate to the Israeli (Drori, 1975).

The military orders were designed to control local governance and to dominate
and control planning, land use, and economic development. Israel sought to reinforce its
dominance in the occupied territories through the holding municipal elections, seeking
local Palestinians who would have some loyalty to Israel. Israel’s goal was to supplant the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that was interested in securing its role as a
government-in-exile and the sole representatives of the Palestinian people. Israel wanted
new leaders and partners for an eventual peace settlement with the Palestinians
(Hammoudeh, 1972). Al-A’raj (1996) argues that 37 out of the 46 military orders
concerning municipalities issued through 1986 were designed to achieve Israeli dominance
over the remaining Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Some military orders
restricted the municipal councils in a way that citizens were not being able to exercise
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active citizenship participation in the local governance. However, there was a new change
in the local governance practice in the Palestinian territories in that women were allowed to
participate in the elections and be candidates for municipal councils. The Israeli military
commander of the Gaza Strip issued military order No. 519 in 1975 and his peer in the
West Bank issued military order No. 627 which allowed women to participate and be
candidates for municipal council seats (Technical team, 1994). Israel tried to suppress the
political elite’s opposition to Israel rule. By giving women the right to participate it was
hoped new and moderate leadership would emerge in the Palestinian territories (Maos,
1984).

As mentioned earlier, municipal elections planned by Jordan for September 1967
were cancelled following Israel’s occupation. Military order No. 80 aimed at extending the
service period of the existing local councils. Mayors were selected by the Israeli Civil
Administration administered by the Israeli Army, from wealthy families and demonstrated
loyalty and support to the Jordanian regime that continued to provide some of the financial
resources to West Bank municipalities. The Israeli authorities organized local elections in
1972 and in 1976, and village council elections in 1975 (Gazit, 2003). The elections were
for councils that would have limited authority to provide education and health services. On
the other hand, Israel did hold elections in Gaza where the military occupation had used
appointed Palestinian mayors dominated and controlled by the Israeli civil administration.

Hammoudeh (1972) investigated the Israeli objectives regarding the 1972
municipal elections. He argued that the objectives included finding new groups and
participants in the affairs of the West Bank who would cooperate with the Israeli
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authorities. Another hope was to enhance the democratic image of the Israeli occupation.
There was also a political hope that new leaders could be found to replace the PLO.
While this group was in exile, it objected to municipal elections and urged the
Palestinians not to participate (Hammoudeh, 1972). Even though the Jordanian
government was not formally present in the West Bank after 1967 it considered the West
Bank as Jordanian territory (occupied by Israel after its military victory) and thus
opposed the proposed elections. Jordan regarded itself as the representative of the West
Bank as the land had been formally annexed. Israel’s military occupation and the absence
of a peace treaty did not, from their perspective, change its sovereignty. Despite the
decision by a majority of Palestinians not to participate in the elections, Israel went
forward with the effort to create a political mechanism for establishing new Palestinian
leadership. Again, Israel’s desire was to eventually negotiate with this leadership with
regard to final disposition of the land. The Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan,
declared on Israeli television on May 31st, 1972 that the newly elected officers were the
properly constituted representatives of the Palestinian people (Gazit, 2003). Shlomo
Gazit, the coordinator of the works of the Israeli army in the occupied territories declared
that the elections were essentially important for three reasons.

First, the elections began the process of normalizing life in West Bank after the
military occupation. Second, the Israeli occupation tried to defeat the objections to new
elections put forward by Jordan and the PLO. Third, Israeli authorities believed that
elections could create municipal councils that would then alone new Palestinian leaders
to emerge (Gazit, 2003).
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On January 16, 1975, the military Regional Commander of West Bank signed
three military orders under which elections were to be held, according to Jordanian Law,
for the rural councils of Beita (Nablus District), Ziddah (Tulkarem District) and Dahariyya
(Hebron District). The elections took place on February 2, 1975 (Maos, 1984). Later, more
local elections occurred in several West Bank villages and towns (Drori, 1975). Israel tried
to demonstrate that the elections held in several Palestinian towns and villages reinforced a
democratic society in the West Bank that was a result or product of Israel’s occupation
policies.

The elections of 1976 were held under very different circumstances from those
that existed at the time of the 1972 elections. After the 1973 October War, the PLO
enjoyed greater influence in the affairs of the West Bank and Gaza and that was
problematic for Israel. The active role of the PLO was reinforced by the Arab League’s
decision at the Rabat Summit of 1974 (Gazit, 2003), held in Morocco to recognize the PLO
d as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Israel had worked hard to
strengthen the local Palestinian leadership enhancing administrative autonomy in an effort
to weaken ties to the PLO (Al-A’raj, 1996). Local municipalities were given the autonomy
to administer education and social affairs and the role of the Israeli military government
was minimized in these policy areas. However, the military continued to have the final
authority for any action. The new Israeli policy was still aimed at maintaining the control
of the Israeli army over security and the overall economy of the Palestinian territories. For
example, the Israeli civil administration controlled and supervised aspects with regard to
land use and construction of new buildings and infrastructure in the Palestinian territories
(Jarbawi, 1996). However, the Israeli government remained focused on creating a
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separation between the Palestinians living inside West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian
Leadership represented by the PLO living in exile. For example, Israel prevented
Palestinian mayors from participating in the 1976 Palestinian National Council meeting in
Cairo (Aronson, 1990).

The Israeli military authority did not help in the financial affairs of any of the
Palestinian administrative units. This prompted many Palestinian mayors to seek assistance
from Jordan (Gazit, 2003). Some Palestinian mayors visited Jordan and openly called for
an economic federation with the Hashemite Kingdom (Maos, 1984, Amro, 1991). While
some mayors criticized the political positions of the PLO towards Israel and called for a
peaceful resolution to the issues of control of the West Bank and Gaza and sovereignty
other mayors called for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip (Al-Nammura, 1994). Moreover, the mayors invited the PLO to consult with them
regarding any political agenda (Jarbawi, 1992) in direct contradiction to Israeli policies and
preferences.

The PLO leadership, in turn, expressed its anger towards mayors who did not
support their agenda. The PLO was concerned that new leadership would seek to eliminate
it as the representative of the Palestinian people and then enter into negotiations with Israel
(Maoz, 1984). The PLO even accused some mayors of cooperating with the Israeli
occupation (Amro, 1991). However, the majority of the mayors continued to acknowledge
that the PLO was the only and sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people
(Jarbawi, 1992).
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Many mayors led the National Steering Committee that became the Palestinian
National Front that openly opposed Israeli policies. As a result, the Israeli military decided
to minimize the authority and responsibilities of the municipal councils in the occupied
territories (Jarbawi, 1992). In addition, the Israeli authorities refused to organize any new
elections and began to appoint new leaders (Maoz, 1984). Some Israeli settlers tried to
assassinate some of the nationalist mayors including the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and
Al Bireh. Both the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah lost their legs when two bombs
exploded under their cars (Arabic Parliament Publication, 1980). In 1981, Israel established
the Civil Administration, consisting of Israeli military officials and subject to the command
of the Israeli Defense Minister, which municipal councils refused to cooperate with the
new institution. The municipal councils refused to coordinate with the Israeli military
authorities, implement any instructions and rules, or attend any meetings with the Israeli
Civil Administration (Jarbawi, 1996). Consequently, Israel dismissed the mayors of Nablus
and Ramallah in February 1982 and dissolved the municipal councils of Nablus, Ramallah,
and Al-Bireh. The military authority then appointed new committees of influential
Palestinians to manage the municipal affairs in the concerned cities (Maoz, 1984). For
example, Thafer Al-masri, the mayor of Nablus, was appointed to the committee in Nablus
in 1985 but he was assassinated a few months later (Jarbawi, 1992). In 1986, following an
agreement between Jordan and the PLO, Israel agreed to appoint committees composed of
Palestinians in the municipalities of Ramallah, Hebron, Gaza and Al-Bireh.

Table VIII shows that from 1981 to 1986 there were 30 municipalities (26 in the
West Bank and 4 in Gaza) and 112 village councils (112 in the West Bank and 7 in Gaza).
Discontent was chronic, however, especially among the younger Palestinians in refugee
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camps (Jarbawi, 1996). Nearly half the Palestinian population of the occupied territories
lived in twenty refugee camps in the West Bank and eight camps in the Gaza Strip, in
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions (Palestinian Ministry of Local Government
Editorial, 2000). The camps had existed since the flight of Palestinian who left their homes
to avoid the conflict in 1948.4

Table VIII
Local Administration in West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1981 to 1986
Area
W.B.
G.S.
Total

Population
961,500
545,000
1,506,500

Municipalities.
26
4
30

Village
Councils
112
7
119

Local Units

Villages

Camps

5
5

216
216

20
8
28

Source: Ministry of Local Government Editorial, August 2000

Communal conflict was liable to break out at any time between Palestinians and
Israeli settlers who were building settlements on the Palestinian territories inside the West
Bank and Gaza (Maoz, 1984). Friction also arose from security measures taken by Israeli
authorities to counter perceived threats (Maoz, 1984). The first Palestinian uprising
(commonly referred to as an Intifada, which refers to the Palestinian resistance against the
Israeli occupation) started in 1987 and continued with varying intensity until the signing of
the 1993 Oslo accord between Israel and the PLO. The escalating level of Palestinian
unrest precipitated a series of protests and violent demonstrations that began on December
9, 1987, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and later spread to Arab communities in
Jerusalem and Israel itself (Jarbawi, 1996). Thousands of mostly teen-aged Palestinians

4

This issue has precipitated the difficult issue of the right of return for civilian
Palestinians who abandoned their homes to avoid battles in the war or who were forcibly
removed from their homes during battles and subsequent military actions.
118

banded together, setting up barricades in refugee camps, confronting soldiers, and attacking
Israeli traffic with rocks. Unlike previous demonstrations, the violence did not appear to be
directed or coordinated by the PLO and continued almost unabated for many months
(Maoz, 1984). It can be argued that the local municipalities in the West Bank exercised a
mixed role with regard to its municipal responsibilities on one hand and political and
national roles on the other hand (CTT, 1994). On one hand, municipalities had an
administrative role of supplying basic services of water, electricity, road pavement and
waste collection. On the other hand, they were not authorized to provide leadership and
direction for planning, land use, or the construction of physical assets that are essential
responsibilities for any viable municipal government (Aronson, 1990). The mayors
involved in politics trying to persuade PLO to adopt pragmatic political positions refusing
the Israeli trials to make them the political representatives of the Palestinian people
(Jarbawi, 1992). Once again, this historical view shows that politics-administration
dichotomy did not exist and Israel tried to give the local leadership a political role only to
for serve its own political interests. This disruption of the local governance administrative
system in this period influenced negatively the local services to people.

5.7 Conclusion

The historical review portion of this dissertation examines the history of local
governance systems in Palestine since 1877. According to the Ottoman Empire’s 1877
Municipalities Law, cities and towns in Palestine were given the authority to oversee local
construction, urban planning, commercial markets, public health, education, and land use
through different regional governmental bureaus. The municipal councils in Palestine
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maintained the same functions given to local governments by the Ottoman Empire under
the rules established by Britain under its Mandate in the 1930 Local Municipalities Law.
That law was then amended into the Local Municipalities Law of 1934, and the Villages
Administration Law of 1944 (Al-Abadi, 1995). These laws remained in force until 1948
when the State of Israel was established and Jordan annexed the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip was annexed by Egypt.

Following the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Israel
legitimized the existing laws applied in both areas unless they otherwise conflicted with
military procedures and needs. Nevertheless, the occupying authorities amended their laws
and regulation to meet their own self-interest, rather than the interests of the Palestinian
people on the ground (Jarbawi, 1996). The Israeli military orders remained in force until
the 1994 Oslo Agreement. On November 20th, 1994, President Yasser Arafat issued the
Presidential Decision No. 1, which confirmed that the rules, regulations, and orders in place
in June 1967 would remain valid till further amendment or change (Amro, 1991).

Frequent occupations that successively governed Palestine concentrated on the
important role of municipalities and local government institutions largely because those
municipalities and institutions were the bridges that could be used to penetrate the
community and tighten effective control (Jarbawi, 1996). Central governments controlled
and dominated local governance structures by executing powers of supervision, control,
appointments, and the designation of roles and responsibilities. Mary Rock (1996) argued
that through imposed or amended laws the external authorities consolidated their
domination over local government institutions ignoring the voices of indigenous citizens.
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For example, the activities of local governance were restricted to engagement with the
provision of limited services of public education and health to people. Local institutions did
not enjoy any substantial autonomy or an independence from the central authorities with
regard to their mission, objectives, activities and rigorous representation of citizens. Also,
the local institutions and their leaders were restricted from engaging in local development
efforts (Jarbawi, 1996).

It is quite evident that the various occupying powers maintained policies and
practices to further their political self-interest. The Ottoman regime tailored their laws,
rules and regulations in Istanbul and maintained their existing administrative divisions for
decades. The Ottoman Empire considered Palestine as a part of the Islamic state and
imposed on it the same policies followed in other countries within the regime, (Amro,
1991). The Ottoman laws created a centralized government that negatively influenced local
Palestinian autonomy. Similar to the Ottomans’ policies, the British viewed the local
governments as tools to advance the interests of the central government.

The Egyptian administration treated the Gaza Strip as a separate region that
remained under the laws issued by the British Mandate. The Jordanian laws were
distinguished by a method intended to enable the Jordanian occupying forces to tighten
their dominance on the political, social, and economic aspects of life in the West Bank (AlNammura, 1994). Activities of the municipal and villages councils were affected by the
competitive struggle between Jordan and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to
represent the people of the West Bank. It is worth noting that the PLO has led the
movement for liberating the Palestinians from Israeli’s occupation. The second military
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occupation after the British Mandate began during the Israeli era with its efforts to
dominate the West Bank and Gaza Strip through altering the current circumstances during
that era. Israel did not help in establishing a viable and independent Palestinian economy,
tried to eliminate political opposition and even sought to create a new local leadership
willing to cooperate with Israeli objectives on the ground and replacing the PLO at the
same time (Jarbawi, 1996). No urban and economic infrastructure was established in the
West Bank and Gaza under the Israeli occupation so that Palestinians could not have an
economic independence from Israel till now as demonstrated by the World Bank and other
international organizations reports.

The aim of this chapter was to review the evolvement of local government system
throughout the history of Palestine beginning from the Ottoman Empire, the British
Mandate, Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and the Israeli military occupation. An
objective of the successive central authorities of the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate,
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration and Israel was to constrain the development of the local
governance and to make it an organic extension of their central authority that aimed at
controlling citizens’ needs and rights. Indigenous people were forced to live in a foreign
context of legal, economic, political and social constraints. Thus the Palestinian National
Authority inherited a multi-dimensional and complicated local governance system
consisting of laws and legislation of the frequent occupying powers that do not reflect the
indigenous needs and rights of the people on the ground.
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CHAPTER VI

CURRENT LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

This chapter reviews and explains the current local governance system and
structures used by the PNA. It describes the characteristics of local governments and the
role played by the PNA’s Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG). The work of the
Ministry of Finance is also considered as that agency has a large effect on the shape and
role of local government. The chapter also focuses on the main features of the 1997 Law of
Local Councils. Finally the struggle between different political factions to control the local
governance system is also analyzed.
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6.1 Local Governance under Palestinian National Authority

Former Palestinian President Yasser Aarafat created and led the Fatah Party that
has dominated the PNA since its creation. As would be expected, Fatah’s leadership had a
pronounced impact on the design and operations of local governments for a period of
several decades through its domination and control on the PNA. Fatah’s leaders were
determined to place into positions of leadership only individuals loyal to the party and to
Yasser Arafat (Work team, 1999). As a result Fatah members dominated the entire
administrative apparatus of the PNA including the PLO, the Palestinian Legislative Council
(Parliament), Palestinian security bodies, and the general public administrative system.
With political control the key factor driving appointments, the best individuals were not
always chosen for some positions. With its members firmly in control the PNA centralized
all administrative and political power in the hands of its ministers, ministry senior
employees, governors of governorates/districts, and mayors. The PNA did establish small
municipalities and regional offices of the MoLG, but power and control remained
centralized.

The PNA sought to establish a democratic system in each local government
through the use of popular elections. However, the PNA reinforced a centralized
government structure and actually granted very little autonomy and power to any local
government. There never really was a democratic system implemented despite the passage
of the 1996 Law of Local Councils that authorized elections and the 1997 Law of Local
Councils that focused on the structure of local government. The elections were delayed for
more than seven years and took two years to complete after the approval of the local
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election laws and procedures. The local elections held in 2004 and 2005 were divided into
stages or phases targeting different parts of the West Bank and Gaza (World Bank, 2006).
This was necessary to deal with security conditions after the 2001 Intifada and the resulting
response from Israel that included roadblocks and “lock downs” that became common
practices to restrict the mobility of Palestinians.

The 1996 and 1997 laws failed to change the imbedded traditional norms of local
governance carried over from the policies and practices of the occupation powers. For
example, families and local political affiliations continued to assume large roles in the
selection of local leaders by the central government (Al-A’raj 1996). The Ottoman Empire
had used influential families to establish and lead local political institutions. The selection
of people for leadership positions loyal and acceptable to the ruling power created systems
that valued loyalty more than merit and performance. Fatah did not want to substantially
change that system. Continuing systems that were not transparent seemed to be “business”
as usual and Palestinians found comfort relying on familial-based systems (Jarbawi, 1996).
Finally, many of the individuals selected as local governors in Palestine had had military
careers or were returning members of the Palestinian Diaspora who were loyal Fatah
members.

The chief or most important local government official is the governor. The
governor is the representative of the President and is responsible for managing all local
affairs in the governate. A governor’s status is that of a cabinet minister5 and the PNA

5

A cabinet is a body of high-ranking members of government, typically representing the
executive branch and it is based on the British system of governance and widely popular
in many countries all over the world.
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President appoints each governor. Many of the governors initially chosen by the President
were from the Diaspora and included Fatah party members living exile. The governors for
Nablus, Tulkrem, Ramallah, Qalkilia, Jenin and Bethlehem lived outside of Palestine and
moved back to the region after the signing of the Oslo Accords. In Jerusalem and Hebron
the governors were residents of the Palestinian territories (Jarbawi, 1996). Regardless of
their origin, all the governors have roots in the PLO military and, predominantly, the Fatah
movement.

The PNA also inherited the structures of local governments created by the Israeli
military occupation that involved a two-tier system for the classification of cities. Local
governance in Palestine has been based on large municipalities that enjoy political power –
Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza – and smaller municipalities such as Rafah, Khan Younis,
Jenin, and Tulkerm that had far less authority. The PNA then classified these municipalities
into four categories: A, B, C, and D, roughly according to the size of the city (by land and
residents). This classification emerged from the elements of the Oslo Accord between the
PLO and Israel that fragmented the Palestinian territories into smaller isolated geographical
area units (Zones A, B, and C). Under the PNA classification of municipalities, the large
municipalities include Ramallah, Nablus, Bethlehem, Hebron, Tulkerm, and Gaza. Table 61 shows the classified municipal units. Municipality A is a metropolitan local government
carrying the name of the governate and municipality B is the former municipalities outside
the metropolitan areas inherited by the PNA. Municipality C refers to newly established
municipalities and municipality D is a new village council that did not exist under the
Israeli occupation and was upgraded from a local council to a city council within a
governate. All four PNA classified local governments are subject to the authority and
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supervision of the MoLG. At the same time, the responsibilities of local governments are
subject to its three Oslo Accord classified areas as it is shown in Table X.

Table X
Municipal Organization in the PNA in 2004
Municipal Classification
Municipality A
Municipality B
Municipality C

Number
14
41
47

Population Size
10,000 +
8,000 +
4,000 – 8,000

Number of Council members
15 (center of Governorates)
13 (former municipalities)
11 (Newly established
Municipalities)
9 (village councils)
7

Municipality D
220
1,000-4,000
Local Development
83
1,000-500
Committee H (A)
Local Development
65
Less than 500
7
Committee H (B)
Total
470*

Source: Ministry of Local Government in the PNA, 2004.

This total number of local authorities does not include Hamlets and Refugee Camps (refugee
camps are beyond the mandate of the MoLG).

Local Development Committees A and B are below the threshold of 1,000 and are not classified as
D municipalities.

Political issues between Palestine and Israel have interfered with and continue to
influence the formation of the Palestinian local governance system. For example,
according to the terms in the Second Oslo Agreement there was to have been a division
of responsibilities for the overall local governance systems between the PNA and Israel.
The West Bank is divided into three urban areas: Area A placed under full Palestinian
self- rule; Area B (mainly small towns and villages) placed under limited Palestinian
civil control and Israeli security control; and Area C remaining under direct Israeli
administration. Table XI shows the responsibilities in the three areas of the West Bank.
This political fragmentation negatively affects local governance in Palestine by
restricting the urban planning in Area C communities that remain under full Israeli
supervision. Moreover, Israel controls the main roads leading to its settlements in the
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West Bank (World Bank, 2006).6 Therefore, without a final political agreement between
the Israeli occupying power and the PNA, the local governance in Palestine will remain
disrupted and paralyzed in the West Bank.

Table XI
Responsibilities in areas A, B, and C according to the Oslo accord
Responsibilities

Area A

Planning
Implementation

PNA, local governments
PNA, local governments

PNA, local governments
PNA , local governments

Resource control

PNA, local governments
and Israeli
administration for water
recourse
PNA, local
governments, Donors
and local communities

PNA, local governments,
Donors and international
and Israeli administration
for water
PNA, local governments,
Donors and local
communities

PNA, local
governments, Donors
and local communities

PNA, local governments,
Donors and local
communities

Full PNA control

Police: PNA
Security: Israel

Finances

Construction

Security

Area B

Area C
Israeli administration
PNA, local governments
and Israeli administration
Human resources: PNA
Natural resources: Israeli
administration
PNA, local governments,
Donors, Local communities
and Israeli admin. For
settlements and by-pass
roads
PNA, local governments,
Donors, Local communities
and Israeli admin. For
settlements and by-pass
roads
Full Israeli control

Source: ARD, 2000e.

6

International law specifies that Israeli settlements in occupied territories illegal
according to the UN resolutions 242 and 338 related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In
view of Article 80 of the U.N. Charter, “the Palestine article,” provides that “nothing in
the Charter shall be construed ... to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any
states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments…” Israel has
justified the settlements using other interpretations of history and the ultimate disposition
of these communities will be part of any peace accord between Palestine and Israel.
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Figure 5:
Palestinian Areas of A, B, and C according to the Oslo Accord in 2000

Source: www.iris.org.il/oslo_2000.htm

This fragmentation of Palestinian controlled territories also has had a negative
impact on the process of developing local governments and systems of governance (AlA’raj 1996). The smaller and isolated municipalities are very weak economically and
politically and often do not have sufficient resources to pay staff salaries. The geographic
fragmentations of the areas in the West Bank created as a result of the political and security
situation between the PNA and Israel (as determined by Israel’s military leadership)
imposed real challenges on the local governments to achieve solid or permanent economic
prosperity and stability and to provide decent services to its residents (ARD, 2000). The
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geographic isolation strangles economic and political development in the West Bank
(World Bank, 2007). This fragmentation became worse after the Second Intifada in 2001
because of more than one hundred Israeli military checkpoints separating Palestinian cities
and villages (World Bank, 2006). Both the Israeli military occupation and the centralized
structure of the PNA have contributed to the weak structures of local governments in the
West Bank.

In addition, these local governments have limited capacity and authority to
generate or raise revenues. As a result most local governments were quite dependent on the
central government represented by MoLG. On the other hand, municipalities with large
numbers of residents, especially those with the status of a provincial capital, have
tremendous political power and independent access to financial resources (Jarbawi, 1996).
These municipalities include Ramallah, Nablus, Bethlehem and Gaza City. Many
Palestinian mayors also hold other political positions in the PLO that, in turn, gives them
substantial political and financial power by advocating getting bigger budgets in the
Palestinian cabinet. For example, the mayors of Nablus, Hebron and Gaza play important
roles in the politics of the PLO as they are members of its executive committee. These
mayors have the authority to receive direct financial donations and projects from donor
countries and without any prior approval from the MoLG (ARD, 2000). However, other
mayors of smaller cities or local councils are not allowed to receive direct financial
donations from external donors without the approval and the supervision of the Ministry of
Finance. Double standards are applied within the local governance system that favors the
mayors of the large cities and the mayors who have strong political power through
belonging to the membership of executive committee of the PLO.
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6.2 Palestinian Ministry of Local Governance

The MoLG was established on May 25, 1994, after the Oslo Accord that handed
responsibility for large segments of the West Bank and Gaza to the PNA. What was
received was a fractured and fragmented system of local governments produced by the
frequent changes in policies and practices by the occupying forces. The existing units of
government were bureaucratically and financially quite weak. Given this situation three
priorities for the MoLG were quickly formulated (Jarbawi, 1996):

1. Establish a decentralized administrative system based on the principles of
democracy as a core for founding a Palestinian civil society that included democratic
elections and the establishment of a meritocracy.
2. Review the conditions of the local governance that existed prior to the establishment
of the NPA to identify needed adjustments and create an indigenous system of local
governance that can serve the Palestinian people.
3. Advance the delivery of services to citizens living in rural areas to reduce and then
eliminate gaps in service levels provided to residents of urban and rural areas.

Trying to achieve the above-mentioned goals the MoLG adopted a new vision for
a progressive local Palestinian governance model (Al-A’raj 1996). This vision shaped the
Palestinian local government system that is divided into two parts. The first established
the central authority branch represented by 16 governorates and two districts, the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, which were controlled and supervised by the Ministry of Interior
(MoI). The district is wider and larger than the local governates. The two districts are the
West Bank and Gaza; each of which includes several governates. In each district, there is
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an office of the MoLG that supervises and administers all the district’s local affairs and in
coordination with the Palestinian Cabinet through the Minister of Local Governance.
Within each of the 16 governorates and districts that are listed in Table XII and the
population included (see Table XIII) there is an office of MoLG, headed by a DirectorGeneral. The Local Governments Minister recommends candidates who are then
appointed by the President of the PNA. The Director-General has extensive authority to
monitor the municipalities within his/her district and to handle local affairs including
approving the final budgets of all cities and villages, approving the hiring of all senior
staff, and approving all urban planning projects. However, the Director-General does not
have infinite authority as he/she reports to the governor who is the final decision maker in
any local affairs in coordination with the MoLG.

The second part of the vision involved the establishment of smaller local councils
along with the municipal governments. With the support of the members of the
Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament), the MoLG established more than 300 new
municipalities during 1996 (MoLG, 2004). Such a high number of municipalities may not
be needed in such a small geographic area with less than 4 million people living in 16
geographical districts. The PNA local governance system deals with the governates (e. g.,
Jenin, Tulkerm, and others) as metropolitan areas surrounded by many villages
designated as city municipalities. For example, it is difficult to justify that a city such as
Jenin with less than 200,000 residents needs 12 local city councils. The same situation
exists for Tulkerm where there are 125,000 residents and 11 local city councils along
with the Tulkerm metropolitan municipality. This indicates that there may well be too
many units of government leading to inefficiencies.
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Table XII
PNA – Number of Local Authorities in Each Governorate in 2004
No.
1.

Governorate/
District
Jenin

Popula.

Munci.

Village

Council

197,661

12

24

***

Comm.

Locality
1

Total

1

3
8

2. Tubas
33,203
3
3
***
***
***
6
3. Nablus
254,305
9
38
***
***
***
47
4. Tulkerm
123,884
11
12
***
***
***
23
5. Qalkilia
73,549
5
8
***
1
***
14
6. Salfeet
52,443
9
7
***
***
***
16
7. Ramallah
219,025
15
44
***
1
***
60
8. Jerusalem
120,167
***
14
9
***
***
23
9. Jericho
27,312
1
2
2
***
***
5
10. Bethlehem
127,880
10
9
***
***
3
22
11. Hebron
415,073
17
20
***
2
2
41
12. North Gaza
146,037
3
***
***
***
2
5
13. Gaza
350,849
1
2
***
***
***
3
14. DeirAlbalah
59,598
2
2
***
***
***
4
15. KanYounes
189,897
6
1
***
***
4
11
16. Rafah
71,954
1
2
***
***
1
4
17.
105
188
11
5
13
322
Total 2,46 2,837

Source: Ministry of Local Government, PNA, 2004

All listed categories are above the population threshold of 1,000 (See Appendix2).

Classification of local authorities into municipalities, villages, councils, communities and localities
served the Ministry of Local Government in 1996, but is not based on specific criteria.

Table XIII
Local authorities in the West Bank by population size in 2004
Number of local authorities
Population
Percent
Up to 1000 persons
11
3.7
1001-2000
102
34.2
2001-5000
108
36.2
5001-10,000
41
13.8
10,001-20,000
19
6.4
20,001-50,000
12
4.0
50,001-100,000
3
1.0
100,001 +
2
0.7
Total
298
100.0
Source: Ministry of Local Government in the PNA, 2004

The PNA created a large number of new municipalities, the majority of which were
small villages that were upgraded from village councils to municipalities. These
municipalities were granted limited authority to collect local taxes and issue building
permits (and collect the fees for the permits). However, the metropolitan municipality in
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the governate does not have any authority to provide financial or staff resources to its
local municipalities. These municipalities were not granted any measure of autonomy and
remain under the control of the central authority represented by the MoLG (World Bank,
2006). The local governance units established after 1994 do not have the authority to
define municipal boundaries within their districts or to collect property taxes. The setting
of municipal boundaries was made more difficult by the settlements established by Israel
and its continuing military presence in the West Bank (Jarbawi, 1996). A similar situation
existed in Gaza before the evacuation of the Israeli settlements in 2006.

The PNA established the MoLG in an effort to centralize the activities and
agendas of the local governance system. While many small municipalities were created
there was no true decentralization. Instead what has been created is a network of weak,
inefficient, and fragmented administrative entities that cannot provide the services needed
by citizens. The local service delivery system is dependent on the central government
(World Bank, 2006). The new small municipalities lacked the financial and human
resources to pursue economic development, overseeing necessary infrastructure projects,
provide services and create a more modern form of government.

6.3 The Main Features of the 1997 Law of Local Council

The Local Councils Law of 1997 organized and specified the role of the elected
councils of local government units (LGUs) and their relationship to the central
government through the MoLG. However, the law was not implemented until 2004
because elections were delayed for 8 years. Some international organizations justified the
delay in conducting the local elections due to security problems and the disruptive effects
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of the interrupted peace process between the PNA and the Israeli government (World
Bank, 2006). From 1994 until conducting the first local elections in 2004, the President in
coordination with the MoLG appointed all mayors. The MoLG selected the members of
the local councils. The MoLG chose to appoint a large number of council members from
wealthy and influential families (World Bank, 2006).

However, many mayors and councilors believed that the new law did not bring
any fundamental changes that would have allowed for the advancement of local control
and the improved performance of local governments (ARD, 2000e). The new law in their
view did not provide local government officials with any new authority (ARD, 2000e).
The law states that local governance councils, elected every four years for four-year
terms, are to have a wide range of responsibilities. For example, the councils are
responsible for providing utilities, administering local services, collecting taxes, fees, and
garbage, and licensing the construction of buildings and houses. Article 3 in the 1997
Local Government Law encouraged a level of cooperation and coordination between the
neighboring local governments through Joint Service Councils (JSC) to fulfill their
municipal functions. However, all the activities of JSC are to be supervised and approved
in advance by the MoLG. This insured centralized control of the setting of taxes and fees,
annual budgets, and procurement and staffing and other related issues (World Bank,
2006).

The JSCs are groups of local authorities that gather within a defined framework to
cooperatively provide one or more services to their citizens. The establishment of JSCs
provides a viable solution for overcoming limited revenue-raising potential faced by
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many local councils and for enabling them to deliver services while adhering to a perhaps
overly fragmented system created by the MoLG (ARD, 2000h). With the encouragement
of the MoLG, some smaller municipalities and communities have joined together to form
JSCs to provide one or more specific services. In 2003 there were 49 JSCs in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip providing services to 360 communities as shown in Table XIV. The
average population served by a JSC is 8,500, which by comparison makes them roughly
equivalent to a ‘C’ category municipality. The services provided by JSC include garbage
collection, water and electricity distribution and billing systems (ARD, 2000h).

Table XIV
Number of JSC according to districts and its functions, 2004
District
Hebron

No. of JSC
3

No. Councils
39

Jenin

5

103

Jericho
Jerusalem
Nablus

3
5
3

10
28
18

Qalkilia

3

28

Ramallah
Salfeet
Tubas
Tulkerm

12
3
2
3

47
8
12
29

Gaza

7

38

Functions
Garbage, Sewage, Solid
waste
Garbage, Water, Solid
waste
Garbage, Solid waste
Garbage, Solid waste
Garbage, Solid waste,
Water
Garbage, Solid waste,
Water
Garbage, Roads
Garbage
Garbage
Garbage, Water, Solid
waste
Garbage, Water, Solid
waste

Total
49
360
Source: Ministry of Local Government Publication July 2004

Another example of the effort to create a centralized system can be found in the
Article 4 of the 1997 Law. This part of the act states that the structure, formation, and
jurisdiction of local governments are to be approved by the central government. Such
control by the central government is emphasized by Article 19 which states that “the
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Minister would issue staff regulations for the local bodies” specifying staff duties, the
grading of positions, the method of appointment, the standards for promotion, and the
rules for termination, vacations, disciplinary action, medical care, insurance, pensions,
travel allowances and related tasks. No discretion was left for local governments.

In fact, the 1997 Law of Local Councils maintained pre-existing laws relating to
the responsibilities and authorities of the governor that were derived from Jordanian and
Egyptian administrative procedures (ARD, 2000e). The law lists the functions,
responsibilities and authorities of the councils that include water supply, electricity,
sewage, waste collection, public markets, parks, recreational facilities, libraries, schools,
museums, clinics and hospitals, town planning and building regulations. In addition the
law provides that the regulation of wide-set of activities (sanitation, health, peddlers and
beggars, weights and measures, advertisements, hotels and animals, internal: budget
preparation, staffing and management of property, and any function given by other laws)
lies within the responsibility of city councils (ARD, 2000e).

It can be argued that the law re-established or validated a centralized local
government system that was somewhat distant from a system that underscored
democratic values and emphasized the principles and practices of modern public
administration. However, the law was the first dealing with the broader issues of local
governance ever passed by a Palestinian parliament. While the large municipalities had
already assumed many of the functions and responsibilities assigned in the 1997 Law, the
newer and smaller municipalities had neither the financial nor the human capital to
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effectively fulfill the required responsibilities (ARD, 2000e). Article 15 lists 26 of these
functions and responsibilities that are summarized in Table XV.

Table XV
Analysis of functions and responsibilities according to the Local Government Law
Function/
responsibility
Financial
management
of municipality
Physical
management
Regulatory
Planning
Developme
nt
Permits
Licenses
Control

Sub
Total of
Functions
2

Public economic
category

Skill needed
in management

Local /regional
impacts

Non –toll public
service

Municipal
finance skills

9

Mostly public toll
services

1

Mostly non –toll
public services

Municipal
engineering
skills
Public
administration
skills

Integrated with
Central MOF
procedures
Central
Authorities and
Local impact
Local impact

4
Some merit
10
Total: 26
services
Source: Associates in Rural Development Inc. (ARD) (2000c)

The Law of Local Councils did not discuss citizen participation and
recommended addressing public participation through public open meetings, public
access to decisions, minutes, reports, and regulations, and public consultations (ARD,
2000d). Citizen participation through general local elections was delayed for more than 7
years after approval of the 1997 law as a result of security issues. When local elections
could be held they were not general as the elections had to be organized in different
stages with part of the West Bank and Gaza holding elections on some days and other
parts holding elections on other days. Moreover, the Law of Local Councils is not a
comprehensive code covering all aspects of local governance issues. For example,
important matters were not addressed such as the formation of new local authorities, the
MoLG’s oversight role, and most importantly the distribution of central revenues to local
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authorities. In addition, many other national ministries also interact and can interfere with
the operations of local governments, and the relationships with these other national
departments were not specified or discussed. Table XVI shows the interrelated
responsibilities and duties among the Palestinian ministries and the local governance
system.

Table XVI
The interrelated responsibilities among the Palestinian ministries at the local level
Line agency

Central level

Governorate level

Ministry of Finance

Issues Rules, Regulations
Manuals and Guidelines
concerning Fiscal issues

Ministry of Planning

National and regional
planning
Coordination grand and
loans with donor counties
Guidelines for
infrastructure development
Rules and regulations.
Instructions

Ministry of Public
Works
Ministry of
Transportation
Ministry of Tourism

Rules and regulations.
Instructions

Ministry of Health

Rules and regulations.
Instructions
Rules and regulations.
Instructions

Ministry of
Environment

Plans and designs for
regional roads
Village council areas,
implement public work
projects
Safeguard cultural
heritage

Provide health services
Environmental impact
assessment

Ministry of Local
Government

Law, bylaws, supervision
Monitoring, instructions

Ministry of Labors

Laws, instructions, bylaws

Ministry of Industry

Laws, instructions, bylaws

Energy Authority
Water Authority

Collecting Property
Taxes
Collecting, VAT
income taxes and
customs

Supervision,
monitoring and
instructions
Monitoring, guidelines
and manuals

Monitoring, guidelines
and manuals
Energy planning
Coordination
Water planning
Coordination
Source: ARD, 2000a.

139

Local level
Auditing,
participation

Transportation
planning and
design
Building
licensing and
planning, permit
endorsement
Public health
Environmental
impact
assessment
Control,
endorsement
Work safety,
licensing
industrial
establishment
Industrial parks
and zones

6.4 Local Governance in Palestinian Practices

After 1994, instead of holding local elections the PNA representatives in the
MoLG began a policy of appointing mayors for the local councils. Political affiliation
was the most important criterion for appointment (Fatah affiliation). Tribal and kinship
factors, however, were also considered to advance unity and avoid conflicts (Jarbawi,
1996). The PNA sought to control municipalities through the use of political and family
criteria in the appointment of leaders. Professional experience, academic qualifications,
and efficient performances were not the major criteria for appointment (World Bank,
2006). For the 14 municipalities, the mayors (except the mayor of Hebron) were
appointed directly by the President of the PNA through the MoLG. The family and
kinship relationships were the practically major political criteria for appointing the
mayors of Qalkilia, Tulkrem, Salfeet, Jenin and Tubas (Jarbawi, 1996). In Jericho and
Nablus, the criteria for appointment were primarily political – loyalty to the Fatah
movement (Jarbawi, 1996). The appointed mayors in Ramallah and Bethlehem were
chosen using religious criteria – mayors of both municipalities must be Christian.
According to a presidential decree, the mayors of 11 municipalities must be Christian
(Ramallah, Birzeit, Jifna, Einerek, Altayba, Alzababda, Aboud, Derqedes Bethlehem,
Betsahor, and Betjala). In Hebron, the same mayor has remained in office since the 1976
elections (Jarbawi, 1996).

In summary, the central government controlled the local governance system and
its administrative and municipal units politically through three policies. First, it
established strong districts directly controlled by the President of the PNA. Second, the
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President also appointed the directors of different administrative units again with input
from the MoLG. Third, the President also appointed the mayors in consultation with the
MoLG.

6.5 Political Factions’ Struggle Over Local Governance

The size of the public sector and its payroll has been increasing as a result of the
reduced opportunities for Palestinians to work in Israel and the weak economy in
Palestine that reduced the number of private sector jobs (World Bank, 2007). Without an
expanding public sector the unemployment level – already high – would be even worse.
Most of the appointments to government jobs were based on political affiliation to
strengthen the ruling party, Fatah. As a result the quality of leadership and
professionalization in local and even national governance suffered from nepotism,
favoritism, and the need to keep as many people employed as possible. According to the
World Bank (2007), international donor countries also have failed to force the PNA to
establish a real mechanism that can vigorously combat the corruption of fiscal policy and
recruitment policies that contributed to the continued growth of the public sector’s budget
(and budget deficits). Different positions were filled with under-qualified personnel, often
through patronage appointments that rewarded political loyalty (World Bank, 2007). The
positions of deputy ministers, general directors and heads of public agencies were
predominantly occupied by Fatah party loyalists. Therefore, the expansion in the number
of public employees was driven by the need to reduce the high unemployment rate and
those who received jobs were affiliated with the Fatah party. To get a job many people
identified with the Fatah Party even if they were only mildly interested in politics.
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Administrative needs were not the highest priority. Table XVII shows the distribution of
local authorities by the most important development need for the local authority and
governorate.

Table XVII

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 2007

During the January 2006 elections, the Palestinian public rated the PA’s weak
performance and perceived corruption as their most important concerns following the
unemployment high rate and Israel’s policy of closing the West Bank (and Gaza).
(Israel’s action was a form of collective punishment in response to attacks by suicide
bombing and other acts it classified as terrorist attacks). According to the Palestinian
Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in its 2005 report, anticorruption themes
were also prominent in the local and presidential elections. Public perceptions of the
integrity, honesty and performance of the government officials were largely negative with

142

respondents noting widespread corruption and high levels of nepotism in the appointment
of employees (PCPSR, 2005). According to a PCPSR poll in 2004, 77 percent of the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believed that public sector jobs were largely
obtained through “connections” (wasta) based on political agendas; 84 percent believed
that there is a widespread corruption in the PNA, and 87 percent strongly supported calls
for reforms.

Global surveys also indicate a widespread impression that the Palestinian
government lacks integrity and is not committed to stopping corruption. In 2005,
Palestine was ranked 112th on Transparency International’s Global Corruption
Perceptions Index. Palestine was seen as worse than Lebanon (83rd) and Yemen (104th).
The share of Palestinians who believe that the PNA has substantial levels of corruption
increased from approximately 50 percent in 1996 to 91 percent in late 2005 (PCPSR,
2005). Concerns with corruption relate mostly to a lack of transparency. Traditional
problems such as bribery or corruption are seen as other important problems (World
Bank, 2002). In one of the World Bank studies in 2001, Palestinian businesspeople
emphasized the danger of corruption as the second greatest impediment to the
development of public and private sector activity and it came after the political instability
and uncertainty, although only 21 percent reported having to regularly pay bribes.

The most recent study of the World Bank (2007) regarding corruption in the West
Bank and Gaza states that

Until now the PNA has not adopted a serious, real, and practical
comprehensive national anticorruption strategy, and the limited
anticorruption activities undertaken have been ad hoc rather than part of a
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systematic approach to combating corruption. However, the January 2006
election victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
elections may provide a new political impetus for addressing corruption.
Civil society has filled some of this gap by proposing anticorruption
measures (World Bank Report, 2007: 81).

Because of the unwillingness of the PNA to combat corruption in the public
sector, other Palestinian nongovernmental organizations took the lead in calling for
reforms. In particular, AMAN,7 the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity, the local
counterpart of Transparency International, issued a comprehensive three-year action plan
to combat corruption in all branches of government and civil society. But this plan has
not been implemented because of the lack of the financial resources and political support
from Fatah (World Bank, 2007).

Under pressure and demands for reform from donor countries, the central
government working with the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) approved the Basic
Law, the Law on Illicit Gains, the Law on Duties and Rights of the Members of the
Legislative Council, the Civil Service Law and the Criminal Code to combat corruption.
However, a World Bank study (2007) concluded that although these laws cover a number
of activities and call for the review of the performances of various higher-level public
officials, there were still gaps in the legislation. For example, these laws did not address
nepotism and conflicts of interest, two of the most prominent forms of corruption in West
Bank and Gaza.

7

AMAN is an Arabic word meaning “security.” AMAN is a Palestinian non-profit
organization in the West Bank that works on reinforcing the transparency policies and
combating corruption especially in the public sector.
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The Office of the Commissioner was established after the approval of the Law on
Illicit Gains in 2005. This individual is responsible for investigating allegations of illicit
wealth involving higher-level public officials and cabinet ministers. But while a
Commissioner has been appointed the office has been largely inactive (World Bank,
2007). The Auditor General also has a limited role in addressing corruption (World Bank,
2007). Equally important in addressing corruption is the Office of the Attorney General
and public prosecutors who are responsible for both investigating and prosecuting cases
of corruption. In general, the Office of the Attorney General has been hesitant and
cautious to investigate corruption cases (World Bank, 2007). For example, in January of
2006, the Attorney General announced that almost 50 investigations of high-level public
officials were underway. However, these cases have not been completed and through
2007 there was no evidence of any action taken (PCPSR, 2007; World Bank, 2007).

6.6 New Political Structure

Hamas’ electoral victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections changed
the political structure in Palestine. Some observers described the victory as an earthquake
in Palestinian politics and in the region (Barry, 2006). The failure of the peace process to
produce tangible results for the average Palestinian and the perceived high levels of
corruption in the local governance system were the major factors that led to the defeat of
the governing political faction. Fatah lost its long-held monopoly on the political system
and set a new Palestinian political and administrative agenda (Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research, 2005). Barry (20062) argues that Fatah collapsed in the
Parliamentary and local elections because of the chaos in local governmental structures,
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function, and performance. Hamas attracted large majorities in the local elections in the
larger cities of Nablus, al-Bireh, Jenin, and Ramallah. By the end of the four stages of
balloting approximately half of all Palestinians lived under councils that were dominated
by Hamas party members (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007).

With corruption a dominant election issue, Hamas members were elected to lead
120 local authorities between December 2004 and May 2005. This seemed to enhance the
image of Hamas and its political influence. Hamas’s desire and willingness for change, its
apparent commitment to transparent and non-corrupt public service, and the promises made
for real reform in the administration of Palestinian agencies attracted supporters. Voting for
Hamas was not based on family affiliation but more on political affiliation and the need for
new leaders who could lead the process of the change and reform (Schulz, 2006). The
victory of the opposition party, Hamas, in the January 2006 PLC elections marked the
beginning of a new stage of the political and administrative system in Palestine.

In summary, experts believed Hamas’ victory was a result of several factors:


The corruption within Fatah and its inability to achieve real reform in the

administrative system reduced its opportunities to win the public support (Schulz, 2006).


Usher (2006) argues that Fatah was unable to address and resolve its internal crisis

between its role as a national liberation movement with that as ruling party of the
Palestinian community. Fatah had not held internal elections for more than 30 years and
its leaders remained the same for a long time. Many of these leaders were accused of
corruption and theft and many public crimes.
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Islamic institution-building and networking in the form of schools, mosques, health

clinics, kindergartens, charities, sports clubs, choirs, computer centers etc. are forms of
mobilization from grassroots which Fatah ignored. The public perceives Hamas as a noncorrupt grassroots organization that gradually has been able to show its capacity to
provide social welfare to the poorest (Mashal & Sela, 2000, Hroub, 2000). Therefore,
people “have high expectations that Hamas will democratize Palestinian society better
than the previous Fatah led PNA” since its establishment (Schulz, 2006).


At present two-thirds of the Palestinians live below the poverty line and it is likely

that it is within this disenfranchised segment of the population that Hamas finds its core
support. Knudsen (2005) argues that about one in every six Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza benefits from support from Islamic charities. Hamas, for its part, allocates
almost all its revenues to its social services, but there is no evidence that Hamas or the
other Islamic charities always provide assistance conditional upon political support
(Knudsen, 2005).

Since Hamas’s electoral victory with its ‘Change and Reform’ candidates in
January 2006 and the subsequent formation of a Hamas government in April 2006 the
dynamics of democratic politics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been severely
undermined and challenged. There has always been tension and distrust between the two
dominant political parties that ended temporarily in June 2007 when Hamas completed its
military control of the Gaza Strip. In seizing control the security systems established by
Fatah were removed by military force. President Abbas attacked the use of violence to
seize control and formed a separate ‘emergency government’ located in the West Bank
(Edwards, 2007). Hamas immediately declared the emergency government illegitimate
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and Fatah responded in-kind calling Hamas’ control illegitimate. Residents in Gaza have
suffered from the resulting civil war between the parties followed by the efforts of Israel,
Egypt, and the US to isolate Hamas.

6.7 Public Administration System under The Mercy of Politics

More than 130,000 Palestinian public employees did not receive their full salaries
for more than 15 months after Hamas’ victory (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,
2007). Gaza has been under a complete closure by Israel and the social, medical,
economic, educational systems entirely collapsed in 2007 and early 2008 (PCPSR, 2008).
Senior public servants affiliated with Fatah were removed from their positions in Gaza.
The Western World has supported the Palestinian President and more funding began to
flow to the budget of PNA in Ramallah. Speaking at a press conference following a
cabinet meeting in Ramallah attended for the first time by President Mahmoud Abbas, the
newly appointed Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, declared that salaries would be paid. He
emphasizing that 31,000 public employees out of a total of 164,000 were excluded from
the payment because they were hired or promoted by the Hamas government since the
beginning of 2006. In addition, about 1,000 employees did not receive their salaries for
failing to abide by orders from President Abbas not to cooperate with the dismissed
Hamas’ government of Ismail Haniya in the Gaza Strip (PCPSR, 2008).

Palestinian public employees have not received a regular salary since March
2006, when the Islamist Hamas formed a government following a sweep of legislative
elections held in January 2006. An international financial and economic embargo
imposed on the Palestinian government prevented it from meeting its financial
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obligations. The embargo ended when Prime Minister Fayyad formed his emergency
government on June 17, 2007, without any Hamas members following the military
conflict in Gaza. After the battle essentially two separate governments exist with Hamas
in control of the Gaza Strip while the West Bank remains under the authority of
Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party. Public employees have been trapped in the Hamas-Fatah
conflict over salaries, regulations, appointments, firing from service, work weekends and
other administrative issues.

6.8 Conclusion

For the first time beginning in the 1990s the Palestinian people were served by a
government created by an indigenous political party. This created an opportunity to
initiate a process that would lead to the development of indigenous institutions. Yet, the
material reviewed suggests that the political appointees of governors and general
managers by the PNA were based on the political affiliations and family connections as a
priority over professional skills, bureaucratic experience, and familiarity with principles
of modern public administration (Jarbawi, 1996; World Bank, 2007). Moreover, the
political unsettlement between the PNA and the on-going Israeli military occupation
continued the existence of a physically fragmented structure in the West Bank with more
than one hundred military checkpoints. In addition, the formation of more modern and
professional forms of local governance was not a high priority for the PNA (World Bank,
2007). This de facto decision is attributed to the fact that modernization of public
administration might threaten the authority and legitimacy of young central government
institutions that suffer from substantial administrative and efficiency problems and
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political instability. Moreover, the data presented suggests that local government
appointments have been based on political affiliation. A department was created, the
“Public Organization Security,” to verify each applicant’s political affiliation (World
Bank, 2007). Unfortunately, Hamas followed a similar practice when it assumed a
leadership role (PCPSR, 2008). Palestinian public administration has been involved in
PNA politics - either between the PNA and the Israeli government or between the two
biggest political factions of Hamas and Fatah - directly and severely to a degree it has
affected its efficient performance and deviated its role of a transparent, accountable and
objective servant to all citizens.
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CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings from a survey of Palestinian community leaders
working in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The questionnaire was designed to
measure and describe respondents’ attitudes and opinions regarding the current local
governance system in Palestine. The questions posed focused on several dimensions of
local governance system. Previous chapters of this dissertation analyzed the effects of
policies and practices of occupations powers on local government to produce a historical
assessment that can be used to understand the current Palestinian local governance
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system and its institutions. The survey data provides a perspective on the operations of
the existing local governance system.

The community leaders’ responses describe aspects of the operation of the current
local governance system, its relationship to the current political environment, and its
ability to meet citizens’ needs and expectations. The survey data permits a comparison of
respondents’ views of what should exist or be accomplished with what is actually taking
place. The responses can then be reviewed and analyzed in the context of the historical
analysis presented.

7.2 Methodological Issues

All respondents were Palestinian community leaders working in the public,
private, and nonprofit sectors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While the local
environment made it impossible to randomly select participants, the data does provide an
assessment of the attitudes of respondents working in different sectors of Palestinian
society. A total of 1,000 surveys were sent to individuals working for 80 different
organizations that participated in the study. The selection of these organizations was
based on their mission, goals, and the fact that each has connections with and works
directly with the public sector. As a result, members of the selected institutions work
daily with the established Palestinian local governments and are directly involved in
different governance issues including efforts to eliminate corruption, the development of
policies and practices to enhance the transparency of public servant recruitment, the
public financing of government, and several other dimensions.
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Conditions, discussed later in this section, made it difficult to randomly select
respondents. Yet questionnaires were returned by a diverse group of community leaders
between the ages of 30 and 60.8 From the 1,000 survey instruments distributed, 185 were
returned yielding a response rate of 18.5 percent. This relatively low response rate was
related to the difficult security situation in the West Bank and Gaza that requires special
procedures to collect any type of survey data.

Some of these difficulties result from the political confrontations between
Palestinians and Israel. Others are related to the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. As a
result, anyone doing research in Palestine is working in a very a tense environment which
is also hostile to social science fieldwork and where mobility and access are limited.
Respondents or anyone who works with those engaged in research has some fear that
expression of one’s views could bring severe reactions. This effectively reduces the
willingness of people to participate in research activities that could produce or yield
findings critical of either of the Palestinian parties or their policies and governance
systems. For example, the Gaza Strip is under a complete siege imposed by the Israeli
authorities and Egypt (and supported by the United States and other Western
governments) since Hamas won the legislative elections in 2006. In the West Bank,
citizens cannot move from one city to another without having to pass through many
Israeli checkpoints and that both consumes and reduces the time they have available to
respond to surveys. There is also concern that telephone lines may not be secure and that
responses given in either telephone interviews or in Internet-based surveys could be

8

The age of 60 is the retiring age for the Palestinian employees in the West Bank and Gaza.
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intercepted and read. For that reason using either of those methods to collect survey
responses was rejected for this dissertation.

Another challenge for researchers is that they sometimes must apply for special
permits granted by the Israeli authorities to access areas for which Israel remains in
complete control. The inability to receive a permit can affect who does and does not
participate in any survey. Moreover, the wall built by Israel in the West Bank isolates
many Palestinian villages from their urban areas and that creates additional obstacles for
researchers trying to insure a valid sample of respondents is selected from an appropriate
universe.

These constraints suggested the value in experimenting with different survey
procedures for this study. First, two research assistants, one in the Gaza Strip and the
second in the West Bank, distributed the survey instrument to public, private and nongovernmental organizations in different Palestinian areas targeting staff members
working on different local governance issues. The process of distributing the survey to
the staff members was coordinated and organized with the directors of each organization.
The research assistants explained the goal and content of the survey to respondents
through telephone, email messages, and at a few workshops where they tried to answer
all questions related to the survey process. To ensure confidentiality, the survey
instrument begins with an informed consent signed by the researcher and acknowledged
the participants. The consent confirms that no foreseeable risks are associated with
participation in this project and all responses will be kept confidential. Moreover,
respondents were assured that no information would be shared, published, or included in
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the dissertation that does not group all responses together making it impossible to trace
any single response to an individual. The Institutional Research Review Board at
Cleveland State University approved the survey instrument. The survey instrument is
attached in Appendix B.

Across a 60-day period the research assistants received the completed
questionnaires and then returned them through mail and email (by those who were
comfortable transmitting responses in the format). Most respondents chose a response
method designed for this study that gave greater protection to confidentiality. After
completing the questionnaire respondents sealed their surveys in an attached blank
envelope and placed it in small collection device or “mail box” that was provided to each
participating agency. Their placement of the instrument in a sealed envelope into the box
provided additional protection of their identity, and it would have even been possible for
individuals to put a blank survey instrument into the box. The research assistants sent the
completed surveys to me via international mail. The use of these procedures also means
that a research method for data collection in a hostile political environment was part of
this dissertation. The concluding chapter contains observations regarding the efficacy of
this data collection method.

The challenges associated with collecting data in the West Bank and Gaza
produces several limitations that must be considered in the use of the findings. First, not
all of the respondents had an opportunity to meet with the research assistants and have
answered their questions about the survey. As a result, different interpretations could
have been made for some questions leading to unclear or invalid responses. Second, it is
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also possible that the security protections taken might not have been seen as sufficient
and some individuals may have preferred not to participate providing a bias in the
responses received. These limitations must be considered when interpreting the results.
However, the receipt of responses from more than 180 individuals received under less
than ideal circumstances provides invaluable insights into the operation of local
governments in present-day Palestine.

7.3 Independent and Dependent Variables

Respondents were asked a series of questions designed to capture what they as
community leaders think of the efficiency and the effectiveness9 of the current local
governance system and what ought to be done to create an indigenous local governance
system that can meet citizens’ needs and expectations. These were the dependent
variables in the analysis. The selection of the dependent variables in this descriptive study
was guided by other studies of governance. The questionnaire was divided into six
sections. First, the main dependent variable was respondents’ perception of the effect of
each occupation on the development of local governance institutions in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. The importance of understanding respondents’ views of the effects of
different occupations is underscored by the work of Amro (1991), Al-Nammura (1994),
Al-Abadi (1995), Mary and Usama (1996), and Jarbawi (1996).

9

Efficiency is a productivity metrics meaning how fast the local governance system can do
something. Effectiveness is a quality metrics meaning how good this system is at testing.
Respondents were permitted to place their own measure of effectiveness given their appreciation
of what is possible under the difficult situations within which local government institutions must
function in the West Bank and Gaza.
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The second set of questions deals with the role of the central and local
governments in administering local budgets, elections, police services, and in the
formation of new local councils. The selection of these dependent variables was guided
by the work of Tiebout (1956), McClure (1990), Oates (1990), Bahl (1992) and Jarbawi
(1996). Third, professionalism plays a very important role in any local governance
system. Mosher (1981), Adams (1994), Lynn (1996), and Stivers (2000) are among the
scholars who have focused on the issues of the professionalism of local governments.
Based on their work questions were included in the survey to address the level of
professionalism in Palestinian local government.

Fourth, political conditions assume an important role in the design of any local
governance system. The impact of politics on administrative systems has been
extensively debated (Stivers, 2000; Rohr, 2001, Holden 1996, Lynn, 1996; Adams, 1994;
Mosher, 1981; Caiden, 1971; Waldo, 1948; and Goodnow, 1900). Their work guided the
formation of questions related to political influences on administrative structures. Fifth,
any local governance system is supported and protected by a legal system (Rohr, 2001).
Therefore, respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of legal protections and
oversight of administrators were also addressed. Finally, the issue of citizen participation
is widely discussed in the public administration literature (Thomas, 1995; Simpson, 1995;
Stivers, 1999; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000, and Bingham, Nabatch and O’Leary, 2005).
In the last section of the questionnaire respondents were asked about citizen participation
in local government.
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The independent variables were respondents’ age, education, sector of
employment and participation in local elections. These independent variables were
selected to understand if there were significant differences in perceptions regarding the
impact of the occupations on the formation of local governments and the current state of
local government operations in the West Bank and Gaza.

The independent and dependent variables are enumerated in Table 7-1.

Table 7-1
No.
1.

Dimensions
Occupations’
Influence
Dimension

Dependent Variables
How would you rate the historic influences of each of these governments on the
institutions that exist today in Palestine?
What would you say is the influence of the following countries on local
government as it operates today in the West Bank?

Independent Variables
1.
Respondents’ age
2.
Education
3.
Sector of
employment
4.
Participation in
local elections

What would you say is the influence of the following countries on local
governments and governance in the Gaza Strip?

2.

National
Government
& Local
Government
Dimension

Do you believe any technical assistance provided anywhere in Palestine is
impacting the development of local government and governance systems?
As countries emerge the relative power of the national government to local
governments must be established. In some systems a national government can
dissolve local governments and in others, such an action is simply prohibited.
Should Palestine implement a system where local governments can be dissolved by
the national government?

1.
2.
3.
4.

Respondents’ age
Education
Sector of
employment
Participation in
local elections

Some countries give the central government the authority to postpone local
elections. Is that an authority that should be granted to the Palestinian national
government?
Should the national government of Palestine have the authority to approve and
reject a local government budget?
Should the national government has the responsibility for local police services and
safety or should that be left as much as possible to local governments?
Should the national government be responsible for the administration of all
elections or should local governments oversee their own elections in accordance to
laws and regulations approved by the national government?
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: residents in a local area
should have the right to vote on the formation of new local governments?

3.

Professional
Dimension

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The criteria in voting for
the election municipal council is dominated by political factors rather than socioeconomic ones?
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The appointment of mayors
of municipality and local councils are dominated by politics.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The mayors have the
necessary academic qualifications and the professional experiences to run their
local governance.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Appointed mayors are
competent and responsible in organizing the issues of the municipalities.
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1.
2.
3.
4.

Respondents’ age
Education
Sector of
employment
Participation in
local elections

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Staffing of local
governance institutions is based on academic merit and professional experience.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Decentralization
policy should be implemented in order to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the administrative system.

4.

Politics
Dimension

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities have the
necessary manpower and technical and professional capabilities to pursue the
authorities and fulfill responsibilities.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Electing an independent,
well-qualified candidate is better than electing politically affiliated, well-qualified
candidate.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: To achieve real reform and
efficient performance, politics relations must be reorganized and reframed with the
administrative system.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Respondents’ age
Education
Sector of
employment
Participation in
local elections

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The selection and the
appointment of mayors of local governance are based on political affiliations only.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities adopt and
apply transparency policy in running the administrative system.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Political factions’
struggle is one of the major impediments for municipalities to be influential and
efficient.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance has a
strategic mechanism of combating corruption.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I think that PNA wants
seriously to implement the reform policy.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: PNA is imposing a
centralized policy to control and dominate the local governance institutions.

5.

Legal
Dimension

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities should
have specific authorities and autonomy from the centralized government.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The PNA’s Local
Governance Law contributes largely toward achieving an efficient and
effective performance of the administrative system.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Palestinian
Legislative Council, the Palestinian Parliament, needs to take further laws and
procedures to reinforce the transparency and the accountability policy in the
local governance.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Respondents’ age
Education
Sector of
employment
Participation in
local elections

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Role of Law is weak
to implement any legislation or laws approved by the Palestinian Legislative
Council.

6.

Citizenry
Dimension

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The national
government interferes and influences the judicial system.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities and local
councils address the indigenous needs and wants of citizens.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Citizens voice is heard in
policies and regulations adopted by local governance institutions.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance
institutions have strong and efficient performance in achieving prosperity for
citizens.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance
institutions have representation of civil society representatives.
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1.
2.
3.
4.

Respondents’ age
Education
Sector of
employment
Participation in
local elections

The completed surveys were coded and the responses analyzed using the SPSS
program. Most the analyses performed were descriptive and where appropriate chi-square
tests of significance were used. To examine the relationship between two qualitative
variables the chi-square test is often used. Pearson’s chi-square is used to assess two
types of comparison: tests of goodness of fit and tests of independence. A test of
goodness of fit establishes whether or not an observed frequency distribution differs from
a theoretical distribution (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). A test of independence
assesses whether paired observations on two variables, expressed in a contingency table,
are independent of each other – for example, whether people from different regions differ
in their views. A probability of .05 or less is commonly used to reject the null hypothesis
that there were no differences in respondents’ perceptions. The alternate hypothesis is not
rejected when the variables have an associated relationship (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell,
2002).

The chi-square tests assume random selection from a known universe. However,
it is possible to use the chi-square test even when a sample has potential biases or
limitations (Osterlind, 1983) similar to those discussed earlier in this chapter. Shadish,
Cook, & Campbell (2002) argue that it is impossible for any social science researcher to
create a sample without potential bias. Maier (1999: 33) adds that social science
researchers will never have complete data and “it would be a mistake to throw up our
hands and reject all research using demographic statistics just because no data are perfect.
Instead, controversies imply a constant struggle to understand the world.” In this study,
the respondents who participated can be seen as being somewhat randomly selected as
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the researcher did not select anyone nor choose participants based on their positions, age,
sex, employment sector, geographical location, or specialty.

7.4 Data Presentation and Analysis

A Profile of the Respondents: The distribution of the respondents’ age,
educational attainments, and employment sector is identified in Table 7-2 and
summarized statistically below.

Table 7-2: Profile of Respondents (Independent Variables)

Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Agee
AGE
Frequency Percent
From 51 to 60

95

51.4

50 or Younger

90

48.6

Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Educational Attainment
EDUCATION
Frequency Percent
College Degree

11

5.9

Graduate Degree

174

94.1

Summary Statistics of Participation in Local Elections
Participation
Frequency Percent
Yes

119

64.3

No

66

35.7

Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Sector of Employment
EMPLOYMENT
Frequency Percent
SECTOR
Public

99

53.0

Private

36

19.5

NGOs

50

27.6

N = 185

Occupations’ Influence Dimension: As explained earlier, local government
institutions in Palestine have evolved through periods when the Ottoman Empire, Great
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Britain, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel controlled elements of the political, social, and
economic life in the Palestinian territories. Respondents believed the previous
occupations’ did influence the local governance system. Even though the view that the
Ottoman Empire’s influence on the local governance system in Palestine was seen as
somewhat small (41.1 percent said no influence and 58.9 percent indicated little
influence) the respondents noted that Great Britain had somewhat greater influence on
local governance through its military laws and rules that became the core of the laws of
other successive occupation forces in Palestine (54.1 percent indicated some influence on
the Palestinian local governance). Egypt and Jordan as well as Israel adopted some of the
British laws and regulations. Table 7-3 summarizes the statistics of both the Ottoman and
the British impact on the local governance system in Palestine.

More than half of the respondents, 59.5 percent, indicated that the Egyptians had a
strong influence on laws and the formation of local governments in Gaza and that is
sustained by the observations that many Egyptian laws and rules are indeed part of the
PNA structure (see Table 7-3). Similarly, 54.6 percent said that the Jordanians had a
strong influence on the design of the local governance system in the West Bank (see
Table 7-3). It is also true that several Jordanian laws and rules are still valid under the
PNA in the West Bank. However, the most dominant influence comes from Israel’s
occupation as all respondents reported that Israel’s military rules and regulations are still
applicable especially in the West Bank even after the Oslo Accord Agreement (see Table
7-3). On the other hand, such rules and laws are no longer functioning in Gaza especially
after the Israeli withdrawal in 2005.
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Table 7-3: The Ottoman, British, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli Impact
Country’s Influence

Impact Level
on Local
Governance
Ottoman Empire
Frequency

Percent

None

76

41.1

Little

109

58.9

Some

British Mandate
Frequency

Percent

85

45.9

100

54.1

Strong
Total

185

100.0

185

100.0

Egypt on Gaza
Frequency

Percent

Jordan on West Bank
Frequency

Percent

Israel on WB and G
Frequency

Percent

75

40.5

84

45.4

110

59.5

101

54.6

185

100.0

185

100.0

185

100.0

185

100.0

The descriptive statistics in Table 7-3 indicate that the Israeli occupation has had
(and continues to have) a substantial effect on local government institutions in the
Palestinian territories. This strong influence should perhaps be anticipated since
respondents are more familiar with and have daily interactions with the Israeli occupation
and its impact. In addition, the PNA and Israel have not reached any political settlement
and that in turn affects the different social and economic aspects of the Palestinian life in
the West Bank particularly and Gaza Strip generally.

There were no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the
relative importance or impact of each of the occupations on the development of local
government institutions by age, participation in local elections, education or employment
(see Table 7-4).
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Table 7-4: The Occupation Influence
Occupation Influence
Ottoman

Independent

British

Egyptian

Jordanian

Israeli

Variables
Age

51 to 60

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Participation

Education

Sector

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Younger

1.58

1.60

2.97

3.20

4.59

4.60

4.52

4.58

5.00

5.00

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

1.58

1.61

3.13

3.00

4.61

4.58

4.52

4.59

5.00

5.00

1.55

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

1.09

1.62

3.09

3.08

4.64

4.59

4.55

4.55

5.00

5.00

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

1.56

1.72

1.60

3.10

3.22

2.94

4.54

4.72

4.61

4.56

4.64

4.45

5.00

5.00

5.00

Note: No differences significant at the (0.05) level or less.

Expatriates’ Impact on the Gaza Strip: The formation of local governments in
some countries has sometimes been influenced by the experiences of residents who might
have lived elsewhere. One-third of the respondents (33 percent) stated that expatriates
who lived in Tunisia have had some influence on the current local governance system in
Gaza. The majority of the Palestinian leaders lived for more than 12 years in Tunisia
(Jarbawi, 1996) after being expelled from Lebanon (see Table 7-5). These leaders had
military backgrounds in the Diaspora and their military rule (and philosophies) had a
substantial impact on governing styles as demonstrated in Chapter VI.
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Table 7-5: The Impact of Expatriates Who Lived In Tunisia, Egypt, and UK on
Local Government Systems in Gaza
Impact Level on

Impact of Expatriates’ Countries

Gaza Strip
Tunisia

UK

Frequency

Percent

None

44

23.7

Little

80

Some

61

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

43.2

54

29.2

4

2.2

33.0

119

64.3

112

60.5

12

6.5

69

37.3

185

100.0

185

100.0

Strong
Total

185

Egypt

100.0

Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a significant impact.

However, the expatriates who lived in the UK were viewed as having a clear
influence on the current local governance system in Gaza as almost two-thirds (64
percent) of the respondents indicated that the expatriates from the UK had some influence
on the current local governance there and 6 percent reported that they had a strong
influence (see Table 7-5). It is worth mentioning that the many Palestinian leaders who
returned to Palestine received their education in the Arab countries and the UK (Jarbawi,
1996). On the other hand, 60 percent of the respondents indicated that the expatriates who
lived in Egypt had some influence and a smaller proportion (37 percent) noted that these
expatriates had a strong influence on the current local governance in Gaza (see Table 75). This shows that the expatriates who lived in Egypt have also had an impact on the
development of local governance system in Gaza.

Table 7-6 shows that the proportion of respondents regarding the current
influence of the expatriates, who lived in other western countries - the USA and France and other Arab countries including Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, on the local governance
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system in Gaza is minimal. There were also no statistically significant differences in
respondents’ views of the relative importance or impact of the expatriates’ countries on
the development of the Gazan local government institutions by age, participation in local
elections, education or employment.

Table 7-6: The Impact of Expatriates of Lebanon, Syria, USA, France, and Jordan
on Gaza
Impact

Impact of Expatriates’ Countries

Level on
Gaza

Jordan
Frequency

Syria

Percent

Frequency

USA

Percent

Frequency

France
Percent

Frequency

Lebanon

Percent

Frequency

Percent

169

91.4

8

4.3

None

102

55.1

168

90.8

173

93.5

Little

82

44.3

13

7.0

11

5.9

4

2.2

1

.5

1

.5

8

4.3

185

100.0

185

100.0

185

100.0

185

100.0

Unsure
Total

184

99.5

Missing 1

.5

184

99.5

Impact of Expatriates’ Countries

Independent
Variables

Jordan
Age

51 to 60

Syria

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger
1.39
Participation

1.51

Yes

No

1.58

Education

Undergrad

Grad

1.09

Sector

Pu.
1.47

Pr.
1.42

1.12
No

1.15

NP.
1.42

50 or

1.05

1.00
Pu.
1.13

1.07

1.08

No

1.06

NP.
1.10

50 or

1.00
Pu.
1.05

1.02

1.03

No

1.02

NP.
1.14

50 or

Grad

1.00
Pu.
1.02

1.00

1.12

1.14
No

1.13

1.14

Undergrad

1.01
Pr.

Younger

Yes
1.00

Undergrad

1.07
Pr.

51 to 60

1.00

Yes

Grad

Lebanon

Younger

1.09

Undergrad

1.12
Pr.

51 to 60

1.07

Yes

Grad

France

Younger

1.11

Undergrad

1.62

51 to 60

Younger

Yes
1.61

USA

NP.
1.00

Grad

1.27
Pu.
1.10

1.12
Pr.
1.03

Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a limited impact.

Expatriates’ Impact on the West Bank: Almost a majority of the respondents,
46.5 percent, believed expatriates who had lived in Tunisia had influenced the current
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NP.
1.25

local governance while 37 percent reported that these expatriates had only some influence
(See Table 7-7). Therefore, 83.5 percent of the respondents see expatriates from Tunisia
having an important impact on the shape of local governance in the West Bank while
their influence in Gaza is seen as far less. This might be attributed to the fact that the
majority of the Tunisian expatriates chose to relocate and live in the West Bank (World
Bank, 2006). Almost three-quarters of the respondents (71.9 percent) reported that the
expatriates from the UK had some influence on the current local governance in the West
Bank (see Table 7-7).

Table 7-7: The Impact of the Expatriates of Tunisia and UK on the West Bank
Impact Level on West Bank

Impact of Expatriates’ Countries
Tunisia

UK

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

None

19

10.3

Little

86

46.5

51

27.6

Unsure

11

5.9

1

.5

Some

69

37.3

133

71.9

Total

185

100.0

185

100.0

Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a significant impact.

Respondents believed that expatriates from the USA and France and the other
Arab countries of Lebanon and Syria had a limited impact on the local governance
system in the West Bank (see Table 7-8). In addition, the table indicates that there were
no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the relative importance or
impact of the expatriates’ countries on the development of the West Bank local
government institutions by age, participation in local elections, education or employment.
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Table 7-8: The Impact of Expatriates from Lebanon, Syria, USA, and France on
Local Government Systems in the West Bank
Impact Level

Impact of Expatriates’ Countries

on West
Bank
Lebanon
Frequency

Syria

Percent

Frequency

USA
Percent

Frequency

France

Percent

Frequency

Percent

None

147

79.5

150

81.1

166

89.7

179

96.8

Little

28

15.1

14

7.6

16

8.6

6

3.2

Unsure

10

5.4

21

11.4

3

1.6

0

0

185

100.0

185

100.0

185

100.0

185

100.0

Total

Impact of Country on West Bank

Independent
Variables

Lebanon
Age

51 to 60

Syria

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Participation

Education

Sector

USA
51 to 60

France

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or Younger

Younger

1.23

1.29

1.29

1.31

1.11

1.13

1.02

1.04

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

1.24

1.29

1.34

1.23

1.12

1.12

1.03

1.03

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

1.18

1.26

1.36

1.30

1.09

1.12

1.09

1.03

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

1.29

1.19

1.25

1.24

1.42

1.33

1.11

1.11

1.14

1.06

1.00

1.00

Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a limited impact.

However, two-thirds of the respondents (67 percent) noted that the expatriates
who lived in Jordan greatly influenced current laws and regulations and more than a
quarter (27 percent) indicated that they had some influence (see Table 7-9). It is obvious
that expatriates who lived in Jordan are seen as assuming a vital role in shaping the local
governance system in the West Bank. On the other hand, those who had lived in Egypt
are seen as having had a less substantial impact. One in five respondents, 21 percent,
believed that the expatriates of Egypt had a strong influence on the local governance
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issues in the West Bank. There were no statistically significant differences in
respondents’ views of the relative importance or impact of the expatriates’ countries on
the development of the West Bank local government institutions by age, participation in
local elections, education or employment.

Table 7-9: The Impact of Jordan and Egypt on the West Bank
Impact of Expatriates’ Countries

Impact Level on
West Bank

Jordan

Egypt

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Little

8

4.3

54

29.2

Some

51

27.6

91

49.2

Strong

125

67.6

40

21.6

.5

185

100.0

Total

Missing
1

100.0

185

Impact of Expatriates’ Countries

Independent
Variables

Jordan
Age

51 to 60

50 or Younger

51 to 60

50 or Younger

4.99

4.62

3.89

3.89

Yes

No

Yes

No

4.97

4.53

3.89

3.39

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

4.55

4.83

2.82

3.68

Participation

Education

Egypt

Sector

Public

Private

NPOs

Public

Private

NPOs

Sector

4.63

4.53

5.35

3.67

3.50

3.55

Note: Groupings based countries from which expatriates had a significant impact.

Influence of Technical Assistance: Technical assistance provided by different
foreign governments can also help form local governance systems and institutions. The
US provides the most support for technical assistance and has had the largest effect on
the establishment of a modern local governance system. More than two-thirds of the
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respondents, 66 percent, reported their sense of the US’s influence (see Table 7-10). The
United State Agency for International Development (USAID) has been active in
implementing many local governance projects in the Palestinian territories since 1994. In
addition, many municipal working procedures were imported from the US through a
series of short-term projects involving local governance, partnerships between the public
sector and businesses, the support provided to enable free elections, town hall meetings
discussing urban developmental plans, and other governance matters (World Bank,
2006).

Table (7-10) indicates that Japan and the United Nations (UN) are seen by
respondents as having some influence on the reform of the local governance system in
Palestine through their different projects. The UN has a permanent development program
(UNDP) in the West Bank and Gaza and the Japanese government has a mission called
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that coordinates the assistance issues for
the Palestinians in different fields (World Bank, 2006). In addition, that data in Table 710 illustrates that there were no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views
of the relative importance or impact of the countries’ technical assistance on the
development of the Palestinian local government institutions by age, participation in local
elections, education or employment. Tables 7-11 shows that the majority of respondents
believed the technical assistance provided by the UK, France, Germany, other European
and Asian countries is somewhat limited in its impact.
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Table 7-10: The Impact of UN’s, USA’s and Japan’s Technical Assistance
Impact of

Entity’s Technical Assistance

Technical
Assistance
UN

USA

Japan

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

None

24

13.0

24

13.0

37

20.0

Little

67

36.2

37

20.0

45

24.3

1

.5

1

.5

Unsure
Some

94

50.8

123

66.5

102

55.1

Total

185

100.0

185

100.0

185

100.0

Entity’s Technical Assistance

Independent
Variables

UN
Age

Participation

Education

Sector

USA

Japan

51 to 60

50 or Younger

51 to 60

50 or Younger

51 to 60

50 or Younger

2.86

2.92

3.34

3.07

2.90

2.90

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

2.86

2.94

3.21

3.20

2.86

3.00

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

3.27

2.86

3.82

3.17

3.82

2.85

Public

Private

NPOs

Public

Private

NPOs

Public

Private

NPOs

2.96

2.81

2.80

3.24

3.25

3.10

3.02

2.81

2.76

Table 7-11: The Impact of British, French, German, other European and
Asian Technical Assistance
Impact of

Country

Technical
Assistance
UK

France

Germany

Other European

Other Asian

Countries

Countries

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

None

158

85.4

162

87.6

68

36.8

166

89.7

176

95.1

Little

27

14.6

20

10.8

106

57.3

17

9.2

6

3.2

3

1.6

2

1.1

3

1.6

185

100.0

185

100.0

Unsure
Some
Total

185

100.0

185

100.0
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11

5.9

185

100.0

Influence of Local Culture: The institutions of local governments are also
influenced by the local culture of residents. One-quarter of the respondents noted that
local culture has had some impact while 70 percent stated it has not much of an impact.

National Government and Local Government Dimension: As countries
emerge the relative power of the national government and its local governments must be
established. In some unitary systems a national government can dissolve local
governments and in others, such an action is simply prohibited. Should Palestine
implement a system where local governments can be dissolved by the national
government? Almost two-thirds of the respondents (61 percent) indicated that laws
must prohibit the national government from dissolving local governments.

Some countries give the central government the authority to postpone local
elections. Slightly more than one-fifth of the respondents, 22 percent, believed the
national government should have this sort of authority. Almost two-thirds, 63 percent,
believed the national government must not have the power to postpone local elections.
The PNA had postponed local elections several times in many cities and villages. In
addition, a clear majority of respondents, 59 percent, indicated that the national
government should not be given the right to approve or deny any local government
budget. However, almost two-fifths (38 percent) indicated that the national government
should be responsible for the administration of all elections in accordance with approved
laws and regulations.

A majority of the respondents (52 percent) indicated that local government should
be responsible for local police services and safety rather than the national government.
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Such support might be attributed to the concerns that the police are too focused on the
political interests of certain political factions (World Bank, 2006). A majority of
respondents also believed that local residents must have, in a local area, the right to vote
on the formation of new local governments. However, there is a high response proportion
of (54 percent) that the criteria of electing municipal councils are dominated by political
factors on the account of socio-economic ones. Table 7-12 also illustrates that there were
no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the role of the central
government and local ones in the development and the administration of the Palestinian
local government institutions by age, participation in local elections, education or
employment.

Table 7-12: Central Verses Local Governments
Dependent Variables

Independent
Variables
Central government

Central government

Central government rejects

Central government

Central government

Dissolves local ones

postpones local elections

local budgets

administers local police

administers local
elections

Age

51 to 60

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Participation

Education

Sector

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Younger

1.13

1.24

1.14

1.20

1.19

1.14

2.23

2.19

2.18

2.17

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

1.17

1.21

1.18

1.15

1.20

1.11

2.22

2.20

2.21

2.11

1.55

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

1.36

1.17

1.00

1.18

1.09

1.17

2.09

2.22

1.91

2.19

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

1.19

1.17

1.18

1.15

1.11

1.24

1.13

1.14

1.25

2.20

2.31

2.16

2.16

2.11

2.24

Professional Dimension: More than a majority of the respondents, 59 percent,
reported that the appointment of municipal and local council mayors is dominated by
politics rather than the potential and professional qualities of candidates. More than a
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third of the respondents (38 percent) believed that mayors do not have the needed
qualifications and professional experiences to run local governments. The issue of
accountability has been raised in the Palestinian society since the establishment of the
PNA in 1994. Many international governments and entities including the World Bank
and the reports of the UN organizations raised many questions about the transparency and
the accountability mechanism that has been applied by the PNA. Almost a majority of the
respondents (48 percent) disagreed with the statement that the appointed mayors are
competent.

The results indicate that respondents believe that the staffing of the public sector
is based on favoritism. More than two-thirds of the respondents (68 percent) noted that
the staffing of local government institutions is not based on academic merit or
professional experience. The suggestion that a more decentralized policy and approach
should be implemented to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative
system was supported by 61 percent of the respondents. A majority (52 percent) indicated
that municipalities do not have the necessary manpower and technical and professional
capabilities to fulfill their responsibilities. Table 7-13 shows that there were no
statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the professional role in the
development of the Palestinian local government institutions by age, participation in local
elections, education or employment.
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Table 7-13: Professional Dimension
Dependent Variables

Independent
Variables

Age

The mayors’ appointment

Mayors have necessary

Mayors are competent and

Local staffing is based on

Municipalities have the

are dominated by politics

qualifications and

responsible for their

academic and

necessary technical and

experiences

performance

professional experience

professional manpower

51 to 60

51 to 60

51 to 60

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Participation

Education

Sector

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

50 or

Younger

50 or

Younger

Younger

51 to 60

2.84

2.22

2.21

2.11

2.19

2.08

2.10

2.08

2.06

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

2.80

2.86

2.21

2.23

2.15

2.14

2.08

2.12

2.09

2.03

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

2.91

2.82

2.09

2.22

2.09

2.15

2.00

2.10

2.00

2.07

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

2.81

2.86

2.82

2.20

2.25

2.22

2.15

2.14

2.14

2.10

2.06

2.10

2.08

2.03

2.08

Politics Dimension: The assumption of electing an independent, well-qualified
candidate is better than electing politically affiliated, well-qualified candidate was
supported by (53 percent) response proportion. The results indicate that a majority of
respondents (72 percent) believed that to achieve real reform and efficient performance
politics relations must be reorganized and reframed with the administrative system. This
is because the selection and the appointment of mayors of local governance are based on
political affiliations according to almost three-quarters of the respondents (73 percent).
Almost four-fifths of the respondents (78 percent) indicated the struggle between the
political factions is one of the major impediments to the creation of efficient
municipalities. To know the relationship between the variable of voting for electing
municipal local councils and the variable of politics’ role, it seems that there is a high
internal consistency of responses (84.9 percent).
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Almost three-quarters of the respondents, 72 percent, do not believe that local
governments throughout Palestine have a mechanism in-place to reduce corruption. A
majority of respondents (63 percent) agreed that the PNA wants to implement policy
reforms. Almost than two-thirds, 62 percent, believe the PNA is imposing centralization
policies to control and dominate local governments. To counter this policy bias a large
proportion of respondents support the creation of specific authorities and the granting of
autonomy to local governments (72 percent). Table 7-14 shows that there were no
statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the role of politics and its
impact on the development of the Palestinian local government institutions by age,
participation in local elections, education or employment.

Table 7-14: Politics Dimension
Dependent Variables

Independent
Variables

Age

Politics relations must be

Mayors’ selection is

Municipalities apply

Political factions’ struggle

Central Government

reorganized with

based on political

transparency policy

is one of the major

imposes a centralized

administrative system

affiliation

impediments for

policy to dominate local

municipalities

governments

51 to 60

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Participation

Education

Sector

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Younger

2.94

2.98

2.87

2.79

2.13

2.08

2.97

2.97

2.91

2.92

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

2.96

2.95

2.81

2.88

2.10

2.11

2.97

2.97

2.92

2.89

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

3.00

2.95

2.82

2.83

2.18

2.10

3.00

2.97

2.91

2.91

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

2.96

2.89

3.00

2.82

2.94

2.78

2.09

2.17

2.08

2.96

2.97

2.98

2.92

2.89

2.92

Legal Dimension: A majority of the respondents (58 percent) believed that the
PNA’s Local Governance Law has not contributed to the development of an efficient and
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effective administrative system. All issues were decided and judged by the MoLG in
coordination with the national government. More than two-third of respondents (73
percent) responded that the Palestinian Legislative Council (the Palestinian Parliament)
needs to pass and enforce additional laws and procedures to reinforce the transparency
and the accountability policy in the local governance.

However, this cannot resolve all the problems of the local governance because the
majority of respondents (67 percent) believe that role of law is weak and the legal system
cannot implement any legislation or laws approved by the Palestinian Legislative
Council. A response proportion of 66 percent believed that the national government
interferes and influences the performance and the functions of the judicial system.

Table 7-15 shows that there were no statistically significant differences in
respondents’ views of the role of law and its impact on the development of the
Palestinian local government institutions by age, participation in local elections,
education or employment.
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Table 7-15: Legal Dimension
Dependent Variables

Independent
Variables

Age

Governance law

Parliament needs to take

Role of law is weak to

National government

contributes largely toward

further laws to reinforce

implement any laws

interferes and influences

efficient and effective

transparency and

approved by the parliament

judicial system

administrative

accountability in local

performance

governments

51 to 60

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Participation

Education

Sector

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Younger

2.15

2.12

2.95

2.96

2.95

2.92

2.94

2.91

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

2.14

2.12

2.95

2.95

2.92

2.95

2.92

2.92

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

2.00

2.14

3.00

2.95

2.82

2.94

2.91

2.93

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

2.16

2.11

2.10

2.94

2.92

3.00

2.89

2.97

3.00

2.94

2.92

2.90

Citizen Participation: More than three-quarters of the respondents (77
percent) believed that municipalities and local councils do not address the indigenous
needs of citizens. Moreover, two-thirds reported (66 percent) that citizens have no
real voice in the policy development process or in the formulation of regulations
adopted by local governance institutions. Two-thirds also indicated (67 percent) that
local governance institutions do not perform well in trying to achieve prosperity for
citizens. Less than half of respondents (45 percent) indicated that local governance
institutions have representation of civil society. Table 7-16 shows that there were no
statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the citizen participation
and its impact on the development of the Palestinian local government institutions by
age, participation in local elections, education or employment.
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Table 7-16: Citizenry Dimension
Dependent Variables

Independent
Variables

Age

Municipalities address the

Citizens’ voice is heard in

Local governments have

Local governments have

indigenous needs of

policies and regulations

strong and efficient

representations of civil

citizens

adopted by local

performance in achieving

society representatives

governments

prosperity for citizens

51 to 60

50 or

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Participation

Education

Sector

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

51 to 60

50 or

Younger

Younger

2.15

2.07

2.14

2.08

2.15

2.16

2.13

2.10

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

2.30

2.35

2.95

2.90

2.954

2.47

2.32

2.24

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

Undergrad

Grad

2.09

2.11

2.09

2.11

2.09

2.16

2.09

2.11

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

Pu.

Pr.

NP.

2.14

2.11

2.04

2.11

2.14

2.08

2.21

2.14

2.04

2.07

2.14

2.18

Summary and Conclusions:

Local government institutions in Palestine have evolved through periods when the
Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel controlled elements of the
political, social, and economic life in the Palestinian territories. The respondents noted
that Great Britain had somewhat greater influence on local governance through its
military laws and rules that became the core of the laws of other successive occupation
forces in Palestine. Egypt and Jordan as well as Israel adopted some of the British laws
and regulations. However, the most dominant influence comes from Israel’s occupation
as all respondents reported that Israel’s military rules and regulations are still applicable
especially in the West Bank even after the Oslo Accord Agreement between the PNA and
Israel.
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The respondents agreed on the fact that the leading expatriates from Tunisia,
Jordan, Egypt and UK played an influential role on shaping the local governance system
in the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, the technical assistance provided by the
US, Japan, and the UN has had the largest effect on the establishment of a modern local
governance system.

The majority of survey respondents agreed on the need of reorganizing the
relations between the central government and local ones emphasizing on giving more
specific authorities and autonomy to local governments and adopting more decentralized
policies in order to achieve more efficient services. To achieve real reform and efficient
performance respondents indicated that politics relations must be reorganized and
reframed within the administrative system to promote accountability and transparency
and to combat corruption and favoritism in the public sector. Moreover, with the
assistance of the legislative system the survey respondents believe that the legal system
must be reinforced to protect and supervise the performance of the local governments.
Finally, the attitudes of respondents believe that such procedures and steps can contribute
towards addressing the indigenous needs, wants, and voices of citizens.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

8.1 Introduction

The formation of local government institutions for an emerging state of Palestine
must recognize that for several hundred years structures of government and governance
have been imposed by occupying empires and states. To assist the emerging Palestinian
state in the process of building institutions with the potential to meet indigenous needs
and fit within the actual culture this dissertation sought to address three separate but
related research questions:
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(1) How have non-indigenous local government institutions in Palestine interfered
with the political maturation of administrative systems?
(2) What differences, if any, in changes imposed on Palestine’s institutions are
related to the two periods of civilian-imposed external systems (Ottoman
Empire and Jordanian/Egyptian rule) and the military occupation rules (the
British Mandate period and the Israeli occupation)?
(3) How has the PNA’s politics shaped and formulated local government systems
to serve limited political factions’ interests ignoring the establishment of
indigenous local government institutions?

In developing answers to each of these questions the work was firmly rooted in
the classical literature of public administration and governance that has guided the
development of local government and administrative systems in emerging nations.
Careful consideration was also been directed towards the issue of changing institutions
from a reliance on clan-based patronage systems – a prominent characteristic of
Palestinian society – to meritocracies. The study also discussed how Palestinian local
governments were initially designed to be politically affiliated and familial-based systems
to support the interests of occupying powers. Their transformation to institutions that rely
on professions and principles of modern public administration was also addressed. The
study examined and assessed the impact of the successive occupying powers on the
structures and institutions of local government systems beginning with the Ottoman
Empire and then continuing through the British mandate, the period of conjoint
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration of the two parts of Palestine, and then Israel’s
military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.
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In addition, the study assessed the historical development of local governance
since the establishment of the PNA. This part of the history describes how the new local
governance system deals with political factions, an inevitable task in all emerging states,
and the effects and the experiences of Palestine’s diaspora on the evolution of local
government systems. When the PNA was created numerous leaders returned from long
periods of exile in other Middle Eastern and Western states. They brought with them
ideas and influences, and these were then grafted into the structures that had devolved
under occupation. Finally, the results of a survey of Palestinian leaders from the public,
private, and nonprofit sectors are presented to more fully appreciate the realities of the
current local governance systems at work under the PNA’s leadership.

The review of the historical assessment of the Palestinian administrative system
and the analysis of the survey results assisted in answering the research questions and in
framing the recommendations based on theory and practice. In addition, the historical
assessment and the survey analysis insured that what was proposed is rooted in what has
developed and can be strengthened while also illustrating what changes are required and
what structures may need to be completed altered.

8.2 Historical Assessment

The historical assessment of the creation of local governance institutions by
various occupying forces demonstrated that the existing local government system evolved
with substantial effects or contributions from the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate,
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and the Israeli military occupation. The existing
operating systems are rife with non-indigenous roots and seek to centralize authority and
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minimize local control. An objective of the successive central authorities of these
occupations was to constrain the development of local governance and to local institutions
organic extensions of their central authority. The goal of these systems was to control
residents and insure support for the occupying forces as opposed to development of the
region or expanding the civil rights and opportunities for local residents. The indigenous
people were forced to adapt to and live within a foreign context of legal, economic,
political and social systems designed to constrain development and rights. Their own
language was relegated to an unofficial status. Thus the PNA inherited a multi-dimensional
and complicated local governance system consisting of laws and legislation of the frequent
occupying powers that did not reflect the indigenous needs and rights of the people on the
ground. It is not evident, however, that the PNA is dissatisfied with a high level of central
control. There is also evidence to suggest that for the short run future, at least, plans to
decentralize authority are not a priority.

It is quite evident that the various occupying powers maintained policies and
practices to further their political self-interests and that focused on (1) centralized control
and (2) the suppression of local initiative, development, and identity. The first of the major
laws to define local governance in Palestine was the Ottoman Empire’s 1877
Municipalities Law. Under this law cities and towns in Palestine were given limited
authority to oversee local construction, urban planning, commercial markets, public health,
education, and land use through different regional governmental bureaus headed by
Ottoman officials. At one level then it appeared that powers were decentralized but in
reality that occupation was articulated by the power vested in the officials chosen by the
Ottoman Empire. Local governance took place only to the point that it agreed with the
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views of the Ottoman Empire’s representative and fulfilled the Empire’s objectives and
needs. Individual action or initiative was not permitted.

The Ottoman regime drafted all laws, rules and regulations in Istanbul and
maintained their existing administrative divisions for decades. This concentrated regional
authority in areas outside of Palestine. The Ottoman Empire considered Palestine as a part
of the Islamic state and imposed on it the same policies followed in other occupied
countries (Amro, 1991). The Ottoman laws created a centralized government that
negatively influenced local Palestinian autonomy. The governance system implemented
was designed to insure that influential and wealthy families who supported the Empire had
formal control and the ability to suppress any ideas, policies, or practices that contradicted
the preferences of the Ottoman Empire (Maoz, 1984). Only people approved by the
Empire’s authorities could hold municipal government positions and leaders were required
to speak Turkish and hold citizenship in the Empire. If these requirements were not
sufficient to insure that acceptable people were selected to lead the cities, the Ottoman
government could interfere in the appointment of any individual through the chairman of
the municipality (Al-Nammura, 1994).

The British also viewed local governments as tools to advance the goals of their
occupation and to maintain security. The 1921 Law of Local Councils gave the British
High Commissioner the authority to change the administration of any large village or the
membership and operations of any local council. The law also specified the form of the
council, its functions, and authorities. The British High Commissioner had the authority to
create a local council in any suburb of a city or to dismiss one that had been previously
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created (Articles 1-20 of the law). When local elections were held in the major cities the
voting was so restricted that only six percent of the indigenous inhabitants of municipalities
actually voted (Maoz, 1984). Because of continuing Palestinian-Jewish conflict the British
were not able to reform the local governance system. Based on the security situation the
British cancelled elections in 1930 and it was not until four years later, following the
passage of the Municipal Corporations Law that elections for mayors and municipal
councils were held.

Reinforcing the centralization of authority, the British relied upon the municipal
councils established by the Ottoman Empire through rules established and detailed in the
Mandate’s 1930 Local Municipalities Law. Paving the way for establishing a national
homeland for the Jews in Palestine, the British actually implemented and managed two
different local governance policies, one for the Jewish residents and the other for
Palestine’s Muslims and Christians (Amro, 1991). As a result the Palestinian administrative
councils were not able to implement policies and practices that were needed by residents
unless those also served the interests of the British forces and were approved by them
(Jarbawi, 1996).

Moreover, the 1934 Law did not provide a strong legal foundation for the
advancement of local rule in Palestine but primarily served British interests rather than
those of the indigenous population (Asuf, 1985). The British High commissioner gave the
military commander the authority to appoint and dismiss both the mayor and the deputymayor of any of the municipal councils. The high commissioner could similarly dismiss a
council, call for elections, approve bylaws or reject them, impose sanctions, and disapprove
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of financial transactions (Asuf, 1985). In a 1938 supplement to the Ordinance of 1934, the
High Commissioner was granted the authority to appoint “any person” to fill a council
vacancy without any participation of an indigenous official or body. The high
commissioner’s will was both encompassing and absolute. In addition, there was no legal
way to appeal decisions and the only limits to the wide-ranging administrative prerogatives
lied with the British authorities in London (Peretz, 1986).

The majority of the public officers were British and they all aspects of local
administration, the legal system, the police, public works, the railways, the secretariat,
government printing, social welfare, surveys, and city planning. This implied that the
policies, decisions, rules and regulations were dominated by British views rather than the
views and hopes of the Palestinian people. Local administrative units suffered from internal
divisions between Jews and Arabs, the British and the Palestinians, and the British and the
Jews. There was also a general lack of public participation and periodic violent
confrontations between Jews and Arabs (Peretz, 1986). Consequently, with this weak
foundation for autonomous local action and a narrow electoral base, any potential to form a
government characterized by professional public administration and a representative
government was very limited during the years of the British Mandate.

The British laws remained in control until 1948 when the State of Israel was
established. After the war between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries Jordan
annexed the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip was annexed by
Egypt. Between 1948 and 1967 the Egyptian administration maintained the British mandate
laws and regulations without any important changes or amendments (Jarbawi, 1996). The
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Egyptian administration appointed municipal committees and councils in an effort to
control the activities and missions of local government in the Gaza Strip. Thus, councils
operated under strict and tight control by Egypt’s central authorities. In the case of
changing or imposing any amendments, an Egyptian legislator, not a Palestinian, was the
final decision maker (Jarbawi, 1996).

Jordan had authority for the West Bank from 1948 until 1967. Laws passed in
1951 and 1952 stated that all the articles from the British law of 1934 law would be
changed to comply with laws and statutes of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, its
Cabinet, the Interior Minister, and the regional governor. The Jordanian laws were
designed to extend their dominance of the political, social, and economic aspects of life in
the West Bank (Al-Nammura, 1994). In time an indigenous movement for self-governance
arose, and activities of the municipal and village councils were affected by the competitive
struggle between Jordan and the PLO.

Jordan’s Minister of the Interior controlled all procedures for the election of local
officials and local autonomy was severely limited. That minister was also given the
authority to establish or cancel any municipal body, to change the boundaries of the
municipal areas (Articles 2-5, 1952 Law), to determine the number of the municipal
council members through the approval of the Cabinet, to determine the dates of municipal
elections (Article 58), to divide any municipal area to elective constituencies (Article 12),
and to define regulations concerning the methods of nomination and election (Article 20).
All municipal budgets were also under the supervision and administration of the Interior
Minister (Articles 70-71), and the municipal councils were not allowed to make any
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payments unless part of a previously approved budget (Article 61). Moreover, governors
and rulers, under the 1957 Law of Administrative Divisions, were given the power to
control and supervise all municipal affairs in the West Bank.

The second military occupation after the British Mandate began during the Israeli
era with its efforts to dominate the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Following the 1967 war with
Jordan and Egypt, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and reinforced
existing laws unless they conflicted with military procedures and needs. The occupying
authorities amended their laws and regulation to meet their own self-interest, rather than
the interests of the Palestinian people (Jarbawi, 1996). The military orders were designed to
control local governance and to dominate and control planning, land use, and economic
development.

Israel sought to reinforce its dominance in the occupied territories through
municipal elections that sought local Palestinians who would have some loyalty to Israel.
Israel’s goal was to supplant the PLO that was interested in securing its role as a
government-in-exile and the sole representatives of the Palestinian people (Jarbawi, 1996).
The Israeli military authority did not help in the financial affairs of any of the Palestinian
administrative units. This prompted many Palestinian mayors to seek assistance from Arab
countries (Gazit, 2003). No urban and economic infrastructure was established in the West
Bank and Gaza under the Israeli occupation so that Palestinians could not have any real
level of economic independence from Israel. Israeli military orders remained in force until
the 1994 Oslo Agreement. On November 20th, 1994, the former President Yasser Arafat
issued the Presidential Decision No. 1, which confirmed that the rules, regulations, and
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orders in place in June 1967 would remain valid until further amendments or changes could
be considered and implemented (Amro, 1991).

Each of the occupying regimes focused on control of cities and local government
institutions largely because those institutions were the bridges that could be used to
penetrate all communities (Jarbawi, 1996). Central governments controlled and dominated
local institutions through appointments of loyalists and the review of all local initiatives,
decisions, or programs. Mary Rock (1996) argued that through imposed or amended laws
the external authorities consolidated their domination over local government institutions
while also ignoring calls for more local representation of indigenous citizens. For example,
local governments were allowed limited authority to provide some services including
public education (but the curriculum had to be centrally approved) and public health. Local
institutions did not enjoy any substantial autonomy or an independence from the central
authorities with regard to their mission, objectives, activities and rigorous representation of
citizens. Local institutions and their leaders were not permitted to engage in local economic
development efforts (Jarbawi, 1996).

The Oslo Accords actually permitted Palestinian local governments to exist for
the first time. This created an opportunity to initiate a process that would lead to the
development of indigenous institutions. Yet, the material reviewed suggests that the
political appointees of governors and general managers by the PNA were based on their
political affiliations and family connections. The PNA tried to centralize power and
insure loyalty to one particular party. Those goals were more important than the
appointment of people based on their professional skills, bureaucratic experience, and
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8.3 Analysis of Survey Results

Respondents noted that Great Britain had a somewhat greater influence (than the
Ottoman Empire) on the current structures of local governance. Egypt and Jordan as well
as Israel adopted some of the British laws and regulations. However, the most dominant
influence has come from Israel’s military occupation, a function of its longevity and the
responses to attacks that have led to domination of decision making and the review of all
policies and practices.

The respondents indicated that expatriates from Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt and UK
played an influential role in efforts to reform local governance system in the West Bank
and Gaza. Expatriates affiliated with Fatah have had a pronounced impact on the design
and operations of local governments for many years through its domination and control
on the PNA. Fatah’s leaders were determined to place into positions of leadership only
individuals loyal to the party and to Yasser Arafat (Work team, 1999). As a result Fatah
members dominated the entire administrative apparatus of the PNA including the PLO,
the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament), Palestinian security bodies, and the
general public administrative system. With political control the key factor driving
appointments, the best individuals were not always chosen for some positions. With its
members firmly in control the PNA centralized all administrative and political power in
the hands of its ministers, ministry senior employees, governors of governorates/districts,
and mayors. For example, many of the individuals selected as local governors in
Palestine had had military careers or were returning members of the Palestinian diaspora
who were loyal Fatah members.
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On the other hand, the technical assistance provided by the US, Japan, and the UN
has had the largest effect on efforts to help advance the establishment of a modern local
governance system. The size of the public sector and its payroll has been increasing as a
result of the reduced opportunities for Palestinians to work in Israel and the weak
economy in Palestine that reduced the number of private sector jobs (World Bank, 2007).
Without an expanding public sector the unemployment level – already high – would be
even worse. Donor countries have paid the salaries of more than half of the public
servants. As a result of all of these factors the quality of leadership and
professionalization in local and even national governance suffered from nepotism,
favoritism, and the need to keep as many people employed as possible. According to the
World Bank (2007), even though international donor countries provided essential
assistance to local governments through money, training, and equipment they have failed
to force the PNA to establish a real mechanism that can vigorously combat the corruption
of fiscal policy and recruitment policies that contributed to the continued growth of the
public sector’s budget (and budget deficits). Different positions were filled with underqualified personnel, often through patronage appointments that rewarded political loyalty
(World Bank, 2007). These trends of corruption and lack of professionalism and the
negative role played by politics were confirmed by the respondents of the survey.

The majority of survey respondents agreed on the need for reorganizing the
relations between the central and local governments and the transfer of more specific
authority and autonomy to local officials. To achieve real reform and efficient
performance respondents believed that the central government must minimize the
interferences with elections and other matters. Greater efforts to eliminate corruption are
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also needed. Moreover, with the assistance of the legislative system the survey
respondents believe that the role of the legal system must regulate, monitor and supervise
the performance and the functions of the local governments and without any interference
of the central government.

The research performed indicates there is a need to reframe and reorganize the
relationship between politics and administration in the Palestinian context. The word
“Politics” is divided into two categories; internal and external. Internal politics refers
to the Palestinian politics that governs and controls relations and interactions between
the different factions. Internal politics also refers to the need to reorganize the
relationships within the central government and competing ministries and local
governments. On the other hand, external politics refers to the relations between the
PNA and the Israeli government in the West Bank and the need to reach a final
political settlement as the local administrative system has been influenced by the
partial political agreements of the Oslo Accord between the two parties.

External politics impacts local government administration in several ways. For
example, Israelis have classified all Palestinian land into three categories. Those
designated as C areas are under the complete authority of the Israeli military. This
fragmentation of Palestinian controlled territories also has had a negative impact on
the process of developing local governments and systems of governance (Al-A’raj
1996). The smaller and isolated municipalities are very weak economically and
politically and often do not have sufficient resources to pay staff salaries. The
geographic fragmentations of areas in the West Bank created by this system impose
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real challenges on the local governments to achieve solid or permanent economic
prosperity and stability and to provide decent services to its residents (ARD, 2000).
The geographic isolation strangles economic and political development in the West
Bank (World Bank, 2007). In brief, both the Israeli military occupation and the
centralized structure of the PNA including its chaotic relationship between internal
politics and the administrative system have contributed to the weak structures of local
governments in the West Bank.

8.4 Methodological Contributions

The data collected for this dissertation involved a survey of community leaders.
All researchers interested in gathering information about conditions in the West Bank and
Gaza face extraordinary challenges. These obstacles are the result of military checkpoints
and feelings of insecurity that could make people unwilling to participate in any study.
Indeed given the state of political affairs it would be reasonable for respondents to be
afraid to disclose their views and perspectives. This made the survey administration
procedures used to collect data an experiment itself.

Security conditions made it difficult to randomly select respondents. Some of
these difficulties resulted from the political confrontations between Palestinians and
Israel. Others are related to the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. As a result, any one
doing research in Palestine is working in a very a tense environment which is also hostile
to social science fieldwork and where mobility and access are limited. Respondents or
anyone who works with those engaged in research has some fear that expression of one’s
views could bring severe reactions. This effectively reduces the willingness of people to
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participate in research activities that could produce or yield findings critical of either of
the Palestinian parties or their policies and governance systems.

Moreover, free mobility is very limited as the Gaza Strip has been under a
complete siege imposed by the Israeli authorities and Egypt since Hamas won the
legislative elections in 2006. In the West Bank, citizens cannot move from one city to
another without having to pass through many Israeli checkpoints that consumes and
reduces the time they have available to respond to surveys. Another challenge for
researchers is that they sometimes must apply for special permits granted by the Israeli
authorities to access areas for which Israel remains in complete control. The inability to
receive a permit affected who did and did not participate in any survey. Moreover, the
wall built by Israel in the West Bank isolated many Palestinian villages from their urban
areas and that created additional obstacles for researchers trying to insure a valid sample
of respondents is selected from an appropriate universe.

In spite of all these challenges, questionnaires were returned by a diverse group of
185 community leaders working for 80 different organizations. The selection of these
organizations was based on their mission, goals, and the fact that each has connections
with and works directly with the public sector. Two research assistants, one in the Gaza
Strip and the second in the West Bank, distributed the survey instrument to public,
private and non-governmental organizations. The research assistants explained the goal
and content of the survey to respondents through telephone, email messages, and at a few
workshops where they tried to answer all questions related to the survey process. To
ensure confidentiality, respondents were assured that no information would be shared,
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published, or included in the dissertation that does not group all responses together
making it impossible to trace any single response to an individual. For example, the
survey instrument began with an informed consent signed by the researcher and
acknowledged the participants. The Institutional Research Review Board at Cleveland
State University approved the survey instrument.

In addition, respondents were given the choice of returning their filled surveys
through mail and email (by those who were comfortable transmitting responses in the
format). Most respondents chose a response method designed for this study that gave
greater protection to confidentiality. After completing the questionnaire respondents
sealed their surveys in an attached blank envelope and placed it in small collection device
or “mail box” that was provided to each participating agency. Their placement of the
instrument in a sealed envelope into the box provided additional protection of their
identity, and it would have even been possible for individuals to put a blank survey
instrument into the box. The research assistants sent the completed surveys to me via
international mail. The use of these procedures also means that a research method for
data collection in a hostile political environment was part of this dissertation.

The challenges associated with collecting data in the West Bank and Gaza
produces several limitations that were considered in the use of the findings. For example,
not all of the respondents had an opportunity to meet with the research assistants and
have answered their questions about the survey. As a result, different interpretations
could have been made for some questions leading to unclear or invalid responses. It is
also possible that the security protections taken might not have been seen as sufficient
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and some individuals may have preferred not to participate providing a bias in the
responses received. These limitations were considered when interpreting the results.
However, across a 60-day period the receipt of responses from more than 180 individuals
received under less than ideal circumstances provides invaluable insights into the
operation of local governments in present-day Palestine.

8.5 Recommendations

Before presenting the main recommendations to enhance local governance in
Palestine, it must be remembered that each suggestion is based on two main sources
of data. First some of the recommendations are based on the responses of the
Palestinian community leaders. Second, other recommendations are generated from
the researcher’s assessment of the historical analysis of the Palestinian administrative
system. Two sets of recommendations some for the short-term and some for longterm, were developed.

8.5.1 Short-Term Recommendations

1. The historical assessment and the respondents’ perspectives indicated that the
appointment of local government staff and mayors is dominated by politics. There
appears to be little emphasis on the professional qualities of candidates. As a
result, respondents reported that staff and mayors do not have the required
qualifications or professional experiences to manage local governments.
Professional standards need to be established for all positions and these need to
guide the appointment of administrators.
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2. Almost four-fifths of the survey respondents indicated the struggle between the
political factions is one of the major impediments to the creation of efficient
municipalities. Hence, the administrative system should be removed from the
political struggle and competition between the Palestinian political parties,
factions and groups. For example, hiring, firing and promotion in the
administrative system must be controlled by legal and professional criteria.
3. Survey respondents do not believe that local governments have a mechanism inplace to reduce corruption. To be sure, with no professionally trained
administrative class the expertise needed was in short supply and the resulting
systems had substantial and often insurmountable challenges in eliminating
corrupt practices (World Bank, 2007). Global surveys also indicated a widespread
impression that the Palestinian government lacks integrity and is not strongly
committed to stopping corruption. Palestinian business leaders noted that
corruption is the second greatest impediment to the development of public and
private sector activity and it came after the political instability and uncertainty.
Corruption cases should be investigated, scrutinized and decided upon in a legal
and transparent way by an independent ministry whose staff and leadership are
appointed through a process that insures these individuals have the skills
recognized by the international community. The government’s security forces
must also protect this ministry and its staff and its recommendations must have
the force of law.
4. To reinforce transparency policies in the administrative system whistleblowers
and members of the media should be protected from any governmental abuse by
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laws to encourage the transparency policies in all local affairs. Laws like this exist
in many other countries included the US.
5. A majority of the survey respondents indicated that laws must prohibit the
national government from dissolving local governments or postponing any local
elections or approving/denying any local budgets. The respondents also believed
local governments should be responsible for local police services and safety
rather than the national government. Such support might be attributed to the
concerns that the police are too focused on the political interests of certain
political factions (World Bank, 2006).
6. The historical assessment of the Palestinian administrative system
demonstrated that there were few if any opportunities for citizen participation.
Local governments need to begin training residents and public officials in
methods of participation to increase the connection between residents and
local governments through organizing workshops, seminars, and training
sessions.
7. Joint service delivery between governments and macro regional planning should
be reinforced and supported.
8. The MoLG established more than 300 new municipalities during 1996 (MoLG,
2004). Such a high number of municipalities may fractionate governance in a
small geographic area with less than 4 million people. Jenin with less than
200,000 residents might not need 12 local city councils. In Tulkerm, a city with
125,000 residents has 11 local city councils and there is also a Tulkerm
metropolitan municipality. There may well be too many units of government
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creating inefficiencies. There should be reduction in the number of councils and
governments and substantial authority vested in those that remain.

8.5.2 Longer Term Recommendations

To make the Palestinian administrative system successful, the national government
should begin to develop a decentralization policy designed to transfer responsibilities to
local governments and grant them the independence to perform their work. The national
government must formulate new strategies, laws, regulations, plans and programs for
developing the municipalities taking into consideration the following long-term
recommendations:

1. The judicial system should be the safety net against the central government abuse
and corruption. The judiciary branch is the cornerstone of any healthy democratic
system. Therefore, judicial review and oversight are essential in building a viable
and effective public service. To enhance and improve the role of the municipal
courts, new legislations, laws and rules should be approved by the Parliament and
must be implemented by the national government. These laws should prevent the
interference of the central government in the judicial system and reinforce
accountability.
2. Annual budgets and audits must become public documents.
3. The “third sector” has proved to be invaluable in meeting people’s demands for
services in cases when governments have failed. A healthy cooperative
relationship should be maintained between the official government bureaucracy
and the non-government sector and there should be clear policy directives
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regarding the role of non-governmental organizations in the delivery of needed
services.

8.6 Study Shortcomings

Under a more secure environment, the research could have selected a wider and
more random sample of respondents from the different areas of the West Bank and Gaza
to understand impressions and needs. Also in a more secure environment, researchers
could have met with all respondents and responded to any questions regarding the intent
of the survey to avoid misinterpretations or misunderstandings. This sort of an
environment did not exist for this study limiting the generalizations that can be inferred.
This dissertation can only initiate the assessment of adapting local government systems
imbued with policies and practices from foreign occupations and years of internal
political strife to ones that are based on indigenous cultures.

Further research, supported by the national government, is needed to evaluate the
role and the performance of local administrative system in Palestine. The next generation
of studies must focus on existing laws and the relationships between (1) the central
government and its competing ministries, (2) the relations between the national and local
governments, and (3) the relationships between units of local governments. In addition,
research is needed to review the relationships between the Palestinian domestic politics
and the administrative system so that clear procedures that emphasize professional
standards are implemented.
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8.7 Conclusion

Based on the historical assessments of the different occupying powers, the survey
results and its descriptive statistics, the study found that indigenous local governance
systems do not exist in Palestine. As a new state emerges the Palestinian national
government has the task of building an administrative system that requires a clear
understanding of indigenous systems and institutions. The institutions that now exist are
the product of (1) externally imposed systems, (2) ideas from returning expatriates, and
(3) modern management science and accepted principles of civil service. Unifying and
untangling these threads explains the difficulty the emerging new Palestinian state will
face as the Palestinian people demand and seek stable and modern governments in spaces
contested by strong political factions.
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APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

1. Instrumental Rationality: It is an important element to define modernity.
Instrumental rationality is portrayed as a technical “way of thinking and living
that emphasizes the scientific-analytical mind-set and the belief in technological
process.”
2. Central government (national government): It is the government at the level of the
nation state. Maintaining national security and exercising international diplomacy
(including the right to sign binding treaties) are usually the responsibilities of this
level of government. Basically, the central government has the power to make
laws for the whole country.
3. Governance: It makes decisions that define expectations, grant power, or verify
performance. It consists either of a separate process or of a specific part of
management or leadership processes. Sometimes people set up a government to
administer these processes and systems.
4. JSC: Joint Service Council.
5. Local governments: They are administrative offices that are smaller than a state.
The term is used to contrast with offices at nation-state level, which are referred
to as the central government, national government, or (where appropriate) federal
government. In modern nations, local governments usually have fewer powers
than national governments do. They usually have some power to raise taxes,
though these may be limited by central legislation. In some countries local
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government is partly or wholly funded by subventions from central government
taxation. The question of municipal autonomy - which powers the local
government has, or should have, and why - is a key question of public
administration and governance. The institutions of local government vary greatly
between countries, and even where similar arrangements exist, the terminology
often varies. Common names for local government entities include state,
province, region, department, county, district, city, town, municipality, and
village.
6. LGL:

Local Government Law

7. LGUs:

Local Government Units

8. Modernity: Modernity in a way that characterizes the world by “secularization,
the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, the differentiation of the
various spheres of the life-world, [and] the bureaucratization of economics.”
9. MoF:

Ministry of Finance

10. MoLG:

Ministry of Local Government

11. MoI:

Ministry of Interior

12. Oslo Accord: agreement which held in 1993 in Oslo, the capital of Norway
between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the government of Israel and
established the PNA and it intended to establish peace between Palestinian and
the government of Israel
13. PLC: Palestinian legislative council (Palestinian Parliament)
14. PNA: The Palestinian National Authority established after the Declaration of
principle between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Government of
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Israel in Oslo in 1993. The PNA ruled over West Bank and Gaza strip and it is not
state but near to self autonomy concept.
15. Questionnaire: A questionnaire is a group or sequence of questions designed to
elicit information from an informant or respondent when asked by an interviewer
or completed unaided by the respondent.
16. Survey: The word “survey” is used most often to describe a method of gathering
information from a sample of individuals. This “sample” is usually just a fraction
of the population being studied.
17. The Council: The Council of the Local committee: This includes the Municipality
Council,

Local

Council,

Village

Council,

administrative

Committee,

Development Committee or any other committee formed according to the law.
18. The Law of Local Council election 1996: law which organizes the election
process in West Bank and Gaza strip in the local level. This law issued in 1996 by
the Palestinian legislative council and approved by Chairman Arafat.
19. The Law of Local Councils 1997: The law that organizes and determines the
mission of local councils and municipalities in West Bank and Gaza strip .This
law issued in 1996 by the Palestinian Legislative Council and approved by
President Arafat.
20. WB:

World Bank

217

APPENDIX B

Questionnaire
Community Leaders’ Views of the Development of Local Governance Structures in
Palestine.
Informed Consent

Dear Respondent,
I am inviting you to participate in a research project studying the evolution and
development of local governance structures in Palestine. Part of the information needed
can only be obtained through an understanding of the views of community leaders on the
roots and evolution of existing structures. The results from this survey will be used in my
dissertation that will help me fulfill the requirements for my doctoral degree from
Cleveland State University. Along with this letter is a short questionnaire that includes a
number of questions. Your participation is important to me, but if you feel uncomfortable
in any way you should respectfully decline to answer the questions.
My study is looking at the strengths and the weaknesses of existing local
governances system and to assess its indigenous roots. The survey aims to investigate if
administrative systems have been a product of Palestinian society or if these systems
emerged as a result of the occupation of foreign governments. My hope is that this
research can contribute to the design of systems that are based on Palestinian society.
There are no foreseeable risks associated with participation in this project. All
responses will be kept confidential. As I do not ask for your names there is no way for
any response to be associated with any individual. No information will be shared that
does not group all responses together making it impossible to trace any single response to
an individual.
After completing your survey you can email it to w.alhabil@csuohio.edu or
simply seal it in the attached blank envelope and place it in the box provided. Your
placement of the instrument in a sealed envelope into the box provides additional
protection of your identity. You can also mail the survey instrument to:
Mr. I. Habil,
Field Personnel Officer, UNRWA - GFO
P.O. Box 781,
Ashkelon, Israel
The survey should take you about 20 minutes to complete. I hope you will take
the time to complete this questionnaire and return it. Your participation is voluntary and
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there is no penalty if you do not participate. Regardless of whether you choose to
participate or not, please let me know if you would like a summary of my findings. To
receive a summary, you can email me on w.alhabil@csuohio.edu.
This project has been approved by the IRB Review Board at Cleveland State
University. For further information about this study, you can contact the Principal
Investigator Dr. Mark Rosentraub at 001 (216) 687 6927 or by e-mail at
m.rosentraub@csuohio.edu, and the Co-Principal Investigator/Student, Wasim Al-Habil
at 001 (216) 376 6608 or by e-email at w.alhabil@csuohio.edu. Please understand that if
you have any questions about your rights as a research participant you can contact the
Cleveland State University Institutional Review Board at 001 (216) 687-3630 or by email at irb@csuohio.edu. After signing two copies of this letter, please keep one copy for
your records and return the other one. Thank you so much for your cooperation and
support.

Sincerely.

Wasim I. Al-Habil,
PhD Candidate,
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs,
Cleveland State University.
I have read and understood this consent form and I agree to participate in this study.
Signature: ------------------------------------------------------------Name: -----------------------------------------------------------------Date: -------------------------------------------------------------------
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Introduction:
As new countries emerge opportunities exist to mold institutions of local
governance and government to fit the unique needs of citizens. This survey is designed
to understand your perspectives on how existing local government systems evolved and
the short and longer-term changes possible to insure systems reflect the culture of the
Palestinian people. No questions are asked that seek to identify you, and answering these
questions will only take a few minutes to complete the survey. All information we will
grouped- together so that no individual’s responses can ever be identified.
Occupations’ Influence Dimension:
1. Local government institutions in Palestine have evolved through periods where the
Ottoman Empire, the British Government, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel have controlled
elements of the political, social, and economic life of Palestinians. If a 5 indicated “A
Very Strong Impact” on the definition of local governments and governance in Palestine,
and 1 indicated “No Impact,” how would you rate the historic influences of each of these
governments on the institutions that exist today in Palestine?
Government

Impact on Local Governments in Palestine Today
Very Strong Some
Unsure
Little
None
5
4
3
2
1

Ottoman Empire
British Empire
Jordan
Egypt
Israel
2. The formation of local governments in many countries has sometimes been influenced
by the experiences of residents who might have lived elsewhere. Using the same scale
where 5 is a “very strong impact” and a l means “no impact,” what would you say is the
influence of the following countries on local government as it operates today in the West
Bank?
Government
Very Strong
5

Impact on Palestine Today
Some
Unsure
Little
4
3
2

Tunisia
Lebanon
Syria
United States
Great Britain
France
Egypt
Jordan
Other European
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None
1

3. Now, thinking about Gaza, what would you say is the influence of the following
countries on local governments and governance there?
Government
Very Strong
5

Impact on Palestine Today
Some
Unsure
Little
4
3
2

None
1

Tunisia
Lebanon
Syria
United States
Great Britain
France
Egypt
Jordan
Other European
4. Technical assistance provided by different foreign governments can also help to form
local governance systems and institutions. Do you believe any technical assistance
provided anywhere in Palestine is impacting the development of local government and
governance systems?
Country/
Institution

Very Strong
5

Impact on Palestine Today
Some
Unsure
Little
4
3
2

None
1

Great Britain
France
Japan
United Nations
Germany
United States
Other European
Other Asian
Religious Groups
5. The institutions of local government are also influenced by the local culture of
residents. When you think about the local governments and the governance systems inplace right now, would you say the local culture has had:
(5) a very strong impact
(4) some impact
(3) not sure
(2) not much of an impact
(1) no impact at all
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National Government and Local Governments Dimension:
6. As countries emerge the relative power of the national government to local
governments must be established. In some systems a national government can dissolve
local governments and in others, such an action is simply prohibited. Should Palestine
implement a system where local governments can be dissolved by the national
government?
(3) Yes
(2) Unsure
(1) No
7. Some countries give the central government the authority to postpone local elections.
Is that an authority that should be granted to the Palestinian national government?
(3) Yes
(2) Unsure
(1) No
8. Should the national government of Palestine have the authority to approve and reject a
local government budget?
(3) Yes (2) Unsure (1) No
9. Should the national government has the responsibility for local police services and
safety or should that be left as much as possible to local governments?
(3) National Government Responsibility
(2) Local Government Responsibility
(1) Unsure
10. Should the national government be responsible for the administration of all elections
or should local governments oversee their own elections in accordance to laws and
regulations approved by the national government?
(3) National Government Responsibility
(2) Local Government Responsibility
(1) Unsure
11. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: residents in a local area
should have the right to vote on the formation of new local governments?
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
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12. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The criteria in voting for the
election municipal council is dominated by political factors rather than socio-economic
ones.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
Professional Dimension:
13. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The appointment of mayors of
municipality and local councils are dominated by politics.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
14. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The mayors have the
necessary academic qualifications and the professional experiences to run their local
governance.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
15. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Appointed mayors are
competent and responsible in organizing the issues of the municipalities.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
16. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Staffing of local governance
institutions is based on academic merit and professional experience.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
17. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Decentralization policy
should be implemented in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the
administrative system.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
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18. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities have the
necessary manpower and technical and professional capabilities to pursue the authorities
and fulfill responsibilities.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
Politics Dimension:
19. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Electing an independent,
well-qualified candidate is better than electing politically affiliated, well-qualified
candidate.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
20. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: To achieve real reform and
efficient performance, politics relations must be reorganized and reframed with the
administrative system.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
21. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The selection and the
appointment of mayors of local governance are based on political affiliations only.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
22. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities adopt and
apply transparency policy in running the administrative system.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
23. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Political factions’ struggle is
one of the major impediments for municipalities to be influential and efficient.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
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24. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance has a
strategic mechanism of combating corruption.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
25. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I think that PNA wants
seriously to implement the reform policy.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
26. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: PNA is imposing a
centralized policy to control and dominate the local governance institutions.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
27. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities should have
specific authorities and autonomy from the centralized government.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
Legal Dimension:
28. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The PNA’s Local
Governance Law contributes largely toward achieving an efficient and effective
performance of the administrative system.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
29. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Palestinian Legislative
Council, the Palestinian Parliament, needs to take further laws and procedures to
reinforce the transparency and the accountability policy in the local governance.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
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30. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Role of Law is weak to
implement any legislation or laws approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
31. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The national
government interferes and influences the judicial system.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
Citizenry Dimension:
32. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities and local
councils address the indigenous needs and wants of citizens.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
33. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Citizens voice is
heard in policies and regulations adopted by local governance institutions.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
34. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance
institutions have strong and efficient performance in achieving prosperity for citizens.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
35. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance
institutions have representation of civil society representatives.
(3) Agree
(2) Disagree
(1) Unsure
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General data:
♦
♦

Age: _____
Highest educational attainment:
Elementary
Secondary
Diploma
Bachelor
Master
PhD

♦ Have you lived outside of the Middle East?
1. Yes
2. No
♦ If yes, where have you lived? ____________
♦ Where did you get your degree? ____________
♦ Occupation: ____________
♦ Sector:
1. Public
2. Private
3. Others
♦ Did you participate in the presidential election?
1. Yes
2. No
♦ Did you participate in the local governance election? 1. Yes
2. No
♦ Have you heard about the code of the local government and municipalities?
1. Yes
2. No, not concerned 3. No, but I am concerned
4. No opinion
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